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Summary 
 
 
Electricity production and consumption are at the heart of modern life and are therefore of 
great interest to public policy. Threats such as security of supply concerns, the volatility of 
fuel and electricity prices, and especially environmental concerns like climate change, are 
putting increasing pressure on current electricity systems. One key response by 
governments has been support for innovation. It is widely acknowledged that electricity 
systems will have to change fundamentally in order to deliver on political goals. This will 
require deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. Incremental change along established 
technological trajectories is unlikely to be sufficient. Instead ‘system innovations’ have 
been suggested as a solution by scholars and policy makers. What are the politics of such 
an endeavour? 
 
To answer this question this thesis looks at two distinct policy initiatives to promote more 
sustainable electricity systems: the ‘Energy Transition’ project in the Netherlands and the 
‘Carbon Trust’ in the UK. While the aim of the two policy initiatives is similar, they try to 
tackle the challenge in very different ways. The analysis is based on semi-structured 
interviews as well as a review of documents and secondary literature and follows a process 
tracing method, combining within-case and cross-case analysis. By utilising a framework 
based on ‘discursive institutionalism’ (as per Hajer and Schmidt) the study aims to shed 
light on the importance of both discourses and institutional contexts in shaping policy 
initiatives to promote ‘system innovations’. It demonstrates the mechanisms by which 
particular framings of the problem, expressed through new storylines, come to legitimate 
particular government policies. It emerges that existing institutions not only shape which 
storylines are politically acceptable but also constitute tangible features of the 
organisational and technical environment which those initiatives must change. In 
conclusion, the thesis argues that the politics of governing ‘system innovations’ can 
usefully be conceptualised and explained by struggles about meaning. These are shaped in 
turn through discursive interactions between actors as well as existing institutions. By 
highlighting the interplay between discourses, interests and institutions, the results provide 
an input to scholarly debate and policy making alike, in ways that offer to help inform the 
rethinking of strategies for fostering socio-technical ‘system innovations’. 
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1 Introduction: The challenge of transforming electricity 
systems into more sustainable configurations 
 
This thesis analyses two policy initiatives aimed at sustainable transformations in socio-
technical systems: the ‘Energy Transition’ in the Netherlands and the ‘Carbon Trust’ in the 
UK. In studying the governance of aspiring sustainable transformations, the thesis draws 
upon science and technology studies and political science, and is intended for those 
audiences, as well as being of interest to policy makers and stakeholders concerned about 
sustainable transformations. 
 
This introductory chapter will discuss the attention given to large-scale, long-term 
structural change in socio-economic systems by scholars as well as policy makers interested 
in sustainability. Such ‘system innovations’ are interesting because they might offer 
inherently more environmentally benign systems. The focus is on one particular type of 
such system: electricity. The chapter explains why electricity systems are considered to be 
in need of fundamental change, how fostering innovation has been a key response to 
climate change and why a focus on technological innovation alone is insufficient. It then 
adopts the broader notion of ‘system innovations’ and discusses two policy approaches 
designed to stimulate such broader changes. It concludes by outlining the research 
questions that this thesis will answer. 
 
 
1.1 Electricity systems: in need of change 
 
Electricity is a key part of life in modern societies. It underpins numerous everyday 
activities from cooking to leisure activities, it powers manufacturing processes, enables all 
modern information and communication technology applications and is universally 
available in developed countries. Electricity has come to be taken for granted in 
industrialised societies (see Patterson 1999; Hofman 2005; Scrase, Wang et al. 2009). It has 
transformed the way people live: “In only a century, electric light and the systems that 
provide it have altered the course of human history. Electric light, electric motors, 
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electronics and other manifestations of electricity make modern industrial society possible” 
(Patterson 1999: 1). 
 
Over the last decade, however, it has become widely acknowledged by researchers, policy 
makers and stakeholders that electricity systems1 need to change substantially to cope with 
a number of challenges. Threats concerning security of supply, the volatility of gas, oil and 
electricity prices and especially environmental concerns about carbon dioxide emissions 
causing climate change are placing current electricity systems under serious pressure. 
 
Policy makers are concerned about the increasing dependency of many OECD countries on 
imports of oil and gas from a few “politically unstable countries with undemocratic 
constitutions” (Müller-Kraenner 2008: 1), predominantly in the Middle East, Central Asia 
and Russia. The UK, for example, is developing a portfolio of policy initiatives to avoid 
dependency on particular nations in order to ensure it can retain independence in its foreign 
policy (Wicks 2009). It is often hoped that a “shift toward low-GHG power generation 
could both ease energy security concerns and reduce GHG emissions in this sector” 
(WBCSD 2007: 13). The reliability of domestic natural gas infrastructure is also a 
particular concern in the UK (Stern 2004). 
 
While energy security concerns are often about the physical availability of for example oil 
or natural gas, there is also an economic issue in terms of the volatility of fossil fuel prices. 
There are a growing number of uncertainties about oil and gas imports in terms of both 
quantity and price. This volatility is of concern because, as Awerbuch and Sauter have 
pointed out, “oil price increases and volatility dampen macroeconomic growth by raising 
inflation and unemployment and by depressing the value of financial and other assets” 
(Awerbuch and Sauter 2006: 2805). They argue that an increased reliance on renewable 
energy technologies helps to decrease significant GDP losses due to the effects of this price 
volatility.  
 
                                                 
1 I loosely define the electricity system as the infrastructure (physical as well as governing rules) and the 
actors who enable the supply and demand of electricity in a defined geographical space, e.g. a country. 
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Climate change is one of the most pressing environmental problems of our times and has 
attracted enormous worldwide public and policy attention over recent years. Carbon 
dioxide emissions from electricity generation are a major contributor to climate change. 
According to the Stern report, electricity generation contributes about 24% of worldwide 
GHG emissions (Stern 2006b). As the Royal Society has argued recently, one urgent 
priority for immediate action is therefore to decarbonise electricity supply (Royal Society 
2009). 
 
These challenges are widely acknowledged by stakeholders such as the European 
Renewable Energy Council and Greenpeace (EREC and Greenpeace 2008), business actors 
such as the World Business Council on Sustainable Development or the World Energy 
Council (WBCSD 2007; World Energy Council 2007) as well as academics (e.g. Reiche 
and Bechberger 2006; Patterson 2007; Mitchell 2008; Scrase and MacKerron 2009).  
 
While the above-cited sources may emphasise different reasons with varying degrees of 
importance, the overall picture is that there is a strong and widely shared understanding that 
electricity systems need to change substantially over the coming decades. Furthermore, 
policy makers increasingly accept that energy systems have to change dramatically if they 
are to deliver desired political goals for deep cuts in carbon emissions in the magnitude of 
60 or 80%, and that electricity supply and demand will have to play a key role in this. 
Electricity generation is one of the main sources of carbon emissions and thus the 
‘greening’ of electricity supply has been at the heart of governments’ responses to climate 
change. 
 
The following section will detail the particular emphasis that is put on innovation and 
technological change to tackle climate change by ‘greening’ electricity supply and demand. 
 
1.2 Innovation, technology and climate change 
 
Fostering innovation is a key policy response in mitigating climate change and making 
electricity systems more sustainable. As part of the International Panel on Climate 
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Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment report in 2007, working group III in their report on 
Mitigation of Climate Change emphasised that:  
“The cost and pace of any response to climate change concerns will also 
depend critically on the cost, performance, and availability of technologies 
that can lower emissions in the future. These technologies include both 
end-use (demand) as well as production (supply) technologies. 
Technological change is particularly important over the long time scales 
characteristic of climate change” (IPCC 2007a: 147). 
 
The report argues that because of two related market failures government policies need to 
play an important role in stimulating technology development and diffusion. The first 
market failure is that firms are often unable to appropriate the benefits of technology 
development because of spillover effects, which leads to underinvestment in R&D from the 
private sector. The second is the failure to sufficiently internalise the social costs of carbon 
emissions into market prices, which reduces the demand for low carbon technologies and 
thereby also reduces private sector investments (see for example Foxon 2003; IPCC 2007a; 
Watson 2009). The IPCC argues that to stabilise carbon emissions a portfolio of 
technologies needs to be developed and commercialised through appropriate and effective 
incentives for the “development, acquisition, deployment and diffusion of technologies and 
for addressing related barriers” (IPCC 2007b: 16). 
 
Also, the widely cited Stern review on the economics of climate change notes that because 
of the above-mentioned market failures there is:  
“a strong case for supporting the development of new and existing low-
carbon technologies, particularly in a number of key climate change 
sectors. The power of market forces is the key driver of innovation and 
technical change but this role should be supplemented with direct public 
support for R&D and, in some sectors, policies designed to create new 
markets. Such policies are required to deliver an effective portfolio of low-
carbon technologies in the future” (Stern 2006a: 373). 
 
Similarly, despite generally being in favour of non-intervention and market-based 
instruments, the IEA also argued recently for government leadership in fostering innovation 
and deployment of new energy technologies to address climate change. It advocated a 
coherent technology strategy supported by a mix of policies to stimulate research, 
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development, demonstration and deployment in line with energy policy objectives (IEA 
2007: 176). 
 
Technological change and innovation is believed to play a major role in tackling long-term 
carbon emission reduction targets because “[t]echnological change supports all the hopes 
for painless reduction in GHG emissions” (Thalmann 2007: 5263). Technological change is 
seen as a possibility for decoupling economic growth from fossil fuel emissions. 
Technology is also hoped to make achieving emission reduction targets cheaper: 
“Achieving deep reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at acceptable social costs 
will involve far-reaching technological change in the energy and in other sectors” (Grubb 
2005: 103). Pacala and Socolow have argued that the widespread deployment of a portfolio 
of existing technologies could solve climate change (2004). 
 
It is also hoped that technological change and innovation will contribute to policy goals 
other than tackling climate change, e.g. increasing security of supply. In their introduction 
to a recently edited book Innovation for a Low Carbon Economy, Foxon et al. point out that 
“[i]nnovation in energy systems will provide a core contribution to achieving national and 
international energy policy goals, including energy security and long-term reductions in 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions” (2008: 1). Others agree that “technology is generally 
viewed as the answer to many energy challenges – supply, security, environmental 
stewardship” (Kenderdine and Moniz 2005: 425). 
 
Policy documents often stress that innovation and technological change is important in 
tackling climate change. For example the UK 2007 White Paper on energy policy 
postulates that: 
“Our move to a secure and low carbon economy requires the development 
of technologies, products and processes to reduce the carbon emissions 
from energy. We need to harness cleaner sources of energy, such as wind, 
waves and tides, and find ways to decarbonise fossil fuels, including 
through more efficient production and use. We also need skilled people to 
develop, install and operate these technologies. Without these 
developments we will be unable to meet our carbon reduction goals and 
we will have fewer sources of energy to rely on within our energy mix” 
(DTI 2007: 216). 
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The US Government also acknowledged the need for technological innovation in tackling 
climate change as part of the 2005 Climate Change Technology Programme: 
“Given sufficient effort, time and motivation, aided by visionary 
leadership, international cooperation, and well-guided research, 
technological innovations could contribute significantly to this long-term 
objective [significantly reducing GHG emissions], and at the same time 
promote global economic development and prosperity. Analyses 
documented in the literature show that accelerated advances in technology 
have the potential, under certain assumptions, to significantly reduce the 
cost of mitigation over the course of the 21st century, compared to what 
would otherwise be the case with usual advances in technology. These 
technologies will create many new opportunities for both reducing GHG 
emissions and promoting economic growth” (U.S. Department of Energy 
2005: 9). 
 
Even the US Government, which did not in the past show substantial commitment to 
climate change targets, acknowledged the importance of innovation as a way to promote 
economic growth and reduce GHG emissions at lower costs. Along similar lines the 
German Government sees policy support for innovation, market diffusion and the 
international availability of new technologies as a central response to rising carbon 
emissions (BMU and BMBF 2008: 46). The German Government also emphasises that 
only innovation allows the possibility of combining economic growth with climate and 
environmental protection. 
 
The discussion above shows that technology as a solution to climate change has become a 
commonplace in the literature on climate mitigation policy as well as in policy documents. 
Innovation will advance these technologies. But what exactly do we mean when we say that 
innovation is important? The following section will clarify how innovation can be defined 
and will differentiate between different types of innovation. 
 
1.2.1 Innovation: more than new products and processes 
 
Innovation in a broad sense can be understood to refer to “the production, diffusion and use 
of new and economically useful knowledge” (Foxon, Kohler et al. 2008). Innovation is 
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often understood as the development of new products or processes at the firm level (see e.g. 
Tidd, Bessant et al. 2005). However, scholars have also distinguished between several 
forms of innovation which differ according to their ‘radicalness’, type and scope. In their 
taxonomy of kinds of innovations Freeman and Perez (1988) distinguish between:  
(1) Incremental innovations (improved products and services, which do not usually 
come about through deliberate R&D activity but through ‘learning by doing’ and 
‘learning by using’; incremental innovations rely on continuous innovation); 
(2) Radical innovations (which are radically new and thus discontinuous and often 
combine product, process and organisational innovations; usually result from 
deliberate R&D efforts);  
(3) Changes of ‘technology system’ (“far-reaching changes in technology, affecting 
several branches of the economy, as well as giving rise to entirely new sectors. They 
are based on a combination of radical and incremental innovations, together with 
organisational and managerial innovations affecting more than one or a few firms”, 
p. 46; they are technically and economically interrelated), and 
(4) Changes in ‘techno-economic paradigm’ (a new technology system or a number of 
technology systems which have pervasive effects throughout the whole economy; 
entail transformation of social and institutional framework; combination of 
interrelated product, process, technical, organisational and managerial innovations; 
“deep structural change in the economy”, p. 59). 
 
This taxonomy is useful as it helps to distinguish between different types of innovation and 
thus helps to overcome the focus on firm-level processes of innovation or particular product 
innovations. Freeman pointed out that attention needs to be focussed on not only individual 
firms, innovations or products but on  
“clusters of related innovations with a potential to affect a very broad 
range of products and processes and even the economy as a whole, such as 
electricity… The concern here is with the complementarities and 
externalities of families of interrelated technical, organisational and social 
innovations and with the rigidities of the built and institutional 
environments and established technological systems” (Freeman 1992: 132).  
 
This perspective on innovation broadens the focus of the discussion above where most 
contributions pointed to the need for specific technological innovations and thus 
underplayed or did not distinguish between many of the different forms of innovation 
pointed to by Freeman and Perez. Different types of policy are likely to be needed to 
support different types of innovation, e.g. changes of technology systems might require 
support for R&D and coordination of actors as well as creating market signals. 
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1.2.2 ‘System innovations’ 
 
There has been a tendency in science, technology and innovation studies more broadly to 
go beyond the firm and the sectoral level of analysis. Socio-technical systems have become 
a focal unit of analysis (Smith, Stirling et al. 2005). Focussing on systems recognises that 
firms and technologies are embedded within wider social and economic systems. Central to 
a socio-technical system is the provision of a societal function such as transportation, 
housing or heating. These systems can be defined as “the linkages between elements 
necessary to fulfil societal functions” (Geels 2004a: 900). Socio-technical systems are 
conceptualised as clusters of aligned elements, such as technical artefacts, knowledge, 
markets, regulation, policies, cultural meaning, rules, infrastructure, etc (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: The socio-technical system for electricity provision and use 
 
Source: (Hofman 2005: 74) 
 
Change in such systems is based on mechanisms of co-evolution in society and technology 
(see e.g. Geels 2004a). This literature investigates how change in socio-technical systems 
occurs: the patterns and dynamics which may lead to ‘system innovations’, meaning 
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structural transformations of these systems (Rip and Kemp 1998; Geels 2004a; 2004b; 
2005a; 2005b). A “system innovation can be understood as a change from one socio-
technical system to another” (Geels 2004b: 19). 
 
The concept of ‘system innovation’ in socio-technical systems seems to fall somewhere 
between category 3 and 4 of Freeman and Perez’s taxonomy cited above: it includes far-
reaching changes in technology and might give rise to new sectors; includes technical, 
organisational and managerial innovations, both radical and incremental; affects more than 
a few firms; includes social and institutional change but does not necessarily transform the 
whole economy: rather it transforms the way in which a certain socio-technical system 
fulfils societal needs. The focus of the ‘system innovation’ concepts is wider in that it 
focuses on not only the economy and firms but also on other societal actors (users, NGOs, 
public authorities, research institutes) (Geels 2004a). This is important as it has been 
claimed that multiple actors are involved in ‘system innovations’ through interactions 
between firms, suppliers, universities and knowledge institutes, public authorities, interest 
groups and users (Geels, Elzen et al. 2004: 5). 
 
Recent thinking on system-level developments presents an alluring potential solution to 
problems of sustainability. Scholars interested in sustainable development have 
fundamentally questioned whether incremental change along established technological 
trajectories will be sufficient to meet such goals or whether ‘system innovations’ will be 
needed (Kemp 1994; Berkhout 2002; Unruh 2002; Geels, Elzen et al. 2004; Jänicke 2004; 
Weber 2005; Tukker and Butter 2007). A variety of scholars have convincingly argued that 
structural change is necessary: “It is not marginal or incremental changes that are needed 
for sustainability, but rather major product, process, and system transformations” (Ashford 
2005: 159). Foxon (2003) has argued that policy needs to address system failures (meaning 
structural and institutional barriers) rather than only market failures if the long-term carbon 
emission reduction targets of the UK 2001 White Paper goals are to be met. Based on a 
review of the innovation systems literature he argues that policies to correct market failures 
do not address ‘system failures’ in the energy innovation system for low carbon 
technologies. His review points out that the evidence showed that learning beyond market 
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transactions and prices is important, that innovation is often a networked activity between 
users, producers and technology developers, and that the institutional set-up is important. 
This thinking is thus very much in line with calls for ‘system innovations’.  
 
In particular, the transition to a low carbon economy will also require “far-reaching changes 
in the institutions, processes, priorities and substance of policymaking” (Scrase, Wang et al. 
2009). A low carbon economy is not just about technological fixes: the wider political, 
economic and social context also needs to be addressed, as the Royal Society has recently 
argued (Royal Society 2009). The challenge for policy is to transform socio-technical 
systems into more sustainable configurations (Berkhout 2002). 
 
If such ‘system innovations’ to make electricity more sustainable are the normative policy 
goal, how then do governments engage with this challenge? 
 
 
1.2.3 Policy approaches to foster innovation 
 
Below, a number of policy approaches which have been used to foster innovation will be 
discussed. These approaches are not of course mutually exclusive and in reality a mixture 
of these approaches has often been used. They are treated separately for reasons of 
analytical clarity.  
 
 
- regulatory approaches 
 
Governments have used regulatory instruments to either phase out certain polluting 
products or activities or to set certain minimum standards (e.g. best available technology) to 
influence the environmental impacts of products and production processes. Other 
regulatory instruments set minimum quality levels for specific media (e.g. air, water, waste 
regulation). One point of critique about traditional ‘command and control’ regulation has 
been that it proved inflexible and costly, underutilised economic instruments and focussed 
on end-of-pipe technologies rather than on cleaner technologies (Ashford 2005). Others 
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point out that the main shortcomings of direct regulation from the perspective of 
stimulating industrial transformation are that those policies shift pollution from one media 
to another rather than eliminating pollution, constrain innovations and reinforce an 
adversarial relationship between public, private and non-profit actors (de Bruijn and 
Norberg-Bohm 2005). 
 
However, recent literature on environmental innovation policy has highlighted the role of 
governments in stimulating clean(er) innovations beyond traditional regulatory approaches: 
there is a large literature by ecological modernisation theorists who share the assumption 
that it is possible to reconcile economic development and environmental improvement by 
technological innovations (Hajer 1995; Cohen 1997; Weale 1998; Mol 2000; Murphy and 
Gouldson 2000; Mol 2003; Jänicke 2004; Sutton 2004; Jänicke and Jacob 2005; Cohen 
2006). These scholars have studied the innovation and diffusion of marketable clean(er) 
technologies and have identified obstacles, such as market failures, which need to be 
addressed by government interventions.  
 
It has been argued that ‘smart regulation’ is a key driving force behind environmental 
innovations by creating or supporting markets for domestic industries. Most famously, 
Porter argued that well-designed regulation might lead to innovation and increased 
competitiveness (Porter and van der Linde 1995). For example, dynamic energy-efficiency 
standards, as in Japan’s Top Runner Programme, “seems to be the most advanced and 
sophisticated approach to ‘ecological modernisation’” (Jänicke 2008: 560). In this 
programme, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry regulates 21 energy-
consuming products and the ‘top runner’ in energy efficiency subsequently becomes the 
basis for the next mandatory standard for national producers and importers in a certain 
target year. Before this deadline a ‘naming and shaming’ approach is used to incentivise 
laggards. Jänicke claims that the fulfilment of the standards is generally very positive and 
that producers confirmed increased competitiveness of their products. It has been argued 
that such regulatory measures can lead to first-mover advantages and create lead markets 
(Jänicke 2005a).  
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However, there is a discussion in the literature more broadly as to whether regulation leads 
to radical or ‘really new’ innovation or just to incremental improvements (Beerepoot and 
Beerepoot 2007). The IPCC points out that regulation and standards “may not induce 
innovations and more advanced technologies” (IPCC 2007b: 19)2. More importantly, this 
approach focuses on individual clean(er) technologies or processes, not whole systems. 
Indeed, even proponents of ecological modernisation policies admit that this policy 
approach reaches its limits when it comes to structural change (Jänicke 2004).  
 
 
 
- market-based approaches to foster innovation 
 
Market-based approaches rely on providing economic incentives for entrepreneurs, and 
supportive institutional frameworks (e.g. IP protection) as well as incentives for consumers 
to make the ‘right’ consumption choices. A key element in decarbonising the electricity 
supply using market-based instruments is the EU emissions trading scheme which tries to 
incorporate the social costs of carbon emissions into fossil fuel generated electricity and 
thus address one of the market failures mentioned above. However, it has been criticised in 
that:  
“getting the prices right will help, but it will only address market 
imperfections, not the fact that for some problems, such as global warming, 
even a perfectly working market is insufficient to address the problem – 
because of both the disparate time horizons over which present costs and 
future benefits are distributed, and because equity concerns are not 
adequately reflected in market decisions” (Ashford 2005: 162). 
 
Reviews of current UK policy have suggested a more active role for the government in the 
development and deployment of low carbon technologies. Although generally commending 
the UK on its commitment to non-intervention and the use of market-based instruments, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), in its last review of UK energy policy, criticised the 
fact that 
“the market-based policies have not ensured innovation and deployment of new 
energy technologies to address the long-term challenges facing the UK. Within 
                                                 
2 Nevertheless, such instruments are useful as they help the diffusion and adoption of new technologies. 
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existing frameworks, market actors have tended to pick mature cost-effective 
energy technologies like CCGT, landfill gas and wind” (IEA 2007: 176). 
Market approaches are thus important in incorporating the social costs of carbon into 
decision-making processes but are not on their own sufficient for achieving more 
sustainable electricity systems. 
 
 
 
- target approach  
 
This approach to fostering innovation relies mainly on setting ambitious targets to increase 
commitment by stakeholders and the government to achieving, for example, lower 
emissions over a specified time period. One recent example is the Climate Change Act in 
the UK, which stipulates that carbon emissions need to be cut by 80% from 1990 levels by 
2050. It is hoped that innovation will contribute substantially to this goal (DEFRA 2007). 
On the international level the Kyoto protocol has a similar function in setting future 
emissions targets, although the time horizon is much more limited. The IPCC argued that 
the emissions-based targets are hoped to induce long-term technology innovation based on 
two effects:  
“The first is that the anticipation of future targets, based on a so-called 
announcement effect, will stimulate firms to invest in research and 
development and ultimately to invest in advanced, currently non-
commercial technology (the credibility and effectiveness of this effect, 
however, being challenged by Montgomery and Smith, 2005). The second 
is that early investment, perhaps through incentives, mandates, or 
government procurement programmes, will initiate a cycle of learning-by-
doing that will ultimately promote innovation in the form of continuous 
improvement, which will drive down the cost of future investments in 
these technologies” (IPCC 2007a: 157). 
 
One example of a concrete instrument using a target approach is the renewables obligation 
in the UK, which puts an obligation on electricity suppliers to source a certain percentage 
of their electricity from renewable energy (Turkenburg 2002; Mitchell and Connor 2004). 
This instrument is also linked to market-based instruments in that the obligations are 
tradable. 
 
14 
 
The target approach puts pressure on firms and policy makers to think long term and to put 
in place measures for achieving these long-term aims. However, the targets approach does 
not automatically lead to policy instruments capable of doing this and near-term targets in 
particular might often be tackled with existing instruments, fostering incremental 
technological innovation (e.g. increasing energy efficiency or deployment of the most 
mature renewables technologies) instead of broader, structural change in socio-technical 
systems.  
 
 
- public RD&D funding and subsidies 
 
Governments have long played a role in stimulating innovation by public RD&D spending 
as well as subsidising the diffusion of new technologies. This can take the form of grants, 
tax incentives or other means to stimulate private investment in RD&D. Diffusion of 
desired technologies has been subsidised, for example by providing tax credits and direct 
subsidies or providing premium prices, e.g. through feed-in tariffs. The IPCC confirms that 
“RD&D can stimulate technological advances, reduce costs, and enable progress toward 
stabilization” (IPCC 2007b: 19). The analysis of RD&D policy is an established and 
advanced field of study. Within this literature there is a major rift between technology-push 
and demand-pull approaches (Grubb 2005) and there is a divergence of views on “whether 
existing technologies are sufficient to tackle climate change or whether a major increase in 
R&D is necessary (IPCC 2007a: 148). Some scholars have argued that the technologies to 
solve the greenhouse gas emissions problem are available (Pacala and Socolow 2004) but 
that they need to diffuse more, thereby restructuring existing systems, lifestyles and 
institutions. Also, the former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair was recently cited as saying 
that ‘practical policy making’ was now needed if the fight against global warming was to 
be effective and that technological solutions to climate change were ‘well within our grasp’ 
and that only political will was needed to implement them (Harrabin 2009).  
 
While dedicated RD&D policy is certainly central to fostering innovation for more 
sustainable electricity systems, it will not on its own lead to ‘system innovations’ because it 
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is too focussed on marketable, technological innovations and neglects necessary changes in 
infrastructures, institutions, policy, and lifestyle changes. 
 
All of these approaches are important and might stimulate incremental and radical 
technological innovations but they are not sufficient to bring about ‘system innovations’ in 
electricity.  
 
 
1.2.4 Possible policy approaches to foster ‘system innovations’ 
 
The increased academic attention given to understanding ‘system innovation’ processes has 
also led to a policy recognition that systemic changes need to happen in electricity systems. 
As claims about the need for systemic change have been increasingly accepted by policy 
makers, debates in technology policy have partly shifted towards considering “how 
governments can catalyse fundamental system-wide change” (Lovell 2007: 35). Very 
recently, policy makers have begun experimenting with policies to foster ‘system 
innovation’ more explicitly. Two such approaches are discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
- ‘structural change in the market’ 
 
In the UK 2000 Climate Change Programme the Department for Environment, Transport 
and the Regions (DETR) described its philosophy for making the transformation to a low 
carbon economy: 
“The Government and the devolved administrations cannot predict how 
technology will develop over the coming decades, nor are they best placed 
to do so. But they can set out the long term goal, offer incentives to 
change, support the development and introduction of some new 
technologies, and help organisations to anticipate and start adapting to 
longer term developments. An increasing number of studies are trying to 
explore how processes and lifestyles might change. We need to build 
consensus about the need for change, the priorities and action that can be 
taken to achieve the optimum rate of change and minimize uncertainty and 
costs both for business and consumers” (DETR 2000: 29). 
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The programme acknowledges that major structural changes in the supply and patterns and 
methods of energy consumption will be required to make the transition to a low carbon 
economy. It is argued that this new philosophy is put into practice through the Carbon Trust, 
“to deliver an integrated programme of support to accelerate the take up of 
low carbon technologies and other energy saving measures, and help 
business to prepare for a low carbon future through education and training, 
and strategic research and development” (DETR 2000: 71). 
 
These quotes indicate that Government thinking goes beyond technologies to also include 
‘soft factors’ such as incentives, organisational strategies, education, training, and changes 
in lifestyles. The need for fundamental change is also emphasised in the DEFRA and DTI 
policy document Changing Patterns: 
“Changes in behaviour from producers and consumers are clearly 
important, but some structural change in the market [emphasis added by 
FK] itself is also required to encourage more sustainable patterns of 
consumption and production. This means stimulating innovation in 
technologies, markets and behaviour, so that the choices on offer from the 
market make it easier to take the more sustainable option... In the fields of 
energy and transport, the Government is looking at what system and 
infrastructure innovations may be required to move to a more sustainable 
future” (DEFRA and DTI 2003: 28). 
 
DEFRA has thus clearly acknowledged that structural change in markets, systems, 
behaviours and infrastructures is required to encourage more sustainable production and 
consumption patterns. This understanding comes very close to what has been described as 
‘system innovations’ above, as technological innovation is understood to be embedded in a 
wider societal system. The Carbon Trust (CT) is the key policy initiative for fostering 
innovation to make the transition to a low carbon economy in the UK. The then Prime 
Minister Tony Blair announced that the CT would “take the lead on low carbon technology 
and innovation in this country, and put Britain in the lead internationally” (cited in: Carbon 
Trust 2003: 44). The IEA referred to the Carbon Trust as “one of the major government 
initiatives to curb emissions” (IEA 2004b: 352). Patricia Hewitt, then DTI Minister of State, 
praised the Carbon Trust as a ‘ground breaking’ initiative bringing together “for the first 
time in Europe – a fully integrated programme of incentives worth up to £150 million 
annually on low carbon technology and business energy efficiency” (Hansard, written 
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answers text for Monday 19 Mar 2001, Volume No. 365, Part No. 54). Other initiatives 
such as the Technology Strategy Board and the Energy Technology Institute etc. were set 
up much later and have a narrower remit. In contrast, the CT is based on an integrated, 
long-term approach working across different sectors (DETR 2000). The remit of the 
Carbon Trust has been defined as “accelerating the move to a low carbon economy” 
(Carbon Trust 2007a: 3) and is thus not limited to technology development and deployment 
although this is a key part of its mission. The IEA stressed that the CT will consider not 
only commercial and technological factors but also wider socio-economic factors hindering 
the move towards a low carbon economy (IEA 2002: 53).  
 
 
 
- deliberate steering of ‘system innovations’ through transition management 
 
A very explicit approach for steering ‘system innovations’ towards sustainability has 
emerged in the Netherlands. To some extent this approach combines some of the 
instruments discussed earlier, but it adds new features and a different steering philosophy. 
Transition management (TM) aims at influencing structural change in socio-technical 
systems alongside system optimisation by a set of coherent interventions (Rotmans, Kemp 
et al. 2001b; Kemp and Rotmans 2004; Loorbach and Rotmans 2006). The policy model 
was developed to tackle persistent, structural problems of unsustainability unsolved by 
traditional short-term policy approaches in systems such as energy, construction, mobility 
or agriculture (Loorbach 2007). The basic idea of transition management is that processes 
of change in a complex society cannot be controlled, but that it is possible to influence the 
speed and direction of the structural processes of change. 
 
The ideas informing TM are based on a multi-level perspective on ‘system innovations’ 
(Geels 2004a: 914). Based on historical case studies Geels distinguishes between niche, 
regime and landscape level. The landscape level comprises slowly changing external 
factors such as climate change, which influence the development of the energy system but 
are beyond the control of individual actors. The current fossil-fuel based energy regime is 
characterised by a dominant configuration of certain technological artefacts, institutions, 
networks, user practices, market structures, regulatory frameworks, cultural meanings and 
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scientific knowledge. Regimes are thought to be relatively stable configurations (Rip and 
Kemp 1998). Their alignment provides stability for technological development. The 
downside of this stability has been termed ‘lock-in’ (Unruh 2000) or ‘entrapment’ (Walker 
2000). In general, the literature on change in technological regimes has put emphasis on 
change along these existing (incremental) trajectories (Berkhout 2002). On the niche level 
new energy practices and technological innovations such as renewable energy technologies 
emerge in protected spaces or market niches, evolve over time and may possibly start to 
compete with the dominant regime and eventually ‘overturn’ it. ‘System innovations’ occur 
through interactions between developments on all three levels. 
 
In the TM model, positive visions of the future play an important role in outlining long-
term goals and in developing pathways along which those goals can be achieved. The 
model suggests bypassing existing (possibly captured) policy networks by establishing so-
called transition arenas. These public–private networks with a focus on frontrunners are 
hoped to overcome lock-in in existing systems by engaging diverse societal actors in a 
reflexive and deliberative learning process. The model suggests conducting ‘transition 
experiments’ to learn about and test alternative energy practices and technologies. The 
authors suggest, for example, instruments such as taxes to create a ‘more level playing 
field’ in which different practices and technologies compete (Kemp and Rotmans 2004: 
152). Policy prescriptions based on transition theory include the following activities: to 
create (market) niches for sustainable innovations (Hoogma, Kemp et al. 2002; 
Hisschemoller, Bode et al. 2006), to put the existing regime under pressure through ‘control 
policies’ (Kemp and Rotmans 2004: 164), and to guide the general direction of the process, 
for example through visioning and backcasting exercises involving stakeholders (Rotmans, 
Kemp et al. 2001b; Quist and Vergragt 2004). The policy prescription of TM will be 
discussed in more detail in sections 2.1 and 4.3. 
 
 
As scholars and policy makers have shifted their attention towards ‘system innovations’ as 
a possible solution to problems of unsustainability, empirical analysis of policy initiatives 
which are aimed at ‘system innovations’ is a new and worthwhile field of research.  
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1.2.5 The neglected politics of governing electricity ‘system innovations’ 
 
As has been argued above, ‘system innovations’ are interesting from a normative point of 
view as they may offer environmental benefits through the development of new systems 
that are inherently more environmentally benign (Kemp and Rotmans 2004: 138). However, 
electricity infrastructures have been characterised as socio-technical systems dominated by 
a particular complex configuration of technological artefacts, user practices, market 
structures, rules, regulatory regimes and scientific knowledge, which only changes slowly 
over time and can be difficult to steer. The problems of current electricity systems are 
deeply rooted in these complex societal structures. Overcoming mechanisms variously 
referred to as ‘momentum’ (Hughes 1983), ‘entrapment’ (Walker 2000), or ‘carbon lock-in’ 
(Unruh 2002) is no easy task. As a result, it is notoriously difficult to achieve a shifting of 
development trajectories in this domain. 
 
Policy scholars have cautioned that solving environmental problems entails differing 
degrees of difficulty: “Where a relatively inexpensive technological fix is not possible and 
solutions may require major behavioural change and/or social or economic restructuring, 
political will and public interest begin to wane” (Connelly and Smith 2003: 132). Jänicke 
and Jacob argue that for “certain environmental problems there is, indeed, the necessity of a 
structural change, e.g. the phasing out of nuclear energy or lignite coal, which cannot be 
effected via market mechanisms” (Jänicke and Jacob 2005: 177). They argue that structural 
change3 requires huge political endeavour and is therefore possible only in exceptional 
circumstances. With regard to climate change, as far back as the 1990s, commentators 
argued that “limiting emissions is not just a matter of technology and costs, but of culture, 
institutions and politics in the broadest sense” (Grubb, Rayner et al. 1991: 911). 
 
The field of governing socio-technical change is therefore an important area of study for 
scholars interested in sustainable development. Meadowcroft claims that  
“the transformation of existing technological systems is critical to addressing 
contemporary environmental problems – such as human-induced climate 
                                                 
3 In this context they see structural change as the decrease of an industry in its core technologies. 
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change – and understanding how such a transformation can be brought about 
constitutes an important challenge” (2005: 479).  
 
This thesis argues that this is particularly true for the challenge of transforming electricity 
systems towards more sustainable configurations. Far from being an obvious process of 
‘managing’ a system towards some unanimously agreed sustainable end point, the call for 
‘system innovations’ is not only a technological but also a political challenge. If this is the 
case, we need to look at the politics of policy initiatives aimed at fostering such wide-
ranging change. 
 
 
1.3 Research Question of this thesis 
 
As derived from the considerations outlined above, the overall research question of this 
thesis is: 
 
What are the politics of policy initiatives to stimulate ‘system innovations’ towards more 
sustainable electricity systems? 
 
To answer this research question the thesis will focus on two specific initiatives in the 
Netherlands and the UK. Both countries have ambitious long-term goals to transform their 
electricity systems and have set up dedicated policy initiatives to support this 
transformation. 
 
The overall research question will be approached by answering a number of more specific 
supporting research questions: 
 
1. How are the national governments in the UK and the Netherlands trying to foster 
‘system innovations’ towards more sustainable electricity systems? Why were the two 
policy initiatives designed and implemented in the described ways? 
 
 
2. To what extent have they delivered on their stated aims in terms of outputs and 
outcomes? 
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3. What are the political constraints that each initiative has encountered, why do these 
arise and what are the lessons for government initiatives aimed at fostering ‘system 
innovations’ towards more sustainable electricity systems? 
 
 
In this thesis politics is understood as being not only about actors realising given interests, 
but also in the following way: “Politics embraces the processes of argument, negotiation, 
and struggle over joint actions or decisions – most often the decisions of what policies will 
be adopted by government institutions” (Dessler and Parson 2006: 34). Especially in 
situations of uncertainty, actors may not be sure about what their interests actually are. 
Processes of ‘system innovations’ where both the processes and the outcomes are unknown 
are characterised by uncertainty. As will be explained in more detail below, politics can 
also be usefully understood as a ‘struggle over the best story’. This struggle takes place in 
an institutional context. Building on such an expanded concept of politics in line with 
discursive approaches in policy studies, the hypothesis of this thesis is that political 
struggles about meanings within existing institutional contexts enable, shape and constrain 
policy initiatives aimed at ‘system innovation’ in electricity systems in important ways. 
 
 
1.4 Overview of the thesis 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review and Analytical Framework 
 
Chapter 2 first looks at the transitions and transitions management literature and finds that 
the politics of these processes have been underplayed in this literature up until now. It then 
reviews the literature on policy and institutional change in order to derive an analytical 
framework suitable for answering the research questions outlined above. The literature 
review focuses in particular on interpretive approaches in policy analysis, paying attention 
to discourses, as well as institutional theory. This particular emphasis will be justified 
within the chapter. Drawing upon insights from policy studies and political science, a 
framework is developed for analysing the politics of government initiatives aimed at 
fostering ‘system innovations’ based on the interplay between discourses and institutions. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
The third chapter spells out the methodology used in this thesis. It explains the research 
design, the rationale for choosing a case study approach, justifies the choice of cases and 
reflects on the limitations of the methodology. This chapter also details the sources of data 
collection and methods of data analysis. It also operationalises the main concepts of the 
analytical framework to be used in the analysis. 
 
 
Chapter 4: The Energy Transition project in the Netherlands and  
Chapter 5: The Carbon Trust in the UK 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 contain the empirical analysis of this thesis. Chapter 4 explains the 
emergence and implementation of the energy transition project in the Netherlands. Chapter 
5 explains the emergence and implementation of the Carbon Trust in the UK.  
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Cross-case analysis 
 
The analysis in chapter 6 uses the two case studies presented in chapters 4 and 5 to 
transform the specific explanation of the cases into more general, theoretically-formulated 
explanations of the politics of initiatives aimed at ‘system innovation’. To that end, a 
variety of discursive mechanisms explaining aspects of the case studies will be discussed. 
The chapter will also consider existing explanations of why the Dutch energy transition 
came about and what the thesis adds to these. Thirdly, the chapter will also discuss 
alternative, interest-based explanations of the cases. 
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
The conclusions chapter answers the research questions of this thesis and summarises the 
contributions this thesis has made to knowledge. It also provides some policy 
recommendations and outlines potential avenues for further research. 
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2 Literature review and Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter looks first at the transitions and transitions management literature and finds 
that the politics of steering such processes have to date been under scrutinised. It then 
reviews the literature on policy studies and institutional theory. Drawing on these insights, 
a framework is developed for analysing the politics of government initiatives aimed at 
fostering ‘system innovations’ based on the interplay between discourses and institutions. 
 
 
2.1 The neglect of politics in the transitions and transition 
management literature 
 
In normative debates about socio-technical transformations scholars have prescribed 
important roles for governments: Hisschemöller et al. argue that governments can play a 
crucial role through the creation of niche markets (Hisschemoller, Bode et al. 2006: 1227) 
(see also the literature on strategic niche management (e.g. Hoogma, Kemp et al. 2002)). 
Quist and Vergragt deem the role of government in facilitating transformations towards 
sustainability to be “indispensable because of the long time horizon, the complexity of the 
processes, and the need for an actor that guards the general direction of sustainable 
development” (Quist and Vergragt 2004: 433). Weber argues that government has a 
moderating function with regard to relevant actors in terms of ‘decentralised network 
governance’ (Weber 2005: 114). Advocates of ‘system innovations’ generally suggest that 
government policy has a key role in environmental innovations and that strong core-
instruments are needed (e.g. Rennings, Kemp et al. 2004: 27). 
 
Also in the transition management model scholars have prescribed a multiple role for 
government. Central to TM is the development of shared visions of the future, the setting 
up of stakeholder transition arenas and conducting transition experiments to explore 
possible pathways towards more sustainable systems. Beyond supporting niches it is argued 
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that control policies to put pressure on the existing regime are needed (Kemp and Rotmans 
2004: 164). The government is seen as a facilitator-stimulator-controller-director in this 
process, depending on the phase of the transition (Kemp and Rotmans 2005: 49). 
Protagonists of transition management (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001a; Rotmans, Kemp et al. 
2001b; Loorbach 2002; Kemp and Rotmans 2004; Kemp and Rotmans 2005; Loorbach and 
Rotmans 2006) have prescribed an important role for government in steering such 
transitions without explicitly recognising and conceptualising the politics of such processes. 
  
As the first PhD thesis in this area, Derk Loorbach’s work on transition management as a 
new mode of governance (Loorbach 2007) mentions politics and power explicitly only very 
briefly at the end of his thesis, while he implicitly refers to politics and interests several 
times in his case study descriptions. For example the dominance of the energy companies in 
the Dutch energy transition is criticised but there is no deeper theoretical analysis or 
explanation of this fact nor a reflection of what this means for the transition management 
model itself. Loorbach confirms that “so far little attention has been directed towards issues 
of power, institutions and leadership” (Loorbach 2007: 294). He suggests that TM could 
learn much about the dynamics of power from policy science and politics studies. He 
acknowledges that “transitions are ultimately shifts in power” (Loorbach 2007: 294) in that 
regime actors will have to change to be in tune with the structural changes in the socio-
technical system or they will perish.  
 
Others have already criticised the lack of attention to power in the analysis of transitions 
(Smith, Stirling et al. 2005; Hendriks and Grin 2007) or pointed to political difficulties the 
government will encounter in any attempt to steer transitions (Jänicke and Jacob 2005; 
Meadowcroft 2005). Most vocal about this neglect, Shove and Walker have argued that the 
politics of transition management require more explicit attention on at least three 
dimensions. They argue that the very abstraction of a socio-technical system as an object to 
be steered from ‘outside’ is not only an analytical challenge but is essentially a “political, 
constructed, and potentially contested exercise in problem formulation” (Shove and Walker 
2007: 765). Politics here takes the form of “a playing out of power of when and how to 
decide and when and how to intervene” (Shove and Walker 2007: 766). This point is 
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supported by Smith and Stirling who argue that there is no objective and politically neutral 
steering of socio-technical systems from the ‘outside’. They advocate a move “from a view 
of ‘steering as management’ to an understanding of ‘steering as politics’” (Smith and 
Stirling 2007: 369). Secondly, Shove and Walker point out that constructing visions and 
shared commitments in transition processes are not neutral exercises but can be co-opted to 
neutralise dissent, that they reflect and are shaped by current systems and that power and 
strategic behaviour are always present in foresight or deliberation exercises. Thirdly, Shove 
and Walker argue that TM advocates underestimate the ambivalence of sustainability as a 
goal by assuming that strategies to foster “transitions towards more environmentally and 
socially benign systems” can be identified, while they argue that defining such systems is 
problematic and conflict-laden (Shove and Walker 2007: 766). 
 
Maybe partly in response to these criticisms, TM advocates have recently paid greater 
attention to power in transition processes. Avelino and Rotmans pointed out that “[s]o far, a 
conceptualization of power is missing, as this current literature on transitions does not 
explicitly define nor mention power” (Avelino and Rotmans forthcoming: 2). They see 
transitions as  
“a particular power struggle between the current regime, upcoming niches 
and landscape pressures. Whereas implicit references to power are obvious, 
an explicit integration of power concepts is lacking and confronts 
transition studies with a conceptual weakness” (Avelino and Rotmans 
forthcoming: 4).  
 
While this paper is a helpful first attempt at – at least conceptually – incorporating power 
issues more fully into the analysis of transition processes in terms of landscape, regime and 
niche interactions in different transition phases, it remains unclear what the political 
limitations and opportunities for government are empirically in the context of deliberate 
attempts to steer ‘system innovations’. 
 
This thesis argues that so far these debates have been overly optimistic about the role of 
government in steering ‘system innovations’, while neglecting the realities of policy 
formulation and implementation which is essentially a political process, not a managerial 
task. Meadowcroft points out that transition management   
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“appears to make rather stringent demands on political systems, for 
substantial policy stability and resilient political coalitions would be 
required to keep reform from being derailed by changes in political 
personnel and a turbulent conjuncture” (Meadowcroft 2005: 491).  
 
What is more, government is not a unitary actor and is deeply embedded in existing 
structures of current socio-technical regimes.  
 
If transitions are to a large degree political processes resulting from decisions by multiple 
actors, then political dimensions should be at the heart of the analysis. This thesis argues 
that the policy prescriptions based on transition theory to date lack a thorough 
understanding of the politics of steering ‘system innovations’. The hypothesis is that the 
processes of politics play a crucial role in any government attempt to steer ‘system 
innovations’ towards sustainability. Politics plays a role in governing transitions through: 
- the definition of problems with the current electricity systems; 
- envisaging the goals of a new system (what should a sustainable electricity system 
look like?); 
- considering which alternative niches to support (e.g. supporting transition 
experiments, funding technology demonstration); 
- unsettling existing ways of fulfilling societal functions (putting regime under 
pressure to change); and 
- the redistribution of resources (e.g. subsidies for renewables instead of fossil fuels). 
 
As has been pointed out above, much is expected from governments in actively steering 
‘system innovations’. Moreover, transformations of socio-technical systems are widely 
argued to involve crucial changes in policies and institutions which are part of the 
incumbent socio-technical systems. This thesis argues that the political science and policy 
studies literature has much to offer in studying the phenomena of institutional and policy 
change. It will be argued that studying new policy initiatives as case studies of why and 
how policy and institutional change happens, helps to reflect on political opportunities and 
constraints for governments in contributing to a transformation of the electricity system 
more generally. To derive a framework suitable for answering the research questions posed 
above, the policy studies as well as institutional theory literature is reviewed below. 
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2.2 Policy Studies, Politics and Discourse Analysis 
 
Policy studies aim at explaining policy processes (Howlett and Ramesh 2003; Hill 2005). 
Scholars have sought to develop theories of policy processes, analyse the content of 
specific policies and aim at explaining causal mechanisms driving policy change. One of 
the main contributions of policy studies is the finding that decision-making varies vastly 
from policy sector to policy sector (John 2003: 482). Policy studies often focus on the core 
groups or individuals who play an important role in the policy process such as advocacy 
coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999), epistemic 
communities (Haas 1992), policy networks (Mayntz 1993; Smith 2000) or discourse 
coalitions (Hajer 1995). Policy change is often seen as being driven by such networks of 
actors (Lovell 2008). These networks typically include state and non-state actors. One 
crucial difference between these approaches is the question of what is believed to hold 
these networks together. Policy networks for example are based on resource 
interdependencies between actors, advocacy coalitions are based on shared belief systems, 
discourse coalitions share a common understanding of policy problems, and epistemic 
communities are networks of professionals based on shared knowledge.  
 
While being interested in the actors involved in policy-making processes, a particular 
emphasis is often put on studying the politics of policy processes as “politics create policies, 
policies also remake politics” (Skocpol, cited in: Hay and Wincott 1998: 955). Politics is 
commonly understood as the process of making decisions, for example about the choice of 
instruments (Dessler and Parson 2006). There are numerous definitions and 
conceptualisations of politics in the literature. Central to a conventional understanding of 
politics are factors such as conflict, interests and power struggles. 
 
 
2.2.1  Towards an ideational understanding of politics 
 
Traditionally, 
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“Political sociology and political science have focused on how the pursuit 
of self-interest affects politics and policy making in advanced capitalist 
societies. This has been true for pluralist, elite, neo-Marxist, historical 
institutionalist, and rational choice theories. Scholars have paid far less 
attention to how ideas, that is, theories, conceptual models, norms, world 
views, frames, principled beliefs, and the like, rather than self-interests, 
affect policy making” (Campbell 2002: 21). 
 
However, there has been a turn in policy studies to go beyond traditional explanations of 
politics based on interests and power struggles. This development, seen since the 1990s, 
has been described as the ‘argumentative turn’ (Fischer and Forester 1993), the ‘ideational 
turn’  (Blyth 1997) or the ‘cognitive turn’ in policy studies (Nullmeier 2006). Despite the 
differences in emphasis, the common aim of these research agendas was to take ideas 
seriously as explanatory factors in policy change. In the discipline of international relations 
scholars have also rediscovered the importance of ideas in policy making (Yee 1996).  
 
A wide range of scholars has since focussed on ideas in studying the politics of policy 
processes. Politics can be understood as “a struggle for power played out in significant part 
through arguments about the ‘best story’” (Fischer 2003: x). Convincingly, Hay points out 
that:  
“If we are prepared to concede that what differentiates social and political 
systems from their counterparts in the natural sciences is the presence of 
reflexive actors capable of shaping the environment in which they find 
themselves, then it is no large step to acknowledge that the ideas actors 
hold – both normative and descriptive – about that environment must be 
accorded an independent role in political analysis. Though many political 
analysts have been reluctant to make this move it is, frankly, implausible 
to suppose either than [sic] actors have complete information of the 
context in which they find themselves or that their behaviour is rendered 
entirely predictable by the (presumably transparent) material interests they 
hold in any given context. Yet qualify either of these assumptions and an 
independent role for ideas is immediately opened within political analysis” 
(Hay 2002: 257-258). 
 
If we accept such a proposition then politics plays a much more fundamental role than in 
simply choosing the ‘right’ policies to achieve a given policy goal or when to intervene in 
an objectified ‘socio-technical system’. Rather, politics plays a major role in identifying 
and framing the problem of how to achieve more sustainable electricity systems. In Hajer’s 
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understanding, “politics involves a struggle for discursive hegemony in which actors seek 
to secure support for their definition of reality” (Ockwell and Rydin 2006: 383). Hajer has 
pointed out that discursive features are essential attributes of policy domains and that 
neglecting these discursive structures “leads to unduly optimistic and in fact rather 
technocratic thinking about policy change” (Hajer 1995: 275). The policy recommendations 
of transition management have been criticised for having such technocratic overtones 
(Shove and Walker 2007; Scrase and Smith 2009), which makes it important to study the 
discursive politics of this endeavour.  
 
 
Arising from the claim that the definition of policy problems is based on potentially 
contested ideas and political construction, the analysis of ‘problem framing’ becomes 
important for the study of politics. One example of such framing effects that is relevant for 
this thesis is the divergent policy implications of different understandings of technical 
change. According to Grubb it matters greatly whether policy makers understand technical 
change as depending mostly on autonomous trends and government R&D or as depending 
on corporate investment in response to market conditions because the policy implications 
differ. In the first case the government would try to induce technical change by using 
technology push policies such as public R&D support. In the latter case the government 
would, for example, try to impose emission caps or carbon pricing and use a variety of 
instruments to re-orient industrial R&D and spur market-based innovation. Grubb argues 
that “divergent perspectives on the process of technology change lead to directly opposing 
policy prescriptions” (Grubb 2005: 113). It thus matters greatly which of the two 
understandings dominates policy making.  
 
A major strand of work on the framing of policy problems has focussed on discourses. 
Maarten Hajer wrote a seminal work using discourse analysis to analyse the emergence of 
the ecological modernisation ideas in the Netherlands and the UK (Hajer 1995). His work 
has been widely acknowledged and offers a broad, often cited definition of discourse. Hajer 
defines a discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are 
produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995: 44) [emphasis added by FK]. 
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The discourse analytical framework developed by Hajer sheds light on how discourse 
coalitions form around shared storylines, how they compete for political influence and how 
discourses structure the solutions offered to the policy problems they ‘create’. Discourse 
analysis reveals the role of language in politics through paying attention to the specific 
situational logic in which a particular account of problem and solution arises (Feindt and 
Oels 2005; Hajer and Versteeg 2005). It is important to stress that, despite the focus on 
language, discursive analysis is not only about language: it is about the way language 
shapes political action and practices.  
 
There are two reasons why Hajer’s discourse analytical framework is considered helpful in 
answering the research question of this thesis (also see Smith and Kern 2009). First, while 
there seems to be a consensus among policy makers that electricity systems have to change 
substantially, the precise formulation of the problem, who is responsible and what can be 
done to achieve more sustainable electricity systems, is controversial. Discourse analysis 
sheds light on those processes and is thus a suitable approach for tracing the politics of 
policies aimed at greening the electricity system. Hajer rightly points out that the meaning 
of concepts like sustainable development cannot be imposed in a top-down way  
“but are continuously contested in a struggle about their meaning, 
interpretation and implementation. In trying to make sense of this struggle, 
discourse analysis has three particular strengths; the capacity to reveal the 
role of language in politics, to reveal the embeddedness of language in 
practice and to illuminate mechanisms and answer ‘how questions’” 
(Hajer and Versteeg 2005: 176). 
 
Second, compared to rational choice approaches (Hay 2004) discourse analysis puts 
emphasis on socially constructed discourses and their influence on practices, which makes 
it suitable for answering my research questions as it takes the explanation beyond a simple 
reference to interests. Instead it analyses the mechanisms of “how interests are played out 
in the context of specific discourses and organizational practices” (Hajer 2000). Other 
approaches to studying politics often assume policy problems to be a given and then 
analyse the processes of decision making. 
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In the following an argument will be made for why more traditional conceptualisations of 
politics based on power and interests are on their own insufficient for the purposes of this 
thesis, which strengthens the case made for using a discursive approach to studying politics. 
 
 
2.2.2 Limitations of the conventional understandings of politics 
 
Conventionally, the analysis of politics is based on the study of power relations and the 
influence of interests. In this understanding of politics, actors use different forms of power 
to achieve outcomes which are in line with their material interests: “For sceptics – variously 
realists, materialists, and often rationalists – ideas do not matter, as power and material 
interests ultimately drive politics” (Price 2006: 252). 
 
Power, understood as the ability of actors to make other actors do something which they 
would not otherwise do (McLean and McMillan 2003), is a central concept of political 
analysis. However, it is also one of the most contested concepts in political science. Arts 
and van Tatenhove argue that “[i]t seems as if there are as many definitions and approaches 
as there are power analysts” (Arts and van Tatenhove 2004: 346). Avelino and Rotmans for 
example distinguish between instrumental, structuralist and discursive interpretations of 
power (Avelino and Rotmans forthcoming). Some analysts focus on actors using resources 
to achieve desired outcomes at the expense of other actors, some consider power in 
organisational terms and others situate power at the level of structures. Arts and van 
Tatenhove warn that it is not enough to focus on resources alone and to equate these with 
outcomes. Instead they argue that policy actors may “become influential not only by 
organizational resources, like money, personnel, tactics, but also by arguments and 
persuasion, or by both” (Arts and van Tatenhove 2004: 347). Thus, using a discursive 
approach does not mean that power does not play a role in politics but rather it introduces a 
different understanding of power. According to Hajer, the  
“argumentative activity is an independent layer of power practices that is far 
more complex in its logic than a conventional realist analysis suggests. The 
politics of discourse is not about expressing power-resources in language but 
is about the actual creation of structures and fields of action by means of 
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story-lines, positioning, and the selective employment of comprehensive 
discursive systems (such as law or physics), etc.” (Hajer 1995: 275-276). 
 
Others would go even further; for example, in Dryzek’s reading of Foucault there is no 
distinction between power and discourse, as for Foucault discourse is the operation of 
power (Dryzek 1997: 11). Even if we do not follow this specific interpretation it should 
have become clear that it is not the case that power is not important for the analysis in this 
thesis. On the contrary, discourse analysis  
“allows one to study the power effects produced by and built into 
environmental discourses. The environmental discourse that constitutes an 
environmental problem enables and constrains the available policy options 
and the range of legitimate actors for its resolution” (Feindt and Oels 
2005: 169). 
 
A hegemonic discourse exercises its power by defining the established categories of a 
policy discussion: oppositional discourses are then left with the choice of using the 
established categories or of stepping outside those categories and insisting on their own 
mode of expression which could see them losing influence (Fischer 2003: 88). Actors who 
want to influence policy must either speak in a way that is consistent with the dominant 
problem definition or seek to change it (Laird 2001). Similarly, Baumgartner and Jones 
point to the possibility of influencing the problem definition as a “potential route to 
political power by relatively weak opponents to large economic interests” (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1991: 1050).  
 
Of course critics would still point out that the material interests of actors drive politics. 
Why would the analysis thus deal with discourses and not just focus on interests? Fischer 
argues that during the last 30 years a lot of support has accumulated to back up the claim 
that ideas are relatively autonomous of interests and institutions. This shift towards also 
considering ideas and discourse arises from the encountering of problems with explanations 
of policy making based purely on interests and structures. Some discussion within policy 
studies thus shifted to focus on “how political and social ideas define the kinds of problems 
that government come to deal with” (Fischer 2003: 45-46). However, this is not to suggest 
that interests do not exist, nor that they do not matter for the explanation of policy change.  
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Material interests are usually hypothesised to be relatively stable over time, rational in their 
attempts to maximise personal gain and therefore to a large extent ‘knowable’. The point 
that ‘ideas matter’ has been regarded with deep suspicion by large parts of the political 
economy and political science communities: “Instead self-interest is taken to be the 
unambiguous and ever-ready tool for explanation” (Blyth 2002: viii). However, consider a 
simple example to explore this notion of interests: according to this line of thought it is 
common to assume that a politician wants to be re-elected, a company wants to make a 
profit and an environmental NGO campaigns against building a new coal-fired power plant 
because they want to prevent climate change. In a discussion about the decision as to 
whether or not this new plant should get planning permission, the interests of the NGO and 
the company who wants to build and operate the plant are pretty obvious. However, the 
situation of the politician is more complicated. Does he hope for a campaign donation 
which will help to get him re-elected, does he hope for local employment benefits from the 
plant or does he look forward to the local taxes paid by this company, which he intends to 
spend on community projects if he approves the plan? Or is it in his interest to reject the 
plan in order to appeal to his green credentials and win the next elections based on the 
support from green voters? Even when at first sight there seems to be an obvious interest 
(to get re-elected), this simple example shows that it is unclear what the best strategy is for 
achieving the politician’s interests and whether his interest is independent of how he views 
the world around him. Thus interests are not always easily ‘knowable’, especially when one 
considers Hay’s point that actors will rarely have perfect information about the context in 
which they find themselves (Hay 2002: 257-258). 
 
Another important point in the context of long-term and complex processes such as ‘system 
innovations’ is that while interests might be seen as relatively stable in known issues, they 
are relatively unknown or uncertain for long-term issues. Laird argues that in some cases 
interests are well established and policy choices have a clear knowable impact on the way 
they affect wealth and income. However, in debates over future energy systems this is a 
different matter: it is unclear what the future will be like and there are huge uncertainties 
over interests and outcomes (Laird 2001: 14). Dessler and Parson argue along similar lines 
that the use of argument and persuasion for the adoption of certain courses of action has 
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varying influence on policy making but is particularly effective when, amongst other things, 
there is “enough uncertainty that many political actors do not line up predictably according 
to either their general political principles or how the issue is going to affect them” (Dessler 
and Parson 2006: 36). Similarly, building on work by Knight, Blyth argues that in 
situations of uncertainty4 (situations regarded by contemporary actors as unique), actors are 
not sure what their interests actually are and so interests in this situation need to be 
explained rather than be used to explain policy and institutional change (Blyth 2002). Also, 
Schmidt points out that, for example, events can create sufficient uncertainty to allow an 
opening to ideas that challenge the predominant ideas due to eroding interest coalitions in 
response to a crisis which loosens the institutional constraints to change (Schmidt 2001: 
252). This thesis argues that the urgent need to transform electricity systems is an instance 
in which this kind of uncertainty exists as there is no precedent for the challenge of 
deliberately steering whole socio-technical systems towards sustainability. Actors are 
unsure which of the potentially possible future electricity systems, in which configuration, 
would best suit their interests. Thus a simple reference to interests does not make much 
sense as an explanation of policy processes in this context. 
 
Another reason for including discourse as central to the analysis is that simple reference to 
actors’ presumed, stable economic interests does not much help to explain the dynamics of 
policy and institutional change. Schmidt suggests that  
“for the dynamics of change, we must be able to go beyond ‘politics as 
usual’, that is, beyond an understanding of the interplay of interests, 
institutions, and cultures that represent the background conditions to change, 
to explain how political actors create an interactive consensus for change, 
which necessarily can only come about through communication” (Schmidt 
2001: 249).  
Schmidt argues that, for example, the liberal adjustment policies in different European 
states in response to globalisation cannot be understood as ‘politics as usual’ because the 
adjustment policies by definition “went against the narrow self-interests of large groups if 
not a majority of the electorate, challenging deeply-held values and reversing longstanding 
practices” (Schmidt 2003: 129). Policies to foster ‘system innovations’ are very similar in 
                                                 
4 Blyth distinguishes between situations of risk in which “agents are sure of their interests but are unsure of 
how to achieve them” and situations of uncertainty in which agents “are unsure as to what their interests 
actually are, let alone how to realize them” (Blyth 2002: 9). 
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this respect, since they: go against the self-interest of a large number of actors with vested 
interests in the existing system; imply radical institutional change, or; go against national 
identity and values. In line with (Schmidt 2001) the question in such situations is thus: how 
do governments gain acceptance for these new policies and institutional changes? She 
claims that discourse analysis sheds light on the political dynamics of “how governments 
managed to gain agreement for change from relevant policy actors and the general public” 
(Schmidt 2001: 248). Similarly, Hay argues that the turn to ideas allows a dynamic 
understanding of policy processes as 
“Ideas often hold the key to unlock political dynamics – as change in 
policy is often preceded by changes in the ideas informing policy and as 
the ability to orchestrate shifts in societal preferences may play a crucial 
role in quickening the pace, altering the trajectory or raising the stakes of 
institutional reform” (Hay 2002: 194). 
 
According to this line of reasoning interests and ideas are interacting in complex ways and 
are therefore not independent of each other (Laird 2001). Similarly, Blyth maintains a 
position in which “[a]gents’ interests are themselves social constructs that are open to 
redefinition through ideological contestation” (Blyth 2002: 270-271). He aims to break the 
long-standing tendency in political science to treat ideas and interests as mutually exclusive 
analytical categories and instead considers them as mutually constitutive, particularly in 
situations of uncertainty. Blyth’s conception of interests considers ‘wants, beliefs, and 
desires’ as important cognates of interest; thus interests are not structurally determined but 
are constructed based on ‘wants’ mediated by beliefs and desires; therefore ideas matter 
(Blyth 2002: 29). Also, Hajer rejects the idea that interests are assumed as given and 
instead argues that they are “intersubjectively constituted through discourse” (Hajer 1995: 
59). Again this does not mean that interests are not ‘real’ nor that they do not influence 
politics but it acknowledges that ideas play an independent role in policy change which 
cannot be treated as a simple derivative of other influences on policy such as interests or 
institutional structures: “The point is to ensure that we do not reduce ideas to some cynical 
derivatives of interests, since ideas are actually constitutive of interests” (Laird 2001: 4). 
He argues that an analysis which stresses the interaction of ideas with interests provides “a 
more nuanced account of the process of policy making” (Laird 2001: 7). Compared to 
rational choice approaches of studying public policies (which would look at the costs and 
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benefits of a course of action and the structurally given material interests of actors to 
explain policy change), discourse analysis takes the explanation beyond a simple reference 
to interests, analysing “how interests are played out in the context of specific discourses 
and organizational practices” (Hajer 2000). It therefore does not deny the importance of 
interests for policy change but nor does it assume them to be easily ‘knowable’, stable or 
independent of ideas. 
 
The debate over the extent to which ideas matter or whether interests dominate politics is a 
controversial issue in social science and partly depends on epistemological assumptions 
(see more on this issue in the methodology chapter of this thesis). Solving this long-
standing debate cannot be the aim of this thesis – the aim is rather more modest. 
Rueschemeyer states  
“that ideas matter in politics is beyond question…Yet the importance of 
ideas compared to other factors shaping social processes has been a matter 
of debate throughout the history of social thought. Global answers to this 
question may be inherently elusive; but more detailed questions – perhaps 
confining themselves to specific developments and circumstances – can 
elucidate the ways in which ideas make a difference, the conditions that 
make them more or less effective, and their interactions with other factors 
that account for social change as well as stability” (Rueschemeyer 2006: 
227). 
In line with this suggestion this thesis aims at elucidating the role of ideas in the shaping of 
two concrete policy initiatives aimed at greening electricity systems in two different 
contexts. 
 
2.2.3 Discourses and institutions 
 
However, discursive politics does not take place in an institutional void; rather, processes 
of politics are bounded by the structure of institutions (Dessler and Parson 2006). Campbell 
argues that when studying actors and how they carry certain ideas into the policy-making 
process it is important to acknowledge that these actors do not operate in a vacuum. 
Institutions like “the formal rules and procedures governing policy making affect which 
ideas penetrate the policy-making process and are adopted and implemented as policy” 
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(Campbell 2002: 30). Analysis thus needs to shed light on these institutional filters. 
Similarly, Chang argues that  
“Politics is an institutionally structured process, not only because 
institutions shape people’s political actions, given their motivations and 
perceptions, but because they influence people’s perception of their own 
interests, of the legitimate boundary of politics, and of the appropriate 
standard of behaviour in politics” (Chang 2002: 556). 
 
In Chang’s understanding institutions are both ‘constraining’ as well as ‘constitutive’ of the 
perceptions and motivations of human beings, and influence interests and thus politics.  
 
While mainly being interested in policy processes, discourse analysts acknowledge the 
importance of institutions in policy making and the interactions between discourse and 
institutions. According to Fischer,  
“for discourse scholars, then, political action is constituted by discourses 
[emphasis added by FK], from hegemonic discourses embedded in the 
existing institutions (for example, the theories and practices of liberal 
capitalism) to the oppositional efforts of other groups attempting to create 
new discourses (for example, environmentalism). Public policies are not 
only influenced by the discourses of particular groups, they are shaped and 
supported by the institutional processes in which specific discursive 
practices are embedded, processes which can have a life of their own” 
(Fischer 2003: 45). 
 
Discourses are manifested not only in political rhetoric but also in “institutional structures, 
practices and events” (Sharp and Richardson 2001: 119). Existing institutional contexts 
enable and constrain what can be said, but the social order also needs to be “constantly 
reproduced and reconfirmed in actual speech situations” (Fischer 2003: 85-86). Discourse 
analysis is not just looking at language and what is being said; the analysis also includes 
“the institutional context in which this is done and which co-determines what can be said 
meaningfully” (Hajer 1995: 2). Similarly to Fischer, Hajer claims that a discursive order  
“even if it has solidified in all kinds of institutional arrangements (like laws, 
organizational routines, or categorizations) requires a constant discursive 
reproduction to guarantee the continuity of its meaning structures” (Hajer 
1995: 125-126). 
The discourse analytical approach thus tries to bridge actors and institutional structures 
through their respective relationships to practices (Hajer and Laws 2006). Actors and their 
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discursive practices are shaping institutions and are influenced by existing institutions. This 
is Hajer’s way of taking on Gidden’s idea of the duality of agency and structure. Drawing 
on Foucault’s theory of discourse he acknowledges that “institutions are only powerful in 
so far as they are constituted as authorities vis-à-vis other actors through discourse” (Hajer 
1995: 51).  
 
Ultimately, there is another argument for the inclusion of institutions into the analysis, 
which derives from the transitions literature. ‘System innovations’ will require changes in 
policy as well as institutions. Geels defines socio-technical systems (STS) as “the linkages 
between elements necessary to fulfil societal functions” (Geels 2004a: 900). An important 
part of such STS are ‘policy regimes’ or relatively stable institutionalised forms of state and 
societal preferences, goals and instruments that help shape the provision of societal goods 
such as transportation, housing or electricity. These policy regimes include institutions 
structuring legislative processes, regulations, policy goals, policy instruments, interaction 
patterns between government and stakeholders, role perceptions of the government, ideas 
about the effectiveness of instruments as well as problem agendas and guiding principles 
(Geels 2004a: 906). Transition scholars acknowledge that existing institutions (understood 
as rules, procedures, routines, patterns, repertoires) can obstruct ‘system innovations’. It has 
been recognised that the interactive processes aimed at steering towards sustainability do 
not take place in an ‘institutional emptiness’ and thus scholars have argued for TM as the 
management of institutional change (Teisman and Edelenbos 2004). Rotmans et al. have 
called for more research “on the effects of existing institutions and governance mechanisms 
on transition processes” (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001a: 70). 
 
For a variety of reasons discussed above it is therefore important not to limit the analysis of 
the politics of policy initiatives aimed at fostering ‘system innovations’ to discourses but 
also to pay attention to the role of institutions. Below, the political science literature on 
institutions is reviewed to complement the analytical framework with a conceptualisation of 
institutions. 
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2.3 Neo-Institutional Theory 
 
Political science scholars have a long tradition of dealing with the state and institutions of 
the state. One particular strand of political science has closely studied institutions, its 
proponents thus being named institutionalists. 
 
Institutions have been defined in variety of ways. A broad definition of institutions which 
resonates with the emphasis on discourses as providing meaning is given by Scott: 
“Institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social 
life” (Scott 2008: 48). Institutions can be usefully understood as generally accepted rules 
which guide the behaviour of actors and can be either formal (e.g. laws, regulations and 
standards) or informal (e.g. norms, habits and customs) and can create constraints on policy 
options (Breukers and Wolsink 2007b: 2738). 
 
In principle, scholars within the institutionalist strand of political science would see 
political constraints (and, to a lesser extent, opportunities) for governments in governing a 
transformation of the electricity system as being set institutionally. According to John, 
institutionalism is based on the idea “that formal structures and embedded norms have an 
effect on human action, which has a long pedigree in political science and appears in the 
classic writings, from Plato to Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, and Woodrow Wilson” (John 
2003: 483). The ‘old’ institutionalism is an approach grounded in constitutional law and 
moral philosophy and often produced detailed descriptions of formal or legal institutions 
and their origin; much of the work was implicitly or explicitly normative rather than 
theoretically grounded (Scott 2008). The ‘old’ institutionalism mainly studied the formal 
institutions of government and defined the state in terms of its political, administrative, and 
legal arrangements (Schmidt 2006b). This ‘old’ institutionalism has produced valuable 
insights but has been criticised for a lack of acknowledgement of individual agency, for 
being too concerned with normative questions to be a science (the ‘good’ order of 
institutions), and for often being descriptive, opaque and vague about any theoretical 
underpinnings (Peters 2005).  
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As a response, behaviouralism and rational choice became the two mainstream schools of 
political science which were both based on methodological individualism5, had a strict anti-
normative bias, were positivist and focussed on the inputs into the political system (which 
remained a black box because of the focus on the individual). In behaviouralism it is the 
society and the economy that influence politics and political institutions. In the ‘old’ and 
‘new’ institutionalism causation can go in both directions and it is argued that “institutions 
shape social and economic orders” (Peters 2005: 15). Rational choice recognises 
institutions more, as a means to aggregate individual preferences, but also fails to 
appreciate that institutions play a significant role in shaping preferences. 
 
The ‘new’ institutionalism formed in the 1980s and 1990s as a response to these approaches 
sought to ‘bring the state back in’ to the explanation of political action while keeping an 
interest in more methodological and theoretically grounded work (Peters 2005; Schmidt 
2006b). These scholars see the conditions of political opportunities as being set 
institutionally (Hay 2002; Fischer 2003; John 2003). Even the most ‘rational’ of actors are 
circumscribed in terms of the options available to them. The basic argument of institutional 
approaches is that institutions do matter and that “something about institutions…explains 
the decisions that governments make” (Peters 2005: 164). According to March and Olsen, 
“[t]his new institutionalism emphasizes the relative autonomy of political institutions, 
possibilities for inefficiency in history, and the importance of symbolic action to an 
understanding of politics” (March and Olsen 1984: 734). The research programme of the 
‘new institutionalism’ tries to investigate the ways in which institutions mainly constrain 
but also enable political action by the state and societal actors (Schmidt 2006b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Methodological individualism is based on “the assumption that individuals are the only actors and that they 
are motivated by individual utility maximization” (Scott 2008: 7-8). 
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2.3.1 Rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism 
 
This literature is often sketched by distinguishing three main strands of new 
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996): rational choice, and historical and sociological 
institutionalism. 
 
At first it might seem contradictory to combine rational choice and institutionalism, as the 
analytical power of rational choice theory depends on the utility-maximising decisions of 
individuals. It seems difficult to combine this starting point with the institutional thought 
which focuses on the constraining influence of institutions (Peters 2005). However, rational 
choice scholars have acknowledged the fundamental role institutions play in political life 
and have thus sought to explain the nature, origin and role of political institutions. The 
general argument is that economic organisations and institutions are explained in the same 
way: “they solve collective-action problems and thereby facilitate gains from trade” (Moe, 
cited in: Scott 2008: 33). There is a variety of approaches within the rational choice 
institutionalism school of thought but generally “institutions are conceptualised as 
collections of rules and incentives that establish the conditions for bounded rationality” 
(Peters 2005: 48). Within these rules, which are constraining and channelling individual 
behaviour, actors are trying to maximise personal utility, which is seen as the primary 
motivation of individuals.  
 
Historical institutionalism is very different from rational choice institutional thought in its 
basic assumptions. Historical institutionalists argue that preferences are not stable and 
“often result from rather than precede or determine choices. Institutions construct actors 
and define their available modes of action: they constrain behaviour, but they also empower 
it” (Scott 2008: 32). The main idea of historical institutionalism is that policy choices made 
during the formation process of an institution will continue to impact and largely determine 
the policy into the future: this leads to a path dependency of institutions which can only be 
overcome with a good deal of political pressure to change the trajectory of institutional 
development (Pierson 2000a; Peters 2005; Schmidt 2006b). Historical institutionalism sees 
institutions as constraining rather than enabling political action “to the point that only the 
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intervention of exogenous factors, which typically rearrange (or punctuate) previously 
immutable structures can bring about change” (Blyth 1997: 230). War and economic 
depression are often used as examples. As a response to the problem of how to 
conceptualise change by agents in a less ad hoc manner, historical institutionalists came to 
see ideas as crucial for understanding the origins and nature of change. Historical 
institutionalism acknowledges the crucial role that ideas play in shaping policy (e.g. 
through the work of Hall (1993) on political paradigms in economic policy making) by 
constraining the limits of acceptable action by government (Peters 2005: 75).  
 
Sociology has a long tradition of dealing with institutions, going back at least as far as the 
work of the German sociologist Weber on the ‘rational’ bureaucracy of modernising 
societies (Peters 2005). There is a rich literature on organisational theory in sociology and 
scholars in this field built on institutional arguments, for example through the work of 
Merton, Selznick and Parsons (Scott 2008). Due to the strong influence of organisational 
theory the sociological literature often fails to distinguish clearly between organisations and 
institutions (Peters 2005). Schmidt states that “[s]ociological institutionalism sees the state 
as socially constituted and culturally framed, with political agents acting according to the 
‘logic of appropriateness’ that follows from culturally specific rules and norms” (Schmidt 
2006b). According to this logic new institutional practices are adopted not because of 
means–ends efficiency calculations but to enhance the social legitimacy of the organisation 
(Hall and Taylor 1996: 949). Cultural norms and rules give meaning to these practices. 
Sociologists would reject the rational choice assumption of utilitarian rationality and 
exchange it for an emphasis on norms, cognitive frames and meaning systems that guide 
political action.  
 
 
 
Despite the valuable contributions that scholars working within these three strands of work 
have made, a crucial question relevant for the aims of this thesis is posed by John:  
“But does institutionalism explain policy change? In part, it does, but 
institutionalists find it harder to explain bursts of change, such as 
improvements in policy performance or the imminence of policy disasters, 
which are some of the crucial issues. Institutions can account for change when 
they adapt, especially in relation to one set of interests and policy concerns. 
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When new pressure groups rub up against established sets of institutions, the 
resultant change may be greater than would be expected… In spite of these 
nuances, it is not certain that institutional approaches offer an all-
encompassing theory of policy change, mainly because institutions are better 
at explaining the dampening rather than the amplifying of political processes. 
They are generally stable, which means they set out routines and constrain 
human action” (John 2003: 484).  
 
A variety of scholars agree with this assessment and further criticise that institutionalist 
accounts often rely on untheorised external shocks to explain change (Hay 2002; Fischer 
2003; Hill 2005; Peters 2005; Schmidt 2006b). This leads to a neglect of agency and a 
tendency towards structuralism in some cases (Hay and Wincott 1998). Schmidt has argued 
that the “rational choice institutionalists’ emphasis on the self-interested nature of human 
motivation, especially where it is assumed to be economic self-interest, is value-laden, and 
can appear economically deterministic” (Schmidt 2006b: 5). Hall and Taylor (1996: 942) 
argue that in particular historical institutionalists emphasise periods of continuity in which 
institutions develop along path-dependent trajectories which are punctuated by ‘critical 
junctures’. They have difficulties in explaining what causes these junctures and often stress 
the impact of economic crises or political conflicts. Sociological institutionalism has been 
criticised for being ‘bloodless’ (Hall and Taylor 1996) and culturally deterministic 
(Schmidt 2006b) because of its focus on rule-following rather than rule-creating action and 
its neglect of political processes of contention. 
 
In response to this issue some scholars have paid more attention to how discourses can 
create opportunities for change within an institutional context. This line of thinking will be 
explored in the next section. 
 
 
2.3.2 Discursive institutionalism 
 
Recognising the shortcomings of the established institutionalist approaches, a number of 
scholars have built upon the foundations of those three approaches to sketch out a 
discursive institutionalist approach (Campbell 2001; Hay 2001; Schmidt and Radaelli 
2004). This fourth institutionalism can be seen as a more radical branch of the sociological 
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and historical institutionalisms (Nullmeier 2006), “providing a framework for the analysis 
of policy change that complements the traditional three institutionalisms” (Schmidt 2003: 
127).  
 
For example, Hay suggests, partly following (Hall 1993), that in moments of perceived 
crisis paradigm shifts can alter the trajectory of institutional evolution (Hay 2001). His 
work is concerned with the dynamic relationship between structure and agency and the 
material and the ideational. Hay focuses on the processes of institutional and ideational 
change and asks “under which conditions paradigms are consolidated, challenged and 
replaced” (Hay 2001: 198). He aims to shed light on the dynamic relationship between 
institutional context and institutionalised conduct. Similarly, (Campbell 2001) is interested 
in understanding different types of ideas and how they influence policy making and 
Schmidt sees ideas and discourse as one important explanatory factor of policy and 
institutional change (Schmidt 2003). According to Schmidt, discursive institutionalism 
“considers the state in terms of the ideas and discourse that actors use to explain, deliberate, 
and/or legitimize political action in institutional context according to the ‘logic of 
communication’” (Schmidt 2006b). Campbell points out that the rise and fall of ideas is 
often politically contested and thus a highly conflictual process (Campbell 2001). He also 
argues, similarly to Schmidt, that it is not ideas on their own which change policy making 
outcomes but the interaction of ideas and interests. Schmidt claims that discourse can be a 
cause for policy change as “it may enable public actors to reconceptualise interests rather 
than reflect them, to chart new institutional paths instead of simply following old ones, and 
to reframe cultural norms rather than only reify them” (Schmidt 2003: 129). Discourse can 
therefore be the most influential factor at times but this is seen as an empirical question. 
 
Discursive institutionalism has the claimed advantage of having a greater ability to explain 
processes of change compared to the other three strands within this literature. In discursive 
institutionalist thought, while institutions and historical traditions provide a structure, the 
dynamics of change are traced by focussing on ideas and discursive interactions. Contrary 
to the other ‘new’ institutional approaches the focus is more on the enabling than the 
constraining side of institutions. Schmidt’s work emphasises this dual nature of institutions. 
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The discursive institutional perspective: 
• is dynamic whereas the other three institutionalist approaches have difficulties 
explaining policy and institutional change; 
• provides a heuristic for going beyond ‘politics as usual’, which is necessary for the 
analysis in this thesis because transformations of electricity systems towards 
sustainability go against the interests of a variety of actors; 
• pays attention to discourse and policy communication; 
• pays attention to the enabling dimensions of institutions. 
 
Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism can contribute to the analytical framework of this 
thesis because, similarly to Hajer, the approach is primarily concerned with ideas and how 
they are communicated through discourse to explain policy and institutional change 
(Radaelli and Schmidt 2005: 10). As has been argued above, Schmidt’s discursive 
institutionalism also specifically sheds light on the dynamics of these change processes. 
Schmidt emphasises that political actors need to create an interactive consensus for change 
through communication (Schmidt 2001), which is very relevant for the question to be 
answered in this thesis. Successful efforts to make electricity systems more sustainable will 
need such an interactive consensus to be created as transitions are multi-actor processes and 
cannot be steered in a top-down way (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001a). 
 
 
2.4 Analytical Framework: Bringing together Hajer and Schmidt 
 
Both the policy studies and the new institutionalism literatures reviewed above clearly point 
to the importance of discourse and their institutional contexts for policy and institutional 
change. By combining concepts from both strands of work this thesis’ theoretical 
framework is developed in order to be able to analyse the politics of new policy initiatives 
to steer transformations of the electricity system. Both the work of Hajer on the analysis of 
discourse coalitions in environmental politics and Schmidt on policy and institutional 
change in nation states in response to globalisation and Europeanisation are particularly 
fruitful in this endeavour because they combine attention to the politics and dynamics of 
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political change, highlighting opportunities for political change, with an institutional 
perspective, highlighting the constraints of political change. Both scholars focus on ideas 
and discourses to explain political change and have done comparative work across nation 
states using their respective frameworks. 
 
Moreover, elements of both frameworks are combined in this thesis to counter the 
respective weaknesses of the other approach: 
- Compared to Schmidt, Hajer pays more explicit attention to discourse coalitions as 
important actor groups in discursive interactions.  
- Although Hajer emphasises that the institutional context of discourse is important, 
this context is somewhat undertheorised in his work and he does not offer a 
framework for analysing how institutions matter and when: in Schmidt’s view such 
an approach risks appearing highly voluntaristic unless the structural constraints 
derived from the three ‘new’ institutionalisms are included (Schmidt 2006b). 
- Schmidt emphasises the role of discourse not only in political coordination within 
policy elites, as in Hajer’s work, but also in terms of the political communication 
with the public. She claims that where analysis takes ideas seriously, it has focussed 
on the coordinative dimension whereas the communicative dimension has not been 
systematically researched (Schmidt 2007). 
- Schmidt’s distinction between normative and cognitive dimensions of a discourse 
presents a helpful distinction which Hajer’s work lacks. This distinction helps to 
shed light not only on why a discourse is cognitively convincing, but also on why it 
is normatively appealing for actors. 
- Hajer has a more explicit focus on how discourses define policy problems. This 
aspect is neglected in Schmidt’s work who often sees policy problems as a given, 
for instance in the form of external pressures such as globalisation to which national 
policies and institutions need to be adapted (see e.g. Schmidt 2000; Schmidt 2003). 
Hajer understands such a pressure as being socially constructed and his approach 
helps to understand how certain framings of the situation affect political responses. 
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In the following the main conceptual building blocks of the analytical framework of this 
thesis are described. 
 
 
2.4.1  Storylines 
 
Hajer developed his discourse analysis framework to study the influence of ecological 
modernisation on the regulation of the problem of acid rain in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands (Hajer 1995). Similarly, this thesis will analyse the influence of discourses in 
shaping new government initiatives to transform electricity systems towards sustainability. 
Based on Hajer this thesis argues “that the developments in environmental politics critically 
depend on the specific social construction of environmental problems” (Hajer 1995: 2). 
This thesis attempts to shed light on the political process, on how the problem of making 
electricity systems more sustainable has been defined, and on what political consequences 
this has in terms of policy and institutional change. Analogously to Hajer, this thesis will 
examine “how the emergence and acceptance of such a conceptual language was taken up 
in actual practice and what sort of institutional innovations it brought about” (1995: 4). An 
important role in this process is played by storylines as new storylines which re-order our 
understanding of policy problems can create political change by the re-ordering of meaning 
(Hajer 1995: 56). 
 
The core idea of storylines is that argumentative processes are very complex and that actors 
often evoke certain storylines rather than refer to the whole discourse about, for example, 
climate change. A storyline is thus a short-cut for a wider discourse which is used as a 
frame of reference by actors. For Hajer storylines are a “generative sort of narrative that 
allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific 
physical or social phenomena” (Hajer 1995: 56). The key function of storylines is to 
“suggest unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a 
problem like acid rain” (ibid.). Storylines are metaphors and facilitate the reduction of 
complexity and create possibilities for problem closure. They help to cluster knowledge, 
help actors to position themselves and ultimately fulfil an essential role in the formation of 
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discourse coalitions (Hajer 1995: 63) (see next section for details on discourse coalitions). 
As storylines become more accepted they give a certain permanence to a debate.  
 
The word ‘storyline’ is an umbrella term for metaphors, analogies, historical references, 
clichés, and appeals to collective fears or feelings of guilt. An example given by Hajer is 
the ‘acid rain’ storyline, which is a narrative that relates industrial emissions to the dying of 
fish and forests and the corrosion of buildings. It constructs a powerful causal story which 
injects urgency (forest dieback) and blame into the political arena (polluting industry) and 
thus gives rise to new political claims. 
 
The concept of storylines is refined for the purpose of this thesis by introducing an 
important distinction into the analysis. Schmidt argues that for a discourse to be successful 
it needs to be cognitively convincing and normatively appealing (Schmidt 2001). Also, 
other authors find this a useful distinction (Rueschemeyer 2006). The same applies to 
storylines as shorthands for more expansive discourses. 
 
In terms of the cognitive dimension the ideas of a discourse need to define the policy 
problem to be solved, and propose adequate policy solution, which is often done through 
reference to techniques and principles of scientific disciplines and justified in terms of a 
‘logic of necessity’. For Schmidt the cognitive interpretation of ‘facts’ rather than truth is at 
issue and the relevance and applicability of ideas matters (Schmidt 2006a: 251); an 
example of this being cognitive arguments used to justify welfare state adjustments in small 
states, such as making reference to external causes like growing competition from other 
European countries or also globally, and to internal causes such as demographic changes 
which jeopardise the architecture of the welfare system (Schmidt 2003: 135). 
 
To be normatively convincing the ideas of a discourse need to appeal to existing or 
emerging norms and values. Schmidt argues that ‘good’ normative arguments demonstrate 
the appropriateness of policy ideas by appealing to norms and principles of public life. 
Their success depends on whether they can appeal to emerging or long-standing values 
(Schmidt 2006a: 252). Similarly, Goldstein argues that ideas that ‘fit’ with existing ideas 
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gain persuasiveness, while “ideas that do not ‘fit’ with underlying social values are unlikely 
to find support among political entrepreneurs and the attentive public” (cited in: Yee 1996: 
90-91). In the case of welfare state adjustments, for example, governments try to argue that 
the reforms do not violate accepted norms such as universalism, equality or social solidarity. 
Discourses can also appeal to competing values that have broad moral support such as 
neoliberal arguments promoting individual responsibility for welfare provision (Schmidt 
2003: 135). 
 
The storyline is a particularly useful concept for the analysis in this thesis because of its 
emphasis on the opportunities for creating policy and institutional change (see e.g. Lovell, 
Bulkeley et al. 2009). Institutions and their continuous reproduction through discourses can 
be challenged when critical tensions in the dominant storyline appears, coupled with the 
emergence of counter-storylines based on new problems, new knowledge or external 
shocks. In this situation “[f]inding or reconstructing the appropriate storyline becomes a 
central form of agency for the political actor” (Fischer 2003: 88). 
 
2.4.2 The interactive process of policy construction and communication 
 
While the storyline concept focuses on the substantive content of ideas, it is also important 
to consider discourses as interactive processes through which ideas are conveyed (Schmidt 
2001: 249). Schmidt and Radaelli (2004: 183) argue that “this interactive dimension is 
essential because it brings both agency and institutions back into the analytical framework 
of analysis”. Hajer sees the argumentative interaction as “a key moment in discourse 
formation that needs to be studied to be able to explain the prevalence of certain discursive 
constructions” (Hajer 1995: 54). 
 
Schmidt (2003) distinguishes two closely interlinked processes in these interactions aimed 
at generating and legitimising ideas which involve different actor groups. Policy ideas are 
generated and constructed through communication between key policy actors. This is what 
Schmidt terms the coordinative discourse. In these processes the main actors are policy 
actors: experts, organised interests, civil servants, elected officials, and public figures who 
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coordinate the construction of policy often using ideas conveyed by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ 
and/or developed in discursive communities such as discourse coalitions. The coordinative 
discourse is often closed to public view (Schmidt 2006a: 254). 
 
However, getting policy ideas deliberated and legitimised, at least in democratic political 
systems, requires political communication with the public about policy problems and their 
envisaged solutions. This is what Schmidt terms the communicative discourse. She argues 
that the main actors in this process are political actors – politicians, spin doctors, campaign 
managers, government spokespersons, and party activists who communicate the ideas 
developed in the context of the coordinative discourse to the public. This includes the 
‘weak’ public made up of citizens as well as ‘informed publics’ made up of ‘organised 
private persons’ or policy forums made up of community leaders, activists, experts, 
organised interests and media. In this process ideas are not only communicated in one way 
but they are discussed, deliberated and ideally modified (Schmidt 2006a: 254-255). The 
coordinative and the communicative discourse are closely intertwined, might happen 
sequentially or in parallel and are only separated heuristically to gain analytical clarity 
about these two different dimensions of discursive processes. 
 
In both of these processes discourse coalitions play an important role. Hajer defines 
discourse coalitions “as the ensemble of (1) a set of story-lines; (2) actors who utter these 
story-lines; and (3) the practices in which this discursive activity is based (Hajer 1995: 65). 
Storylines are the ‘discursive cement’ that holds a discourse coalition together through the 
production of ‘discursive affinities’ (Hajer 1995; Ockwell and Rydin 2006). Hajer describes 
how discourse coalitions are formed “if previously independent practices are being actively 
related to one another, if a common discourse is created in which several practices get a 
meaning in a common political project” (Hajer 1995: 65). Hajer emphasises that discourse 
coalitions compete for influence on policy design and implementation. He sees the 
argumentative interaction as “a key moment in discourse formation that needs to be studied 
to be able to explain the prevalence of certain discursive constructions” (Hajer 1995: 54). 
Discourse coalitions can stretch from politics, to science, regulators, NGOs, journalists and 
academics. It is thus important to focus the analysis not only on governmental actors. 
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In contrast to Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1993) actors in discourse 
coalitions are not bound together by shared belief systems but by a shared set of storylines 
in the context of an identifiable set of practices (Hajer 1995; Fischer 2003: 107). This also 
distinguishes them from, for example, interest-based policy networks which have been 
analysed mainly using power dependence theory or rational choice approaches (Rhodes 
2006). Discourse coalitions form in the struggle for hegemony amongst actors who possibly 
perceive their position and interests through widely differing discourses. Bulkeley has 
shown in her case study of Australia that despite differences in beliefs and interests, “actors 
create coherent storylines about the climate change problem by drawing on the arguments, 
example, evidence, and legitimacy of others in the coalition, which are used to press for 
policy change” (Bulkeley 2000: 739). 
 
Schmidt herself points out that it is often difficult to separate ideas from the processes 
through which they are generated and constructed (coordinative dimension) and publicly 
presented and deliberated (communicative dimension) (Schmidt 2003), but this distinction 
still seems to be a useful heuristic complementing the analysis of storylines which focus on 
the content of ideas. 
 
 
2.4.3 The institutional context 
 
As emphasised in both Hajer and Schmidt’s work, discourses as well as opportunities and 
constraints for political change are influenced by the institutional context. The basic 
argument of institutional approaches is that institutions do matter and that “something 
about institutions…explains the decisions that governments make” (Peters 2005: 164). 
Institutions are widely understood as formal and informal rules, including formal structures 
in government (such as bureaucracies and legislatures), but also informal societal structures 
(such as interest representation in policy formulation and implementation, and party 
systems) which influence policy making (see e.g. Lijphart 1999; Schmidt and Radaelli 
2004; Peters 2005). In Schmidt’s words institutions “whether understood as interest-based, 
historically evolving, or socially constituted rules of behaviour – frame the discourse, 
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defining repertoires of more or less acceptable (and expectable) discursive interactions” 
(Schmidt 2003: 129-130). Writing about the new institutional analysis of the effects of 
ideas on policy, Yee similarly argues that institutions influence which ideas gain political 
access: “The organization of the political system as a whole affects the entry of ideas into 
the policymaking process by allowing or restricting the access of social groups to political 
leaders and bureaucratic officials” (Yee 1996: 92). The institutional norms and 
arrangements “set the parameters of what people talk about as well as of who talks to whom 
in the process of policy-making” (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 197). The overall argument 
is that the formal institutional system has an influence on how policies are made and which 
actors can take part in the processes of policy formulation and implementation. 
 
However, it is also important to note that despite looking at the characteristics within a 
nation state, international institutional rules (e.g. EU rules) play an important role in policy 
making. There might also be major institutional differences in different policy areas. Indeed 
one of the main contributions of the policy studies literature is the idea that decision-
making varies vastly from policy sector to policy sector (John 2003: 482). So while some 
dimensions of the institutional context might be determined by the national context (such as 
the parliamentary system), others might differ according to the specific policy area and can 
also change over time (Schmidt 2006a: 225 also acknowledges this point). It is thus 
necessary in the analysis of the case studies to pay attention to both the national institutions 
and international rules as well as sector-specific rules and arrangements.  
 
Apart from the formal institutional arrangement there are also informal institutions which 
play a role in policy-making processes such as norms, practices and beliefs which constitute 
the ‘rules of the game’. Unruh (2000), for instance, mentions norms, values and customs as 
examples of informal institutions. Another example might be organisational routines. John 
argues that institutions are in part formal arrangements “but there are also the practices 
embedded in formal organizational arrangements, which are sometimes called standard 
operating procedures” (John 2003: 483-484).  
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These informal ‘rules of the game’ on the one hand shape more or less acceptable ideas and 
discursive interactions (Schmidt 2008). This is very much in line with Hajer who has 
argued that institutions shape what can be said meaningfully (Hajer 1995) or Fischer’s 
notion that actors “are constrained not only by conventional understandings and agreed-
upon rules of the game but also by mutual positioning, existing institutional routines, and 
changing contexts” (Fischer 2003: 106). On the other hand institutions also need to be 
‘discursively upheld’ as they do not have a cognitive capacity of their own (Schmidt and 
Radaelli 2004) and should be viewed as incentive structures rather than actors (Immergut 
2006: 567). 
 
One key finding of the institutionalist literature is that institutions are difficult to change 
because they are path dependent. Path dependency contributes to the stability of institutions 
by making reversals unattractive as actors have made commitments on the basis of existing 
rules in the expectation that these will continue to exist (Pierson 2000a; 2000b). Path 
dependence, however, not only applies to institutions, “but the very ideas on which they are 
predicated and which inform their design and development, that exert constraints on 
political autonomy” (Hay 2006: 7). This is what Hay calls ‘ideational path dependence’. 
Ideas solidified in norms and rules present ‘cognitive filters’. 
 
Schmidt (2008: 313) argues that the other three new institutionalist strands have made 
institutions overly ‘sticky’, whereas the turn to ideas and discourse is an effort to ‘unstick’ 
institutions. Rational choice, and sociological and historical institutionalism are unable to 
explain path-shaping rather than path-dependent institutional change (Hay 2006). However, 
from a discursive point of view, institutions are seen as being constituted by practices and 
Hajer argues they are in need of discursive ‘software’ to operate and produce effects. 
According to Hajer, “institutions are only powerful in so far [as] they are constituted as 
authorities vis-à-vis other actors through discourse” (1995: 51). Hajer refers to the duality 
of agency and structure and argues that change comes about through the interaction 
between agents and structures (1995: 58). Schmidt would agree with this line of thinking 
and points out that actors have ‘background ideational abilities’ as well as ‘foreground 
discursive abilities’:  
54 
 
“Agents’ background ideational abilities enable them to act in any given 
meaning context to create and maintain institutions while their foreground 
discursive abilities enable them to communicate critically about those 
institutions and so to change or maintain them” (Schmidt 2008: 322). 
There is therefore a recursive relationship between the institutional context and discourses. 
Institutions play a constraining (control and constrain behaviour) as well as enabling 
(support and empower action) role (see e.g. Scott 2008: 50) and discourses can solidify into 
new institutional arrangements (Hajer 1995). As Hill eloquently puts it: “Political activity is 
not just a game played within rules, it also involves efforts to renegotiate those rules” 
(2005: 83). 
 
 
2.4.4 Change in policy practices and institutions 
 
Thus, the important question is when a discourse becomes dominant and makes a difference 
in terms of changes in policies and institutions? As outlined above, usually several 
competing discourse coalitions wrestle for political influence. Hajer has suggested a two-
step procedure for assessing the influence of a discourse: is the discourse being used by 
many people to conceptualise the world (discourse structuration)? Has the discourse 
solidified into institutions and organisational practices (discourse institutionalisation)? 
Hajer argues that if both criteria are fulfilled a particular discourse has become dominant 
(Hajer 1995: 60-61). I will now turn to these two concepts. 
 
As the discourse analytic framework developed by Hajer is not only based on textual 
analysis of what is said by whom and why, but also includes the practices and institutional 
changes, it is essential to assess the importance of a discourse on those practices. The first 
condition necessary for this to happen is that a discourse has to become so important that it 
cannot easily be ignored by policy actors when they discuss an issue. Hajer posits: “We will 
speak of the condition of discourse structuration if the credibility of actors in a given 
domain requires them to draw on the ideas, concepts, and categories of a given discourse” 
(Hajer 1995: 60). Structuration thus describes the extent to which a discourse becomes 
credible in policy debates: the storylines and agents of a discourse coalition achieve 
discursive hegemony by achieving coherence and credibility (Bulkeley 2000: 735). Hajer 
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talks of discourse structuration when the discourse starts to dominate the way a social unit 
conceptualises the world according to this discourse. The more actors use a certain 
definition of the world according to a specific discourse, the more powerful the discourse is.  
 
The second step for assessing the influence of a discourse is to look at its 
institutionalisation. The institutionalisation of discourses occurs when a discourse solidifies 
in particular institutional arrangements and concrete policies (Hajer 1995: 61). Tracing 
discourses in policy documents and reconstructing storylines thus needs to be combined 
with the analysis of its effects in terms of changing policies and institutions. Dryzek 
similarly includes effects on institutions and policies as important items for assessing the 
effects of discourses (Dryzek 1997: 20).  
 
In Hajer’s account of the emergence of ecological modernisation in the Netherlands it was 
this phase in particular that was problematic. After the eco-modernist storyline had 
managed to get integrated into the mainstream (discourse structuration) it failed to produce 
substantially different outcomes because of various “institutionally embedded micro-
powers” (Hajer 1995: 175). Hajer’s analysis highlights a number of mechanisms such as 
‘ambivalent storylines’, the role of ‘disjunction markers’, ‘symbolic politics’, the need for 
‘sensory experience’, the discursive creation of ‘macro actors’, the ‘social construction of 
ignorance’, ‘black boxing’, positioning and ‘mutual functionalisation’ as well as structured 
ways of arguing (Hajer 1995: 268-275). Bulkeley similarly concludes from her analysis of 
storylines in the Australian climate change debate that while a degree of discourse 
structuration took place around the no-regrets storyline, “its institutionalisation has been 
effectively limited by traditional concerns to ensure that demands for energy are met and 
business continues as usual” (Bulkeley 2000: 745). These points show that new problem 
definitions embedded in a particular new storyline do not necessarily, even if shared among 
a variety of actors in a policy area, translate into policy and institutional changes. The 
cross-case analysis in chapter 6 will return to such mechanisms in more detail. 
 
The empirical analysis of the two case studies will thus critically assess whether in practice 
the new storylines led to changes in policies or institutions. As the main interest of the 
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thesis is the effects of particular discourses on policy initiatives to transform the electricity 
system, the analysis will focus on the effects of the discourses on policy practices and 
institutions. 
 
 
2.4.5 Summary of the analytical framework 
 
Combining concepts from the work of Hajer and Schmidt, this thesis uses the storylines 
concept to shed light on the normative and cognitive ideas used to promote policy and 
institutional change in the two case studies. By looking at the discourse coalitions involved 
in the interactive process of policy construction and communication it pays attention to 
agency. This focus on actors and agency is complemented by considering the institutional 
context in which the discursive interactions occur. The thesis finally assesses whether and 
how the analysed processes led to change in policy practices and institutions. 
 
Figure 2: Analytical Framework of the thesis 
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2.5 Discussion of challenges confronting the Analytical 
Framework 
 
Any analytical framework has ‘weak’ or ‘blind’ spots and can only investigate a particular 
part of the complex social world. It is therefore important to be transparent about, and 
reflect on, the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen analytical framework. 
 
Although the theoretical position of this thesis is open to the claim that discourses matter it 
does not argue for ‘ideas all the way’. First, whether discourses matter for policy and 
institutional change in particular instances needs to be analysed empirically. Second, it is 
clear that more traditional variables like material resources play a role in policy processes 
but cannot ex ante be considered as sufficient explanatory factors, as argued above. This 
thesis agrees with Bulkeley who argues that “An acknowledgement of the roles of 
discourse, negotiation, and learning within the policy process does not deny the importance 
of considering interests and resource interdependencies” (Bulkeley 2000: 745). Thirdly, it 
is acknowledged that one limit of the influence of discourse is the fact that governments in 
capitalist economies have to fulfil a number of basic functions irrespective of discourse, 
most importantly ensuring continued economic growth: however, as Dryzek suggested, the 
relative influence of discourse and this kind of economic constraint on government policies 
should be investigated empirically for particular cases (Dryzek 1997: 12). 
 
One particular challenge is posed by the essentially nation-level focus of the analysis which 
makes it difficult to take international factors into consideration (such as cross-national 
epistemic communities, general technological trends, etc). While the definition of 
institutions allows international institutions to be integrated into the analysis the focus is 
clearly on national policy contexts. However, international factors such as EU state aid 
rules have been included in the analysis if they were mentioned by actors as playing a 
major role. 
 
Sharp and Richardson point out that one limitation of discourse analysis is that it has 
difficulties linking analysis to material outcomes of policy (Sharp and Richardson 2001). 
This is true but is a more general problem in the field of policy studies. The complexity of 
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societies makes it difficult to causally link any particular policy instrument to a particular 
condition in society. Policy analysis thus often deals only with explaining policy outputs 
such as setting up new policy instruments or institutions, rather then policy outcomes. This 
is also true for this thesis. The analysis aims at explaining processes of policy and 
institutional change rather then the impact the analysed policy initiatives have on the 
electricity system, and therefore focuses on the processes as well as policy outputs. 
However, even if such an analysis was possible, it could not in any case be done yet as the 
sustainable transformation of electricity systems is a long-term process. It is thus too early 
to look at outcomes. Nevertheless, the conclusions will also attempt to shed some light on 
the preliminary outcomes of the analysed policy initiatives based on indicators such as 
reduction in carbon emissions. 
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3 Methodology 
 
The thesis undertakes case studies of two selected policy initiatives aimed at promoting 
‘system innovations’ to achieve more sustainable electricity systems in the UK and the 
Netherlands. It uses a process tracing method. This chapter justifies the research design of 
the thesis and describes the methodology used. 
 
 
3.1 Studying discursive politics: Ontological and Epistemological 
Assumptions 
 
In order to be able to judge the suitability of the chosen research design and methods for the 
analysis presented in this thesis, it is necessary to clarify the main ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of the work as these have implications for the methodology. 
To do so the differing assumptions underlying Hajer’s and Schmidt’s work will be outlined 
before positioning this thesis in the ‘critical realist’ tradition. 
 
 
3.1.1 Ontology 
 
In terms of ontology, “Scholars have beliefs about what the social world is made of and 
how it operates, and these beliefs influence their choices about how to construct and verify 
knowledge statements about that world” (Bennett and Elman 2006: 456-457). Most 
important for this thesis are the following categories: 
- Discourses 
- Interests 
- Institutions  
- Politics. 
 
As explained above, the underlying assumption is that discourses and interests are not 
independent of each other but have a recursive relationship: interests can influence 
discourses but discourses can also shape the understanding of what the interests of an actor 
are, especially in times of uncertainty. Following Blyth’s argument it is not the direct 
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material interests which shape actors behaviour but their particular perceptions of their 
material interests, and so ideas render interests ‘actionable’ (Blyth 2002: 39). However, 
while it is important not to see discourses as a reflection of material interests, it is also 
important not to subscribe to a voluntarist idealism. Instead, a recognition is required  
“of the complex interaction of material and ideational factors. Political 
outcomes are, in short, neither a simple reflection of actors’ intentions and 
understandings nor the contexts which give rise to such intentions and 
understandings” (Hay 2002: 208). 
 
Similarly, discourses and institutions have a recursive relationship as well. As outlined 
above, discourses are to some extent shaped by existing institutions (Hajer 1995; Schmidt 
and Radaelli 2004), but they can also chart new institutional paths and shape the evolution 
of institutions (Fischer 2003: 44-45; Schmidt 2003).  
 
Figure 3: Ontological Assumptions: Discourses, Interests and Institutions 
 
 
Discourses        Interests          
 
 
 
  
      Institutions 
 
 
From this ontological position the interplay of ideas, interests and institutions leads to 
policy change. Which of these three variables has the most effect in a given policy process 
at any point in time is an empirical question. In summary, discourses can both influence 
and be influenced by interests and institutions and are taken as the entry point for the 
analysis. 
 
 
3.1.2 Epistemology 
 
Schmidt’s work on discursive institutionalism is aimed at demonstrating empirically the 
causal influence of ideas as explanatory of policy and institutional change (Schmidt 2006b). 
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Schmidt claims the same epistemological status for her ‘discursive institutionalism’ as the 
rational choice, historical or sociological institutionalism. It is a “framework for analysis 
that generates theories to be tested, but it is not itself a theory” (Schmidt 2003: 130). 
Nullmeier points out that despite the fact that Schmidt takes ideas seriously her work does 
not represent genuine social constructivism because she firstly retains the distinction 
between ideas and interests and secondly argues that when ideas do not transform interests 
they ‘merely reflect’ interests. Nullmeier is right in arguing that social constructivists 
“would insist that the reproduction of those schemata on which our interests (and 
institutions) are based is an achievement of communication and discourse” (Nullmeier 
2006: 3). 
 
Schmidt and Radaelli argue that: 
“our emphasis on discourse is compatible with different epistemological 
approaches to the study of the policy process, along a continuum from 
positivist approaches in which ideas may be mainly seen as reflecting the 
strategic interests of actors to constructivist approaches in which ideas are 
seen to constitute interests” (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 194).  
Schmidt and Radaelli advocate an ‘ecumenical view’ as they argue for the analysis of 
ideational variables in the context of institutional and interest-based variables. In their view 
interests and discourse have a recursive relationship and which factor influences the other is 
an empirical question. 
 
In Hajer’s view those would be difficult to combine, since discourse for him defines 
interests (Hajer 1995). Hajer makes a much more definitive claim: in his view discourse 
always matters and interests and institutions do not exist independently of discourse. 
Interests are defined by discursive positioning and institutions are understood as past 
discourses ‘solidified’. Hajer’s research on the rise of the ecological modernisation 
discourse was aimed at explaining how the problem of acid rain was understood and 
tackled differently in the UK and the Netherlands (Hajer 1995: 105-106). Hajer wanted to 
demonstrate how social constructivism and discourse analysis “add essential insights to our 
analysis of contemporary environmental politics” (Hajer 1995: 3). Hajer and Versteeg 
maintain that the “analysis of discourses can help to illuminate why certain definitions do 
or do not catch on at a particular place and time and to explain the mechanisms by which a 
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policy does or does not come about” (Hajer and Versteeg 2005: 177). The discourse 
analytic epistemology is mainly focussed on “illuminating mechanisms in policy practice, 
rather than on trying to generate general laws” (Hajer and Laws 2006: 262). While general 
laws are rejected, theoretically informed explanations of mechanisms at work in policy 
processes are possible and desirable.  
 
An important feature of epistemology is assumptions about the extent to which knowledge 
claims can be generalised (Hay 2002: 63). In line with Hajer and Schmidt’s thinking, this 
thesis adopts the position that contingent generalisations6 (as middle-range theories) are 
possible and that it is therefore possible to theorise about political processes; although the 
reflexivity of the social actors studied makes this more difficult than in the natural sciences. 
There are no immutable foundational truths in social life and predictive theory is not always 
possible (George and Bennett 2005). 
 
To avoid accusations of relativism, this thesis adopts a ‘critical realist’ position. This school 
of thought proposes that reality exists independently of our ideas about it, that this is to an 
extent knowable, but that our access to reality is indirect and fallible; not everything can be 
verified by direct experience or observation (Proctor 1998). This position thus distinguishes 
between reality and our knowledge of it which necessarily carries cultural, political and 
other meanings. In critical realism knowledge  
“is neither wholly objective nor subjective but is in fact the result of 
interaction between subject and object: For critical realists, the truth-
content of different ideas can be compared on a relative basis: some 
(social) explanations are more adequate representations of reality than 
others, though all are, by virtue of the dialectic (subject-object) nature of 
knowledge, always ‘partial truth’” (Proctor 1998: 361). 
 
Realist thought stipulates that causal mechanisms and their effects are not fixed, but 
contingent on the conditions in which they work (Sayer 1992: 108). Fischer describes a 
continuum from idealists (who exaggerate the role of ideas at the expense of economic and 
political interests) and materialists (who see ideas as rationalisations of interests) (Fischer 
                                                 
6 George and Benett understand ‘contingent generalisations’ as specifying the conditions under which a 
proposed mechanism is at play and conditions under which it is overridden by other mechanisms (George and 
Bennett 2005: 8). 
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2003: 23-24). The ‘critical realist’ position advocated here constitutes a compromise 
between purely materialist, positivist positions which neglect the formative power of ideas, 
and entirely constructivist positions which reject an independent role for material reality 
outside of discourse (Proctor 1998). Adopting such a middle-ground position makes it 
possible to use a research method like process tracing, which will be explained in more 
detail below. 
 
 
3.2 Process tracing as a method to explain policy change 
 
Process tracing is an analytical approach to reconstruct a process and identify causal 
mechanisms in a complex phenomenon. According to George and Bennett,  
“In process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, 
interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a 
theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence 
and values of the intervening variables in that case” (George and Bennett 
2005: 6). 
Process tracing can be used to test theories but can also be used to generate inductively new 
variables or hypotheses from the mechanisms observed in case studies (George and Bennett 
2005: 7). In particular, when theories are underspecified, process tracing can be used to 
further develop middle-range theory by identifying one or more causal processes that 
explain an outcome. Process tracing fits with the ‘critical realist’ position outlined above as 
it does not aim at establishing general laws (if X, then Y) but at identifying contingent 
mechanisms (X leads to Y in this case, through steps A, B, C). The process tracing method 
does not necessarily rely on simple linear reasoning but, through detailed case studies, can 
take interacting causal variables into account (such as ideas, institutions and interests) for 
the explanation of complex processes. 
 
Process tracing is the shared emphasis of historical and discursive institutionalism (Hay 
2001: 213) and has recently received a lot of attention as a tool in qualitative research more 
generally (George and Bennett 2005; Bennett and Elman 2006; Checkel 2006; Tansey 
2007). Process tracing has been suggested as a useful research strategy to empirically 
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demonstrate the causal influence of ideas in policy processes (Yee 1996; Campbell 2002; 
Schmidt 2006a). Yee argues that causal links between ideas and policies need to be 
explained in terms of causal mechanisms that render the meaning of ideas and beliefs 
compelling to actors (Yee 1996: 102). He suggests that such mechanisms can be identified 
through, for example, historical methods such as archival research, interviewing elite 
informants and participant observation. For discourse analysis scholars the task has been 
described as being to “reconstruct the policy process, gathering information about critical 
events and processes that explained the operation and effects of discourses” (Sharp and 
Richardson 2001: 205). Campbell also recommends careful process tracing as one method 
to explain how ideas affect policy making processes by showing “how specific actors 
carried certain ideas into the policy-making fray and used them effectively” (Campbell 
2002: 29).  
 
For these reasons this thesis follows a process tracing method in the context of a broader 
case study approach focussing on explaining the discursive politics of two selected policy 
initiatives. The case study approach will be explained in more detail in the following 
section. 
 
 
3.3 Case study approach 
 
The chosen methodology for this thesis is a case study approach. The following sections 
will thus explain the rationale for choosing this approach, justify the choice of the two cases 
used, and specify the unit of analysis. 
 
3.3.1 Rationale for choosing a case study approach 
 
This thesis is based on two case studies. The most commonly used definition of case 
studies is as follows: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994: 13). Case studies are a good 
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methodology to use in situations when one is aiming at understanding complex and 
contemporary social phenomena (following Yin 1994), such as the politics of policy 
processes. Case studies are valuable because  
“the key to explaining how [policy] change comes about has to be 
grounded in a detailed contextual examination of the circumstances at play 
in specific cases. For this purpose quantitative methods have to take a back 
seat to qualitative research” (Fischer 2003: 108). 
 
Case study research is a distinctively advantageous avenue for research that is explanatory, 
analysing a contemporary phenomenon over which the investigator has little or no control 
(Yin 1994: 9). This is the case with this thesis topic. Case studies enable the researcher to 
retain holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin 1994: 3), which is 
crucial in understanding the politics of policy processes. Case studies can be used to 
accomplish different aims, for example to provide description, test theory or generate 
theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994; George and Bennett 2005) and are therefore a good 
strategy for this thesis as the research questions are partly aimed at providing empirically 
rich descriptions of the policy processes through which the two initiatives came about, but 
also at explaining the politics of such initiatives by looking at the interaction between 
discourses and institutions. Case studies are an appropriate research technique to answer 
questions of ‘why’ and ‘how’ as this requires tracing operational links over time (Yin 1994: 
6). 
 
Case studies have also been suggested as the central approach for carrying out process 
tracing in order to identify causal mechanisms (Gerring 2004: 348; George and Bennett 
2005). Case studies have distinct advantages when it comes to “the development and testing 
of historical explanations and the detailed exploration of hypothesized causal mechanisms 
in the context of particular cases” (George and Bennett 2005: 6). They also enable the 
researcher to include both material and ideational variables and look at complex interaction 
effects between different variables (such as discourses, institutions and interests).  
 
Case studies attract criticism concerning their ability to generate generalisable knowledge 
from the study of individual cases. The design of this thesis thus combines within-case 
analysis of two in-depth case studies with a comparative analysis across the two cases. This 
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has been argued to be the strongest means for drawing inferences from case studies (George 
and Bennett 2005: 18). Multiple case studies have the advantage of being more reliable 
than single case studies and are less prone to criticisms about the generalisability of 
findings from single case studies (Hakim 1987; Yin 1994). 
 
 
3.3.2 Selection of cases 
 
The choice of the two countries to be studied in this thesis (the UK and the Netherlands) is 
based on a strategic sampling approach. The rationale behind the case selection was not to 
choose representative cases of a given category but to choose cases which display a high 
degree of the phenomenon under study (Pettigrew 1990) and are polar in the sense of 
covering the ‘known range and variation’ (Hakim 1987).  
 
In terms of high degree of phenomenon (in this thesis the fostering of ‘system innovations’ 
towards sustainable electricity systems), both countries adopted ambitious long-term goals 
with regard to future sustainable electricity systems early on compared to other European 
countries. The UK Energy White Paper of 2003 envisions a 60% cut in carbon emissions 
by 2050 (DTI 2003)7 and the Fourth Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan of 2001 
speaks of 40-50% cuts in carbon emissions by 2030 (VROM 2001). Other countries around 
this time adopted only short- or medium-term goals. The German National Climate Change 
Programme of 2000 for example only aimed to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 25% by 
2005 and to increase the share of renewables to 10% by 2010 (BMU 2000: 7). Given these 
ambitious, long-term goals, both countries will need fundamental changes in their 
electricity systems. Both governments have developed new ‘system innovation’ policy 
initiatives to support the ‘greening’ of their electricity systems. Both cases are therefore 
‘special cases’ in the sense that they adopted long-term goals and developed a new type of 
policy initiative aimed at ‘system innovations’ which differs from traditional innovation 
policy measures to support green product or process innovations. Both case studies are 
exemplars within this category – as far as the author of this thesis is aware they are the only 
                                                 
7 This goal was later strengthened to 80% through the 2008 Climate Change Act. 
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two initiatives in both countries aimed at stimulating transformations of the electricity 
systems towards sustainability, which is the interest of this thesis. 
 
What makes policy initiatives aimed at ‘system innovations’ special, apart from their level 
of ambition, is the fact that long-term, systemic change processes are particularly uncertain 
as they are non-linear processes (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001a; Geels 2005b). As has been 
argued above, this has been hypothesised to lead to a situation of uncertainty in which 
actors are uncertain about the best ways to safeguard their interests (Blyth 2002). This 
context would thus suggest that the cases are examples of ‘most likely’ cases in which the 
interaction between ideas and interests should be particularly evident if discourses do 
indeed have an influence on the politics of policy processes. If discourses cannot be shown 
to exert a transformative influence on interests and institutions in these cases, the discursive 
institutionalist claim would be significantly challenged. 
 
In terms of their polarity, Hajer has already pointed to the very different discursive 
structures, policy styles and traditions in the two countries, which makes the comparison an 
interesting one (Hajer 1995: 6-7). Also, Voß suggested that governance patterns in shaping 
long-term change in electricity systems are remarkably different in those two countries 
(Voß 2004). The UK has a long tradition of neoliberal market-based policies in the energy 
sector (IEA 2007; Toke and Lauber 2007). The Netherlands is well known for its capacity 
for environmental planning, its innovations in environmental policy and for its consensual 
approach to target-group involvement and thus has a long tradition of cooperation between 
government and energy companies, for example through the use of covenants (Weale 1992; 
Hajer 1995; Gouldson and Murphy 1998; Jänicke, Kunig et al. 2000; Jörgens 2003). The 
Dutch ‘polder model’ of consensual decision-making between different societal groups and 
the state leads to a more corporatist governance approach (see e.g. Schmidt 2006a) 
although liberalisation has had an impact on the governance of the energy system, putting 
more emphasis on market mechanisms (Agterbosch, Vermeulen et al. 2004).  
 
The differing national institutional contexts are an advantage rather than a problem for the 
contrasting of the cases as the thesis claims that the analysed phenomena of politics are 
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generic to the nature of the challenge of transforming electricity systems rather than to 
specific national political contexts or policy approaches. In this sense the choice of case 
studies therefore also follows a ‘most different’ case selection logic (Blyth 2002: 12). If 
everything else other than the independent and dependent variable is different in the two 
cases, this highlights the importance of the independent variables in explaining the 
processes under study. 
 
The Dutch case study will analyse the Energy Transition which followed the Fourth 
National Environmental Policy Plan to achieve transitions in important societal sectors like 
energy. This policy initiative is explicitly based on socio-technical transitions theory as 
advocated by Dutch scholars and is explicitly aimed at influencing systemic change 
towards sustainability in energy.  
 
The UK case study is not a straightforward comparative case study as there is no functional 
equivalent to the Dutch Energy Transition. However, the second case study serves as a 
contrasting reference point as similar concerns about the necessity for systemic change in 
the electricity system have led to an initiative which is markedly different from the one in 
the Netherlands. While the Dutch approach is based on a stakeholder process (transition 
platforms), the UK Government set up a private company limited by guarantee (the Carbon 
Trust) to ‘accelerate the transition to a low carbon economy’ (Carbon Trust 2007a). This 
initiative is also based on a systemic approach in that it combines attention to new supply 
technologies, as well as demand-side measures to increase energy efficiency and energy 
saving by firms and public authorities, management, regulatory, organisational and 
investment issues. It also includes information and policy advice as crucial for enabling this 
transformation to happen and thus pays attention to technical as well as social change. 
 
Besides these theoretical considerations, the two cases are also of particular interest on their 
own terms as: 
- the Energy Transition project and the Carbon Trust are both considered as unique 
and novel policy initiatives that are supposed to transform electricity systems 
towards sustainability and which have attracted international policy attention; 
- the establishment of the Carbon Trust has not yet been analysed empirically at all;  
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- whereas the Energy Transition has received some attention, it was mostly analysed 
in comparison to the original transition management model. The emergence of the 
new approach and its impact on the implementation have not yet been analysed in 
depth. 
 
 
3.3.3 Unit of analysis 
 
The unit of analysis in both case studies is the selected policy initiative aimed at greening 
the electricity system. Although the unit of analysis is the policy initiative it is important to 
look not only at the governmental actors but also at the private and civil society actors 
involved in the problem-framing through new storylines, the processes of policy 
coordination and communication, and the structuration of the storyline which influenced 
the process of setting up and implementing these policy initiatives (discourse 
institutionalisation). The analysis of the two initiatives covers the time period between 
1997/8 (when the ideas of the storylines were initially conceived) and 2006 and 2008 (when 
the interviews took place for the Dutch and the UK case respectively). Such an extended 
period of time is usually considered adequate to analyse processes of policy change 
(Sabatier 1993). 
 
It has been argued that despite globalisation and the major role the European Union is 
playing, national technology and innovation policies are still central as they remain the 
most important and effective level of governance in this policy field (Dolata 2005). Others 
have also shown that in the field of environmental policy the nation state is still the most 
relevant actor and there are no tendencies to suggest that the state is ‘withering away’ 
(Jänicke 2005b). More specific to energy policy, despite recent attempts to establish an EU 
energy policy, policy in this field is mainly determined by national politics (Helm 2007; 
McGowan 2009). 
 
 
3.4  Sources of Data Collection and Methods of Data Analysis 
 
The analysis of the two case studies relies on three sources of data: 
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- review of relevant literature; 
- analysis of relevant policy documents (including parliamentary records, policy 
reports, government publications); 
- analysis of semi-structured interviews. 
 
It triangulates between the information from those different sources, which is a 
recommended strategy for collecting evidence in case study research (Yin 1994; George 
and Bennett 2005). In the following sections these three sources of data will be discussed in 
more detail.  
 
 
3.4.1 Relevant literature 
 
The relevant literature includes publications on energy, technology, and environmental and 
innovation policy in the Netherlands and the UK. The literature review was based on a 
systematic search through the Web of Science using keywords such as energy, innovation, 
sustainability, transition, discourse, UK, Netherlands, etc. The IEA national energy policy 
reports for the UK and the Netherlands have also been a valuable source (IEA 2000; IEA 
2002; IEA 2004a; IEA 2007). Important for the Dutch case study especially are 
publications which have looked at the implementation of the transition management 
approach in the energy domain (Hofman 2005; Kemp and Loorbach 2005; Kemp, Rotmans 
et al. 2007; Loorbach 2007; Nooteboom 2007; Dietz, Brouwer et al. 2008; Hendriks 2008; 
Loorbach and Kemp 2008) because they can help to triangulate the findings of this case 
study.  
 
My involvement in a study of the Dutch energy transition led by Adrian Smith not only 
funded my fieldwork, but also helped shape my initial thinking and led to two co-authored 
publications (Kern and Smith 2008; Smith and Kern 2009)8. The joint project showed that 
                                                 
8 The empirical material for these publications was gathered by the author of this thesis and he has been active 
in the detailed research design, was responsible for all the practical research effort, undertook the key 
preliminary analysis of research materials (documents and interviews) and co-authored two papers with 
Adrian Smith. The division of labour in the project was largely identical to the supervisor-research student 
relationship. The main difference was that the project was initially framed by Adrian Smith. The analysis of 
the ‘Energy Transition’ presented in this thesis is substantially different from the Smith and Kern 2009 paper. 
The analysis presented in this thesis tries to overcome some of the weaknesses of this paper, which did not 
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existing institutions as well as interests were important factors in explaining the policy 
processes and thus led me to draw extensively on the institutionalist literature in creating 
the framework presented above and to pay more explicit attention to the conceptualisation 
of the relationship between discourses and interests. 
 
The UK literature on the subject is helpful in providing insights into, for example, the 
dominant framing of UK energy policy and the historical evolution of this policy area, but 
there are no publications directly analysing the Carbon Trust. The relevant literature has 
been thoroughly and systematically reviewed to inform the interviews and to triangulate 
conclusions derived from the analysis of the interviews and policy documents.  
 
 
3.4.2 Relevant documents 
 
The analysis of relevant government policy documents offers insights into how these policy 
initiatives are justified and explained. Policy goals and details of the implementation of the 
initiatives and subsequent institutional changes are provided. This includes reports from the 
respective ministries in both countries (mainly Environment, Economy, and Research), and 
the International Energy Agency, as well as from public organisations like the Carbon Trust, 
the National Audit Office in the UK and the Energy Transition Taskforce, SenterNovem, 
and government advisory councils such as the General Energy Council or the VROM 
council in the Netherlands.  
 
For the UK case study the parliamentary records were searched for debates on the Carbon 
Trust (key word search in Hansard). The analysis of the Dutch case study could not make 
use of parliamentary records due to language difficulties. However, since the case has been 
investigated by several Dutch researchers the availability of these secondary sources 
                                                                                                                                                    
explicitly differentiate between the content (ideas) and the processes of the discursive policy construction and 
neglected Hajer’s distinction between discourse structuration and institutionalisation. In contrast, the analysis 
presented in this thesis relates the emerging storyline more explicitly to the dominant discourse; makes use of 
more empirical detail, especially about the institutionalisation, to see which practices changed and why; and 
uses a broader framework which combines attention to discourses (Hajer) with attention to the institutional 
context (Schmidt) because the initial paper had shown the difficulties of institutionalising this new storyline. 
This thesis also pays explicit attention to the discursive mechanisms which shaped the policy initiative. 
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compensates for the lack of access to primary information. Relevant documents also 
include policy evaluations by public authorities in English or independent organisations as 
well as documents authored by stakeholders (such as NGOs, industrial associations, etc.) It 
is important not to privilege official discourses by limiting the analysis to official policy 
documents only, but also to look at opposition and resistance and their rationalities (Oels 
2005: 193). Similarly, Dryzek has argued that in assessing the effects of a discourse it is 
important to look at the arguments of the critics of a discourse (1997: 20). The analysis 
therefore relies not only on official documents but also includes documents from 
stakeholders and critical voices. The relevant documents have been thoroughly and 
systematically reviewed to inform and triangulate the expert interviews, identify storylines 
and gain insights into how the discourses have or have not shaped changes in policies and 
institutions. 
 
 
3.4.3 Semi-structured interviews 
 
Both case studies also make use of semi-structured interviews. A snowballing sampling 
method was used (see Arksey and Knight 1999; Tansey 2007). Tansey has argued that 
because the goal of process tracing is to  
“obtain information about well-defined and specific events and processes, 
the most appropriate sampling procedures are thus those that identify the 
key political actors – those who had the most involvement with the 
processes of interest” (Tansey 2007: 765). 
 
Instead of random sampling the aim is to include the most important actors who were 
involved in the process to be studied. Generalisation from the actors interviewed to a large 
population of actors is not what is aimed for. Rather, the research was interested in their 
personal accounts of these processes and what role they played in them. To be able to 
include first-hand accounts of actors involved in the processes under investigation is one of 
the main advantages of elite interviews compared to the analysis of the official version of 
events found in documents (Tansey 2007). Interviews with key actors can shed light on the 
informal processes underlying decision-making processes (George and Bennett 2005). Also, 
Hajer, Schmidt and Radaelli point to the importance of interviews for exploring causal 
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sequences (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 205). Interviews are particularly useful to get a 
better understanding of the meaning that interviewees attach to particular events (Kvale 
1996: 105). 
 
The snowball approach used for the purposes of this thesis started from existing contacts 
with researchers and civil servants in both countries who helped to identify key actors 
involved in the particular policy processes being studied. Interviewees were then asked for 
further suggestions for other important actors involved in the area under research, and these 
were then contacted if two or more interviewees put forward their names. This process was 
stopped when interviewees began to repeat the names of interviewees already contacted. In 
parallel to this, documents were screened for names of actors mentioned as important. To 
avoid the selection being skewed by interviewees suggesting actors with similar 
characteristics and views, and in order to interview a diverse set of actors, an attempt was 
made to create a balance based on two characteristics. Balance can be sought by 
deliberately seeking opposing positions (Sharp and Richardson 2001), so by including 
‘insider’ and critical ‘outsider’ views on the two initiatives it is hoped that a balance in the 
representation of the policy processes can be achieved. Secondly, balance was sought by 
seeking actors from different domains of society: government, private firms, academia and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as environmental or other lobby groups. 
 
Between January and May 2006, 27 semi-structured interviews were conducted in the 
Netherlands with actors involved in the implementation of the ‘energy transition’ project, 
or those who were familiar with it but were not directly involved, from government, 
industry, civil society and research organisations. 26 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted for the UK case study between October 2007 and March 2008. These were with 
current and former employees of the Carbon Trust and key stakeholders from government, 
research, business and environmental groups. For a list of interviews conducted, see 
Appendix A. 
 
The interviews were conducted as semi-structured, exploratory interviews to allow for 
openness, while maintaining a focus on the key issues to be addressed. Exploratory 
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interviews introduce an issue and then follow up on the interviewees’ answers, seeking new 
information about and new angles on the topic (Kvale 1996: 97). Key issues were: 
- how the interviewees explained the rationale for the new policy initiative and what 
policy problem they were hoping to tackle;  
- why the particular approach was chosen;  
- how the new initiative came about and which key actors were involved; 
- experiences in the implementation of the policy initiatives;  
- reflections on the successes and problems of the initiatives,  
- and potential policy and institutional changes that followed from it. 
 
The interviews were based on a flexible schedule depending on the role of the interviewee 
(for an example of this, see Appendix B), which included a sequence of themes to be 
covered as well as suggested questions. At the same time, however, there was openness to 
changes of sequence and form of questions in order to follow up on the answers given (see 
Kvale 1996). Most of the interviews took place face to face but some were conducted over 
the phone. All interviews have been recorded and transcribed. All interviewees were 
assured that they would remain anonymous to enable them to speak openly. 
 
 
3.4.4 Methods of data analysis 
 
In accordance with Hajer’s suggestion the steps detailed below were followed in 
conducting the analysis. In the document analysis the research looked for structuring 
concepts, ideas and categorisations as well as the use of storylines, metaphors, etc. This 
analysis yields “a basic notion of the process of events as well as the sites of discursive 
production” (Hajer 2000). The analysis of the interview data can be used to generate more 
information on causal chains and to gain a better understanding of the meaning of particular 
events for the interviewees which, for example, have led to a re-framing. This can lead to 
the identification of key events which are essential for understanding the discursive 
dynamics. 
 
If meaning is central to the study of policy processes, this has implications for the methods 
of empirical analysis because “as meanings are not directly observable, the realm of 
meaning has to be approached through reflection and interpretive analysis” (Fischer 2003: 
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139). This information on meaning and causal mechanisms is useful to reconstruct the 
discourses which actors are drawing on and to analyse particular cognitive shifts 
(reframing) which are of interest for the analysis. To this end, the researcher has to try “as it 
were, to get inside the heads of the particular players in an effort to figure out the thinking 
behind the actions at issue” (Fischer 2003: 141).  
 
The analysis is therefore based on meaning interpretation inspired by hermeneutical 
philosophy. Kvale describes this approach as follows: 
“The researcher has a perspective on what is investigated and interprets the 
interviews from this perspective. The interpreter goes beyond what is directly 
said to work out structures and relations of meaning not immediately apparent 
in a text. This requires a certain distance from what is said, which is achieved 
by a methodological or theoretical stance, recontextualizing what is said in a 
specific conceptual context” (Kvale 1996: 201).  
 
The context for this interpretation is provided by the main analytical concepts of this thesis: 
storylines, processes of coordinative and communicative discourse, institutional rules and 
norms and the structuration and implementation of the discourse. To structure the rich 
empirical data of the policy documents, secondary sources and interview transcripts in line 
with these key concepts, a manual coding technique was used.  
 
 
3.5 Operationalisation of the main concepts of the analytical 
framework 
 
The analysis was carried out in four steps, which will be described below. The section will 
also explain how the main concepts have been conceptualised to guide the empirical 
analysis in chapters 4 and 5. Firstly, the ideas of the storylines have been analysed. 
Secondly, the interactive dimension of discourse creation and communication has been 
scrutinised. Thirdly, the analysis of the discourse has been complemented by attention to 
the institutional context of these processes. Lastly, changes in practices have been 
examined to test for the practical influence of discourses. 
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3.5.1 Storylines 
 
Hajer defined a storyline as a “generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon 
various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena” 
(Hajer 1995: 56). Storylines are therefore operationalised as key metaphors, analogies, 
historical references, clichés, and appeals to collective fears or feelings of guilt which are 
used to justify the two policy initiatives studied. Storylines are reconstructed by identifying 
statements that contain elements of the different narratives used in policy discussions (e.g. 
in relation to the problem framing of innovation for sustainable electricity, used metaphors, 
new vocabulary, suggested solutions, reference to possible instruments, etc). The analysis 
focussed on the structuring ideas, themes, narratives and metaphors which recurred 
frequently in the analysis of the interview and documentary evidence. It focussed in 
particular on the way storylines framed: 
- the ways in which innovation processes are understood (e.g. as the ‘chain of 
innovation’ with a ‘valley of death’; or as ‘system innovations’); 
- what needs to be done to foster innovation towards sustainability;  
- whose responsibility this is (and who is ‘to blame’);  
- the ‘division of labour’ between public and private actors,  
- as well as the way in which technology is understood to contribute to solving the 
problems in the electricity system and what role other factors play.  
 
The analysis included competing understandings and framings of the problems of how to 
promote a more sustainable electricity system through policy. If there was disagreement 
between them, this has been explored in an attempt to elicit the reasons for such differences. 
In this, the storylines concept is taken to encompass cognitive and normative ideas, 
concepts and categorisations about fostering innovation for sustainable electricity systems 
(see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: The operationalisation of storylines 
Storylines  
consisting of 
Cognitive ideas 
(logic of necessity) 
Normative ideas 
(logic of appropriateness) 
ideas, concepts,  
categorisations, 
metaphors, analogies, 
historical references, clichés, 
appeals to collective guilt or 
fear 
define problem to be solved, 
propose adequate policy 
solution, often through 
reference to techniques and 
principles of scientific 
disciplines 
‘good’ normative arguments 
demonstrate appropriateness of 
ideas by appealing to existing 
or emerging values, norms and 
principles of public life 
Source: own illustration, based on (Schmidt 2006a; 2007) and (Hajer 1995) 
77 
 
 
As the interest of this thesis is to explain the emergence of the two policy initiatives, the 
analysis concentrated on those selected storylines that were used to promote the new 
initiatives as well as challenges against them. It investigates why and how they were 
successful in initiating policy change. The interview transcripts, policy documents and 
secondary literature were used as sources of data to identify storylines. 
 
 
3.5.2 Interactive process of policy construction and communication 
 
Both Schmidt and Hajer agree that it is not only the ideas and narratives which matter in 
analysing discourses. They both pay explicit attention to how discourses and storylines are 
created (interactive dimension of discourse) and in particular which actors play a role in 
these discursive processes (e.g. discourse coalitions mobilised around shared storylines) 
(Hajer 1995: 20). It is important to emphasise that the analysis included governmental as 
well as non-governmental actors including experts, organised interests, civil servants, 
elected officials, politicians, ‘policy entrepreneurs’, government spokespersons, citizens 
and activists (Schmidt 2006a: 254). 
 
The relevant discourse coalitions have been reconstructed by identifying actors involved in 
the discussions about innovation policy for sustainable electricity who share the usage of a 
storyline over a particular period of time and by tracing the formation of coalitions through 
cross-references between actors and the extent to which actors share practices. Practices 
will involve activities to support innovations (such as R&D activities, demonstration 
projects, energy efficiency measures, regulations, conducting research programmes, new 
forms of partnerships, lobbying activities, etc). The analysis has necessarily been limited to 
some of the main actors. Main actors are those who most frequently participate in the 
policy discourse and are highlighted by other actors as being important. The analysis also 
covered actors who criticise or disagree with the new storylines promoted. The motivations 
and interests of actors are included as far as possible.  
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Besides the focus on actors, the analysis also focussed on key events in the policy process 
of these new policy initiatives which have been highlighted by involved actors as important 
milestones, and what role they played (e.g. publication of key reports).  
 
The following sources of data have been used to shed light on the processes of policy 
construction and communication: interview transcripts, policy documents, parliamentary 
records, policy reports, public statements, and policy announcements as well as interest 
group statements. 
 
 
3.5.3 The institutional context 
 
The institutional context is considered to include formal as well as informal norms which 
vary across countries. Formal institutions considered in the analysis include the governance 
structures (e.g. unitary or federal political system), the electoral system (majority or first-
past-the-post), the division of departmental responsibilities, the rules governing the civil 
service, etc. (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). Informal rules considered in the analysis include 
‘standard operating procedures’ (John 2003; Peters 2005) of organisations, political rules of 
conduct (whether consensual, competitive, or conflictual), administrative practices, etc. 
This is a wide-ranging list of potential institutional factors relevant for the analysis. For the 
purpose of this thesis the analysis of the formal institutions relied mainly on existing 
characterisations available in the literature. In terms of the analysis of informal institutions, 
any norms or rules guiding acceptable behaviour and practices mentioned by interviewees 
or policy documents as important in the specific policy context have been included in the 
analysis. International institutions such as EU rules were included in the analysis when they 
were considered relevant by interviewees or mentioned as important by secondary sources. 
 
 
3.5.4 Change in policy practices and institutions 
 
To assess the importance of a discourse it is necessary to look at two criteria according to 
Hajer: is the discourse being used by many people to conceptualise the world (discourse 
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structuration), and has the discourse solidified into institutions and organisational practices 
(discourse institutionalisation)? Hajer argues that if both criteria are fulfilled a particular 
discourse has become dominant (Hajer 1995: 60-61). 
 
If actors, institutions or organisations speak the language of a particular storyline and thus 
conceptualise their world in the frames of this discourse, discourse structuration has been 
achieved. As for the structuration criterion, the analysis of the two case studies thus looked 
at actors and organisations involved in the policy process under consideration and assessed, 
through their utterances, whether or not they drew on the particular ideas, concepts and 
categories of the emerging storyline. This analysis will be presented as part of the sections 
on the interactive processes of policy construction and communication. 
 
Hajer’s second criterion is about the institutionalisation of discourses. How can the 
question of whether a discourse has become solidified in institutional and organisational 
practices be assessed? Tracing discourses in policy documents and reconstructing storylines 
is here combined with the analysis of its effects in terms of changing policies and 
institutions, as proposed by Hajer: 
“We will speak of discourse institutionalization if a given discourse is 
translated into institutional arrangements, i.e. if the theoretical concepts of 
ecological modernization are translated into concrete policies (i.e. shifting 
investment in mobility from road to rail) and institutional arrangements 
(introduction of multi-value auditing, or the restructuring of old 
departmental divisions)” (Hajer 1995: 61)[emphasis added by FK]. 
 
The emphasis of the analysis is thus on whether the new storylines have led to new policies 
being implemented or changes in institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements 
include the setting up of new organisations (such as new departments) or changes in the 
‘standard operating procedures’ of existing institutions. Sharp and Richardson, for example, 
explain that an immigration policy document does not have an impact on outcomes “until it 
starts to change the practices of the immigration officers” (2001: 199-200). Here then, 
practices are thought of in a very concrete sense, in the everyday actions of bureaucrats. If 
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the changes in policies and institutional practices9 are discursively justified by policy actors 
by referring to the ideas, concepts and categories of an emerging storyline it can be said 
that the discourse has been institutionalised. This can be established by process tracing of 
policy and institutional change in a given policy field, relying on information from 
interviews and secondary sources as well as policy documents. As the main interest of this 
thesis are the effects of particular discourses on the two policy initiatives, the analysis will 
focus on the effects of the discourses on governmental policies and institutions in the sense 
described by Hajer and Schmidt. 
 
 
 
3.5.5 Summary of the operationalisation of key concepts 
 
Table 2 below summarises the key concepts of the analytical framework, their dimensions 
and the sources of information that have been used in the analysis. 
 
Table 2: The operationalisation of the key concepts of the analytical framework 
Concept Definition Important dimensions/indicators 
Sources of 
information 
Storyline “Generative sort of 
narrative that allows actors 
to draw upon various 
discursive categories to 
give meaning to specific 
physical or social 
phenomena” (Hajer 1995: 
56) 
Central metaphors, claims, 
cognitive and normative 
ideas, analogies, historical 
references, clichés, appeals 
to collective guilt or fear; 
controversies about any of 
these elements 
- Policy documents 
- Interview transcripts 
- Hansard database of 
parliamentary records 
 
Coordinative 
discourse  
Discourse among policy 
actors in the process of 
constructing policies 
(Schmidt 2006a) 
Informal, private 
negotiations between civil 
servants, experts, interest 
groups, elected officials 
- Interview transcripts 
 
Communicative 
discourse 
Discourse between policy 
elites and the ‘informed 
public’ in the process of 
political communication, 
informing and deliberating 
policies (Schmidt 2006a) 
Public announcements by 
government 
Public discussion of policy 
ideas 
- Policy documents 
- Hansard database of 
parliamentary records 
- Interview transcripts 
- Reports by Advisory 
Councils 
                                                 
9 For convenience the term ‘political change’ will be used in this thesis to mean policy as well as institutional 
change. 
81 
 
Discourse 
coalitions 
Coalition of actors 
involved in the production 
and use of a storyline 
(Hajer 1995: 65) 
Actors involved in debate 
over a longer period of time 
and are often referred to by 
others 
- Interview transcripts 
- Policy documents 
Institutional 
context 
Formal and informal rules 
influencing policy-making 
processes (Schmidt and 
Radaelli 2004) 
Governance structure 
Electoral rules 
Departmental division of 
labour 
Organisational ‘standard 
operating procedures’ 
International rules (e.g. EU) 
-  Secondary literature 
-  Interview transcripts 
Effects of 
discourse  
Is the discourse being used 
by many people to 
conceptualise the world? 
(discourse structuration) 
 
 
Has the discourse solidified 
into policy, institutions and 
organisational practices? 
(discourse institu-
tionalisation) 
(Hajer 1995: 60-61) 
Use of ideas, concepts and 
categories of the emerging 
discourse by actors and 
organisations involved in 
energy policy-making 
 
Effects on formal and 
informal institutions (e.g. 
legislation; organisational 
practices within 
government) 
Effects on government 
policies 
- Interview transcripts 
- Policy documents 
- Secondary sources 
 
 
 
3.6  Limitations of the methodology 
 
As already mentioned, case study investigations can attract criticism regarding their 
potential for generalisability (Yin 1994). The value of the case study methodology lies in its 
analytic generalisability rather then statistical generalisability. Yin argues for the value of 
this mode of generalisation, “in which a previously developed theory is used as a template 
with which to compare the empirical results of the case study. If two or more cases are 
shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed” (Yin 1994: 32-33). Case 
studies can thus contribute to theory development or theory testing and in this way make a 
contribution to knowledge (Stake 1994: 238; also see George and Bennett 2005).  
 
Another criticism of case studies is that they are in danger of being purely descriptive. 
Critics would argue that although the individual case is interesting to understand, the wider 
relevance of the analysis is unclear. The two case studies used in this thesis are descriptive 
in terms of exemplifying distinct storylines and their political impact but are also 
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explanatory in illuminating the mechanisms through which certain storylines become 
dominant and why changes in institutions and policies do (or do not) occur as a result of 
discursive struggles. Analysis which is based on a clear methodology like process tracing 
and has theoretical ambitions in identifying mechanisms cannot be considered descriptive.  
 
Another potential criticism is the internal validity of the study. This concern refers to the 
causal mechanisms to be explained in the thesis. The key problem here is whether the 
analysed discursive mechanisms are really responsible for the changes in policies and 
institutions rather than other possible causes. Campbell, for example, points to the difficulty 
in analysing the interplay of interests and ideas (Campbell 1998). Schmidt also 
acknowledges these difficulties and argues:  
“Discourse is a complicated variable, however, because the ideas it 
articulates cannot easily be separated from the interests that find 
expression through it, from the institutional interactions that shape its 
expression, or from the cultural norms that frame it” (Schmidt 2003: 129). 
This problem is not easily overcome. However, several analysts have argued for the value 
of process tracing as a suitable method for trying to separate out the different factors 
contributing to policy change (Campbell 2002: 32). It is important to be open and reflexive 
about the interpretation of the data and to pay attention to possible rival explanations and 
counterfactuals during the analysis. The analysis thus tries explicitly to rule out competing 
explanations as much as possible so that the reader can judge the credibility of the 
interpretation. 
 
Finally, the methodology chosen has disadvantages when it comes to policy prescription. 
Discourse analysis does not lead to identification of the ‘right thing to do’ for policy 
makers to support a transition towards a more sustainable electricity system. Nor does a 
discourse analytic approach allow evaluation of the two case studies in terms of which 
approach is (going to be) more successful 10 . Its aim is more modest: by identifying 
discursive processes it sheds light on the specific situational logic on which policy framing 
                                                 
10 Admittedly, it is a limitation of the approach (and many others in policy research) that studying policy 
processes does not allow policy outcomes to be judged more directly, as those outcomes are difficult to trace 
over time and the effects of policies can often not be isolated from other influences (Sharp and Richardson 
2001). 
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and practices are based and can thus contribute to more reflexivity about the role and 
importance of discourses. It might inspire policy makers to “think critically about their own 
practice” (Sharp and Richardson 2001: 207). As Hajer and Versteeg point out, the strength 
of discourse analysis “is not to be found in its prescriptive force, but in the ability to trace 
the discursive power struggles underlying environmental politics” (2005: 181). This is in 
line with the aim of this thesis as the goal is not so much to come up with prescriptions for 
policy but rather an analysis of policy making (Hill 1997).  
 
 
Having discussed the methodology of this thesis, the following two chapters will present 
the empirical results of the two case studies in terms of within-case analysis (George and 
Bennett 2005; Bennett and Elman 2006). The sixth chapter will summarise the findings 
across the two cases. 
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4 Case Study I: The Energy Transition in the Netherlands 
 
The following analysis sheds light on how and why the ‘Energy Transition’ was set up as a 
new policy initiative to transform the energy system and how this initiative was 
implemented. 
 
 
4.1 The Energy Transition 
 
In 2001 in its Fourth National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP 4) the Dutch government 
acknowledged the existence of a variety of persistent, intractable and long-term 
environmental problems such as climate change. It argued that systemic change in societal 
systems such as energy is necessary to achieve sustainability (VROM 2001). It 
subsequently set up a policy initiative, the Energy Transition (ET), led by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs to manage the transition towards a more sustainable energy system 
(Kemp and Loorbach 2005; Kern and Smith 2008).  
 
The Energy Transition is based mainly on the activities of transition platforms (Aubert 
2007). In six platforms individuals from the private and the public sector come together to 
develop common ambitions for particular areas (the so-called transition themes), develop 
pathways and conduct transition experiments (Oudshoff and Klinckenberg 2003; VROM 
2003; EZ 2004a).  
 
After developing strategic visions for the selected themes for 2030, the task of the 
platforms was to work out possible transition pathways along which an energy transition 
could be achieved. A transition path is understood as a “consistent set of actions, fulfilled 
preconditions and learning experiences that lead to fulfilment of the ambition formulated” 
(EZ 2004a: 19). The pathways are explored further by transition experiments carried out by 
coalitions of stakeholders. The experiments propose ways to travel along the suggested 
transition paths. The aim of transition experiments “is to see how a new energy system 
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behaves in a specific practical situation and how the surrounding area reacts to this new 
system” (EZ 2004a: 19). The first transition experiments started in 2005.  
 
This case study examines why and how this new policy initiative came about and how it 
was implemented, by analysing the discursive struggles underlying this policy process and 
its institutional context. 
 
 
4.2 The dominant discourse around liberalisation and markets as 
well as environmental concerns in Dutch energy policy 
 
To provide the context in which the ‘transitions’ storyline emerged, this section will outline 
the specific Dutch features of the liberalisation discourse dominant in energy policy at the 
time. Analysis will mainly cover Dutch energy policy in the 1990s and will in particular 
look at how environmental concerns such as climate change have been considered. 
 
The liberalisation agenda gained currency in the Netherlands during the Lubbers-III 
government (1990-1994). It has been argued that the traditional neoclassical economics 
discourse became particularly dominant in the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) and thus 
“[e]conomically relevant factors are only recognised as far as they are reflected in prices in 
the market” (van der Straaten 1992: 68).  According to this economic theory, environmental 
problems can be seen as negative externalities of production. Consumption decisions 
therefore need to be corrected by increasing prices of the problematic activities to achieve 
an optimal allocation of the factors of production. 
 
With what is called a ‘natural monopoly’ on infrastructure, its importance for the economy 
and energy security concerns, the electricity sector was, however, widely thought to present 
a special case. The Energy Department within EZ was thus still rather sceptical and 
reluctant to apply this kind of thinking in an unqualified way within the energy sector. 
Lobbying from the electricity generating sector also opposed the liberalisation discourse 
and argued that “electricity is not like sugar” (de Jong 2006: 3). The Government supported 
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this position against the European Commission and was concerned in particular about 
retaining the monopoly in gas. In discussions with the EU commissioner Cardoso, EZ 
minister Andriessen stated: “I am and will continue to be a monopolist” (de Jong 2006: 3).  
 
However, in the wider political discourse at the time, it was increasingly questioned why 
gas and electricity should be excluded from the general trend and treated differently to 
other commodities:  
“The Dutch utility sector and MEZ11 energy department could no longer 
escape participation in these discussions, and from 1991-92 onwards, energy 
market liberalisation and the resulting industry restructuring became part of 
the energy policy” (de Jong 2006: 1).  
 
The new minister Hans Wijers was a keen advocate of liberalisation and relying on market 
forces wherever possible. The Third Energy White Paper published in 1996 built on the 
idea of “markets wherever possible, government wherever needed” (de Jong 2006: 5). The 
key objective of Dutch energy policy was set out in the White Paper as “achieving a 
sustainable energy economy within competitive energy markets” (IEA 2000: 17). The 
energy sector was to become a ‘normal’ sector and the Government’s choice for ‘more 
market’ was widely supported, although there were questions about the detail and the speed 
of the changes. According to the IEA, the White Paper entailed:  
“a fundamental re-orientation of the Government’s role in the energy market 
in order to increase market consideration in decision making; a shift of 
policy instruments from the supply to the demand side of the market…and 
progressive liberalisation of electricity production, import/export and 
supply” (IEA 1996: 11).  
 
Alongside liberalisation, however, the White Paper also put an emphasis on the challenge 
of moving to a more sustainable energy economy and paid attention to energy efficiency 
and renewables as a second main track of policy. Among other elements, the White Paper 
adopted a policy goal of 10% renewable energy out of the total energy supply in the 
Netherlands by 2020 (Junginger, Agterbosch et al. 2004). Despite the attention given to 
markets, the Government retained the position that because of the existence of market 
failures with regard to adverse environmental effects of energy supply and demand, the 
                                                 
11 MEZ is the Dutch abbreviation for the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
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Government would continue to promote energy conservation and the market introduction of 
renewables. The Dutch discourse around liberalisation and free markets admitted that there 
was a role for the Government to play in safeguarding the public interest also in the long 
term; especially with regard to security of supply, prevention of monopolies, network 
stability, and in internalising other external costs. The role of the government in a 
liberalised energy sector was seen as changing from being an active player in the energy 
market to “safeguarding the public interests in the energy supply by drawing up and 
enforcing the rules for the market” (EZ 2002: 27). However, this was not interpreted as 
‘less government’ but as government playing a strategic, different role. 
 
To stimulate green electricity consumption, in line with neoclassical economic ideas, a 
‘regulatory energy tax’ (the so-called eco-tax) for small and medium-scale users was set up 
in 1996 from which green electricity was exempted (van Rooijen and van Wees 2006). This 
support was justified in terms of avoided GHG emissions as negative externalities of 
conventional electricity generation. Any instrument requiring a minimum compulsory share 
of renewable electricity was seen as unfeasible under free-market conditions. Liberalisation 
was declared to require a focus on demand-side instruments (such as the eco-tax) instead of 
supply-side measures (compulsory targets). It is thus claimed that the Dutch Government 
has made “extreme efforts to reconcile economic efficiency and environmental concerns” 
and that in hindsight “environmental protection has for a long time carried more weight in 
government energy policy than economic efficiency” (IEA 2000: 26; 27). 
 
In the Netherlands the liberalisation process started with the new Electricity Act entering 
into force in 1998. In the first step, only large customers were allowed to choose their 
supplier (Verbong and Geels 2007). This had major impacts on the energy sector: 
“Just like in most member states of the EU, the regional monopolistic 
electricity sector in the Netherlands had to make way for the coming 
liberalised free market. Energy distributors began to make the transition to 
private companies without regional constraints” (Agterbosch, Vermeulen 
et al. 2004: 2056). 
The electricity market liberalisation was completed in July 2004 with every customer being 
able to choose their supplier (IEA 2004a: 114). Dutch energy policy makers were firmly 
committed to the liberalisation agenda promoted by the UK as well as the European Union. 
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The Dutch government decided not only to conform to the stipulations of the EU Directive 
96/92/EC but to go beyond them by aiming to introduce full competition in electricity by 
2004, instead of the required 33% by 2003 (IEA 2000: 89).  
 
As in other countries, the commitment to liberalised energy markets also had an impact on 
other elements of energy policy such as energy conservation and renewables policy. 
Market-based instruments were generally preferred over other instruments to support these 
policy goals (de Jong 2006: 1). Under the dominant liberalisation discourse, a key element 
of the renewable energy strategy was a consumer-driven approach, which included fully 
liberalising the small customers market for green electricity ahead of fossil fuel-based 
electricity, voluntary agreements, greening the fiscal system and R&D support (Junginger, 
Agterbosch et al. 2004). New policy initiatives had to go with the grain, as a civil servant 
pointed out: “in EZ the big thing in energy is market liberalisation so we [the team of civil 
servants responsible for the energy transition] have to connect with that. If we don’t do that 
we will always remain a sideshow” (interview 12). This quote already illustrates the 
dominance of the liberalisation discourse during the time when the Energy Transition 
initiative was set up and implemented. 
 
In summary, liberalisation and market-based instruments were influential elements of the 
dominant discourse in Dutch energy policy since the 1990s. The dominant liberalisation 
discourse and its emerging energy market institutions is thus an important contextual factor 
which influences energy policy making and constrains the emergence of new storylines to 
promote policy and institutional change.  
 
 
4.3 The ‘transitions’ storyline 
 
This section analyses ideas that emerged during a routine policy strategy development 
process for the Fourth National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP 4) and formed a new 
‘transitions’ storyline (Smith and Kern 2009). In the following, the central cognitive and 
normative ideas of the emerging storyline are analysed.  
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Against the background of the dominant liberalisation discourse described above, the 
‘transitions’ storyline promoted the need for structural change (‘system innovation’) in 
socio-technical systems like the energy sector, in order to tackle persistent environmental 
problems such as climate change. It argues for a long-term transition management approach 
alongside traditional short-term policies. An active steering towards desirable visions of 
sustainable societal systems, and the development of experiments to explore possible 
transition pathways, as well as stakeholder engagement, are central elements of this 
storyline (Loorbach 2007).  
 
 
4.3.1 The necessity of ‘transitions’ 
 
One main element of the ‘transitions’ storyline was the claim that ‘system innovations’ 
towards sustainability are necessary in order to tackle persistent environmental problems 
(VROM 2001: 24). The Fourth Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan aims at 
fundamental changes in functional systems like energy, transport and agriculture. The 
policy framework of NEPP 4 is based on the idea that persistent environmental problems 
are inherent to current social systems (VROM 2001: 11). While the Policy Plan states that 
the internalisation of external costs of environmental degradation is important to achieve a 
decoupling of economic growth from environmental impacts (VROM 2001: 8), thereby 
following a neoclassical economics discourse, it also argued that existing policies are not 
sufficient to achieve the outlined aims because they “do not adequately take into account 
the obstacles to sustainable development, which can be regarded as system faults in the 
economy and institutions now functioning” (VROM 2001: 26).  
 
While past NEPPs focused on upgrading functional systems through the diffusion of 
technology, NEPP 4 takes a broader approach in which “the systems themselves are seen in 
need of change” (Kemp and Loorbach 2005: 126). This breaks with the current approaches 
to environmental policy and the discourse around free markets and calls for ‘system 
innovations’ which are not to be achieved by continuing or intensifying existing policies. 
Instead the plan argues, “solving the major environmental problems requires system 
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innovation; … long drawn-out transformation processes comprising technological, 
economic, socio-cultural and institutional changes” (VROM 2001: 30).  
 
 
4.3.2 The possibility of deliberate ‘transition management’ and its central 
elements 
 
The second central aspect of the ‘transitions’ storyline was that ‘system innovations’ can be 
influenced by policy makers in terms of their direction and speed (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 
2001a). The optimistic message in high-level policy documents was: “Transitions require 
vision, courage and perseverance from everyone involved. The question is not whether it is 
possible, but how it is possible” (VROM 2001: 78). 
 
NEPP 4 relied heavily on concepts developed by Dutch researchers in the ICIS-MERIT 
report (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001a) which was commissioned for the preparation of the 
plan by VROM. In this report a steering approach to direct such processes towards 
sustainability (transition management) is described (also see Kemp and Rotmans 2004; 
Kemp and Loorbach 2005; Kemp and Rotmans 2005; Loorbach and Rotmans 2006). This 
way of thinking is influenced by evolutionary economics, sociology as well as complexity 
and systems theory. Transition management (TM) employs an integrative and multi-scale 
framework for policy deliberation, choice of instruments, and actions by individuals, 
private and public organisations, helping society to escape lock-in while avoiding new 
evolutionary traps (Kemp and Loorbach 2005: 123-124). Notions of innovation and 
learning are central to the transitions storyline (Kemp and Loorbach 2005; Smith and Kern 
2009). In order to promote innovation and ‘out of the box thinking’ the idea underlying the 
approach was to focus policy attention on frontrunners and innovators (interview 18).  
 
Visions are an important element of the ‘transitions’ storyline. Such long-term visions are 
seen as an important starting point for broad societal discussions about the desired direction 
of a transition (interviews 1; 7; 13; 17; 18). In the ‘transitions’ storyline positive visions of 
the future play an important role in outlining long-term goals and in developing pathways 
along which those goals can be achieved (Kern and Smith 2008). The purpose of 
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employing visions is manifold: to mobilise actors and create support, to create and maintain 
momentum, to provide a coherent framework for the selection of the experiments and to 
reduce uncertainty (interviews 3; 17).  
 
To learn about the potential of certain visions and explore possible transition pathways, the 
‘transitions’ storyline puts an emphasis on concrete social experiments with promising 
technologies which need protection (partial, temporary and gradually phased out) in areas 
where there is lock-in. The utilisation of new technologies in a protected niche setting is 
believed to create a transition path in a bottom-up way (Kemp and Rotmans 2004). 
According to this way of thinking,  
“transition pathways towards these visions can be promoted through 
experimentation with alternative socio-technical practices in sustainability 
niches (e.g. organic food, eco-housing, solar heating). The associated 
social learning informs the design of successive niches, re-evaluates 
guiding visions and transition pathways, and informs deeper institutional 
change. … Competing niches, offering fresh approaches, can benefit, grow, 
and attract wider support… Over a timeframe of 20 or more years, 
developments through niches follow an ‘S’-curve trajectory of growth, 
diffusion and stabilisation around new, sustainable systems of provision” 
(Smith and Kern 2009: 80).  
The idea of experiments is closely linked to ideas about strategic niche management which 
have been promoted in the academic innovation literature for some time (Schot, Hoogma et 
al. 1994). 
 
Another of the key ideas behind the ‘transitions’ storyline is that it is necessary to target not 
only industry stakeholders to achieve ‘system innovations’ but that citizens as well as local 
and national government will have to play crucial roles in the transition process (VROM 
2001: 28). The government itself is not believed to be able to steer the transition process 
due to a lack of “a good enough overview of the technical and economic possibilities” 
(VROM-Raad 1998: 10). Therefore societal actors must be given a stake in the transition 
process. Stakeholders play an important role in the overall process:  
“The government is no longer the only one in the driver’s seat when it 
comes to determining long-term social goals… stakeholders play their part 
in setting the policy lines, in the creation of opportunities… The advantage 
of this way of working is that it allows a broadly based sense of 
opportunity to develop” (EZ 2004a: 9). 
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The engagement of stakeholders is also seen as crucial to create and maintain public 
support for the long-term transition process (Kemp and Rotmans 2004). The process should 
focus on visionary frontrunners and entrepreneurs with new ideas. The challenge is seen as 
engaging stakeholders “to make them interested in solving the persistent problems by 
shifting from a ‘sense of urgency’ to a ‘sense of opportunities’ approach” (interview 1). 
 
 
In summary, the storyline skilfully combined appeals to existing normative commitments 
(innovation, stakeholder engagement, planning, environmental awareness) as well as 
cognitive commitments around the interplay of sustainable technologies with social factors. 
With its focus on long-term, systemic change it constituted a partial break with the focus of 
prior national environmental policy plans on negotiated, incremental improvements, for 
example through energy-efficiency covenants, and outlined a strategic process architecture 
for how such systemic change could be stimulated. 
 
 
4.4 The interactive process of policy construction and 
communication 
 
However, in the analysis of discourses it is not only the ideas that matter but also the 
underlying processes through which policy ideas are formulated and communicated with 
the public in order to gain acceptance. This section analyses these processes of policy 
construction and communication. As specified in the framework, it distinguishes 
analytically between a coordinative and communicative dimension of discursive processes. 
 
 
4.4.1 Coordinative discourse 
 
In the coordinative discourse the main interlocutors are policy actors and it is focussed on 
constructing a policy programme (Schmidt 2006a: 254). The main actors involved in the 
coordinative discourse around the ‘transitions’ storyline were: 
- a small number of researchers and consultants; 
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- civil servants from the Ministry for Economic Affairs (EZ) and the Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM); 
- the ministers Pronk (VROM) and Jorritsma (EZ). 
 
 
4.4.1.1 The discursive politics around the ‘transitions’ idea 
 
Central to the emergence of the idea that ‘transitions’ were necessary to solve persistent 
environmental problems was a coalition of civil servants and researchers as well as 
consultants who cooperated in various research programmes focussing on sustainable 
technologies in the 1990s. Some of the individuals involved in these programmes started 
thinking about technology and sustainability issues along similar lines and formed networks 
within which these ideas spread. This context provided a crucial background for helping the 
ideas about ‘transitions’ to form and subsequently to become accepted into government 
policy (which will be dealt with in the next section in more detail).  
 
One of the programmes through which the ‘transitions’ discourse coalition emerged was the 
Sustainable Technology Development (STD) programme. This research programme for 
sustainable technologies, involving five Dutch ministries, was financed with € 11 million 
and ran from 1993 to 1997 (Kemp and Loorbach 2005: 127). Its focus was on identifying 
technologies which could deliver factor 20 improvements in terms of environmental 
impacts within 50 years (see Vergragt 2005). According to VROM, STD “has shown how 
sustainable technology can be developed to meet certain societal needs, based on scenarios 
for the future” (VROM 1998: 246). Another achievement of STD was the “creation of 
several new and now self-standing innovation networks with shared goals and agreed action 
plans for sustainable technology development” (Weaver, Jansen et al. 2000: 283). An 
important lesson learned from the programme was that long-term thinking is one of the 
most essential conditions for implementing sustainable development. It also became clear 
that non-technological factors are important preconditions for sustainability: “Often 
technologies are more or less available but the barriers are institutional, economical, and 
especially cultural” (Vergragt 2005: 305). According to this thinking, although technology 
is seen as pivotal, “there is a need for a goal-oriented, strategic, co-evolutionary, systems 
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perspective, which stresses the dynamic interrelation between cultural, structural and 
technological innovation” (Weaver, Jansen et al. 2000: 286). Vergragt points to the fact that 
the STD programme “was the first to call for deep ‘leapfrog’ technological, cultural and 
structural changes in society in order to address sustainability issues on a global scale” 
(Vergragt 2005: 302). The STD programme was one of the niches in which the ‘transitions’ 
discourse coalition had its roots (interviews 2; 7; 9).  
 
In parallel with STD, a technology foresight study commissioned by VROM and carried 
out by TNO (Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research) worked along 
similar lines. The programme was “explicitly meant to re-align technological development 
with the long-term goal of achieving sustainable development” (Vollenbroek, Weterings et 
al. 1999: 83). The study explicitly focussed on a timeframe of 15 to 25 years to include 
more radical innovations. Interestingly, the study did not look at single technologies but 
took a systems approach 12  to technological development because looking at single 
components would mean overlooking the relation between the elements which fulfil their 
societal function, such as transportation or communication, only in combination. 
Researchers involved in the Technology Foresight Study ‘81 Options’ suggested in 1997 
that “in the long run a greater leap in efficiency may be expected from the development of 
new systems than from optimising existing ones” (Vollenbroek, Weterings et al. 1999: 86). 
One of the key ideas about transitions as ‘system innovations’ was thus already present in 
this report, although in an undeveloped form. 
 
Another programme important for the development of the transitions ideas was the National 
Initiative Sustainable Development (NIDO) which ran from 1999 to 2004 (NIDO 2001a). 
The overall goal of NIDO was to structurally anchor sustainable initiatives in society (see 
Cramer and Loeber 2004). More specifically NIDO’s aim was  
“to make a quantum leap forward in sustainable development. By acting as 
a spur to new development, NIDO can help organisations to fulfil their 
ambitions with regard to sustainable development. The Dutch government 
believes that major advances can be made if firms, government bodies, 
                                                 
12 A ‘technological system’ was defined for that purpose as “the combination of technical means and the 
human skills and knowledge to make these means perform a specific, societal function” (Vollenbroek, 
Weterings et al 1999: 84). 
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scientists and civil-society organisations are prepared to pool their 
resources and expertise” (NIDO 2001a: 4). 
 
A member of the board of NIDO recalls: “I first came across the transitions approach when 
I served on the board of NIDO. It was one of the instruments for NIDO to work with. There 
was a ‘firm belief’ by scientists that this was the new approach” (interview 11). Again this 
programme provided a platform for exploring ideas which started to be shared by a 
coalition of actors involved in these programmes.  
 
A central metaphor which was used to promote the transitions idea was the S-curve (see 
Figure 4 and Figure 5). These graphs were used to depict transition processes as consisting 
of four phases: predevelopment, take-off, acceleration and stabilisation (Figure 4) and to 
show the enormous societal benefits a system innovation would have compared to a system 
optimisation strategy (Figure 5). The graph can be interpreted as a transition but can also 
easily be taken, for example, as a product diffusion curve. 
 
Figure 4: The S-curve metaphor for transitions 
 
Source: (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001a: 17) 
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Figure 5: Transition vs. System Optimisation 
 
Source: (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001a: 31) 
 
The S-curve and its interpretive flexibility was crucial in the formation of the transitions 
discourse coalition as it allowed different actors to agree on the graph without necessarily 
agreeing on the detail of what a transition would mean in practice.  
 
Through interactions in the various initiatives around technology and sustainability 
described above, a network of individuals emerged who knew each other personally and 
who started to think along similar lines and express their ideas in similar terms. One of the 
main lessons learned from these programmes was that changes in technologies were often 
impeded by cultural, economic, social and institutional factors and that a systems 
perspective was necessary (Weaver, Jansen et al. 2000; Vergragt 2005). The emerging 
discourse coalition spanned researchers, policy makers and consultants as well as a few 
business people and included around 20 people (interview 7) who were well connected to 
the relevant ministries. Over an extended period of time in the 1990s the interactions 
fostered trust between these actors and through dialogue the ideas around the ‘transitions’ 
storylines began to converge. A member of this emerging discourse coalition described the 
process as follows: 
“There was a policy network of individuals and civil servants in favour of 
those ideas, bridging the science and policy sphere because they were 
involved in both and could translate ideas and had some credibility and 
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also some business relationships. This network emerged out of those 
programmes” (interview 2). 
 
Similarly, a senior civil servant at the Economic Ministry argued, “the learning processes 
with [the research programmes] were necessary preliminary steps for a transitions 
approach” (interview 15). This coalition of actors “consolidated component ideas into the 
(developing) transitions storyline” (Smith and Kern 2009: 84). The initial coalition had the 
authority and the communicative skills to affect others and strategically used the 
opportunity presented by the policy development process of NEPP 4 to get the storyline 
more widely accepted and to formulate ideas about how to manage transition processes. 
This process will be analysed in more detail below. 
 
 
4.4.1.2 The discursive politics around the development and adoption of 
‘transition management’ into national policy 
 
A routine policy strategy development process opened up a possibility to consolidate the 
‘transitions’ storyline and influence policy making. Dissatisfaction with the success of 
previous National Environmental Policy Plans led civil servants to look outwards for new 
ideas. The internal thinking within the Environment Ministry about a new policy approach 
for the further development of environmental policy started as soon as NEPP 3 was 
published (Keijzers 2000). In the run-up to NEPP 4, several civil servants from the strategy 
departments of VROM and EZ were working closely together in an interdepartmental 
working group to prepare the document. This group amongst other things discussed the 
relationship between innovation and the environment. It became clear that regulation or 
subsidies would not be sufficient and “people from within the government were looking to 
the outside for new concepts” (interview 7). In this context the discourse coalition of 
researchers, consultants and civil servants strategically made use of this window of 
opportunity and promoted the ‘transitions’ storyline to provide a new direction for this 
policy plan. In the context of the discussions about the future of environmental policy two 
reports were commissioned which were important in developing ideas about how to 
manage transitions. 
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While preparing NEPP 4, VROM commissioned a report to the consultancy Twynstra 
Gudde Management in 1998. The report entitled Transitions: can three people change the 
world?13 came out in February 2000. The question posed to the group was: ‘what influence 
can governments have in promoting jumpwise change in the field of production, 
consumption, behavioural patterns, and societal structures’ and the report was supposed to 
identify first insights into drivers and bottlenecks of transitions (interview 23). VROM 
acknowledged that “technological options are part of this, but also structural changes and 
cultural changes. They [VROM] were looking for levers for policy making for change 
processes in a sustainable direction” (interview 23). In their assignment VROM already 
used the term ‘sustainable transitions’. VROM was looking for an ‘overarching concept’ 
for NEPP 4 (interview 17). According to Kemp and Loorbach, the report 
“defined the transition concept and argued that societal change in principle 
could be steered, and that one should look for levers, to be identified through 
causality analysis looking at causality loops. The report was based on a flux 
model. It did not openly say that three persons can bring about a transition but 
indeed offered a suggestion to that effect” (Kemp and Loorbach 2005: 127). 
 
The result was not so much a scientific report as an attempt “to get a first flavour of 
transitions” (interview 17). VROM started negotiating with EZ about the ideas of this 
report but EZ wanted ‘a more scientific report’ and also found a fault in the fact that the 
report was written by VROM consultants and not economists (interview 23). EZ was thus 
not yet convinced by the ‘transitions’ discourse and did not believe in the expertise of the 
consultants – a common struggle in discursive politics is over the contestations of 
knowledge claims (Ockwell and Rydin 2006). This led to the commissioning of a second 
report: the ICIS-MERIT report.  
 
This second report for the preparation of NEPP 4 was commissioned to a group of 
researchers led by Jan Rotmans, director of ICIS and Rene Kemp, researcher at MERIT, 
and was entitled Transitions & Transition Management. The case for a low emission 
energy supply (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001a). In this report Rotmans et al. described 
transitions as long-term structural change processes in societal subsystems and outlined a 
                                                 
13 The original title in Dutch is: 'Transities: kunnen drie mensen de wereld doen omslaan?' 
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model of how such processes could be influenced in their direction and pace – transition 
management. The model was exemplified by using energy as an illustration. This report 
was of crucial importance in getting the ideas of transition management into NEPP 4 
(Kemp and Loorbach 2005: 129). They claim that this was due to the close interaction 
between the NEPP 4 team and the authors of the report. This interpretation is supported by 
other participants in this process (interviews 3; 4). An observer points out that this “was a 
very peculiar window of opportunity for both science and policy makers” (interview 19). 
 
Given the context described in the preceding section, ideas about ‘system innovations’ had 
been debated between policy makers and researchers for some time. In the write-up of 
NEPP 4 this debate crystallised and led to the adoption of the ideas of transition 
management into official governmental policy. This was due to the continuous cooperation 
between researchers and policy makers. The usual practice of commissioning a report by 
policy makers and presenting the final report by researchers was not followed. Instead the 
research group held a workshop with energy experts where the initial ideas were presented 
for the energy case. After that, 
“A number of meetings have also been held with the Energy workgroup, 
or its members, as well as with a larger group of people involved with the 
NMP4. Through these meetings…a collective learning process was 
created where the ideas of transition management were crystallised 
through a proportional contribution from the researchers and officials” 
(Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001a: 11). 
 
The outcome of the process was not predetermined but arose through the interaction: 
transition management was thus an idea that gradually emerged from discussions between 
the research group and the group of policy makers preparing NEPP 4 (Kemp and Loorbach 
2005: 129). One participant described this process as a series of meetings “with a lot of 
confusion, a lot of ideas, a lot of discussion, a highly iterative and interactive process 
during which the concepts co-evolved” (interview 17). During this process the ICIS-
MERIT research team had approximately 30 meetings with policy makers to help them 
internalise the concept of transitions. Methods used to persuade policy makers included a 
play, a fairy tale, discussions, and involving a painter in order to represent the main ideas. 
Consultants also played an important role in this process as they could build bridges 
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between policy makers and researchers (interview 17). The bottom line of most observers’ 
comments is that Jan Rotmans and other members of the ICIS-MERIT team were very 
active, entrepreneurial and influential in getting the transition management idea accepted by 
policy makers (interviews 3; 4; 7; 10; 19; 21; 23). They were “people who had the right 
words, pointing towards new directions … who also had the authority and the 
communicative skills to affect others” (interview 7).  
 
 
This section has argued that the transition management ideas were formulated through a 
process of in-depth cooperation between a small group of researchers, consultants and civil 
servants from VROM and EZ. The following section will analyse the process through 
which the ‘transitions’ storyline became adopted by the Dutch Government as the basis for 
their long-term environmental policy. 
 
 
4.4.1.3 The departmental politics around accepting the ‘transitions’ approach 
 
Two ministries were central to the acceptance of the ‘transitions’ idea into the Fourth 
National Environmental Policy Plan: in the process of preparing national environmental 
policy plans the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) was 
the leading ministry given its responsibility for environmental policy, climate policy and 
the stimulation of ‘green’ technologies. Equally important was the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (EZ) which is responsible for economic, energy and innovation policy.  
 
The discourse coalition promoted this policy formulation process by linking their 
‘transitions’ storyline to other agendas such as business opportunities through green 
innovation, or the market liberalisation agenda important for the Economics Ministry, and 
strategic environmental planning and stakeholder involvement for the Environment 
Ministry. The transitions coalition articulated a suite of concepts which accorded with 
broader discursive developments and institutional commitments. This led to a broad 
support base for the transitions initiative across government departments as a result of the 
non-threatening framing of the transition management approach as additional to existing 
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policies and the growing dissatisfaction with those existing policies. Interest groups seem to 
have been largely absent in the policy formulation process. 
 
 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
 
At the time when VROM was preparing NEPP 4 “there was a realisation within VROM 
that the existing environmental policy plans had become a ‘dead end’, but they had no ideas 
how to do it” (interview 2; also interview 10). A bureaucrat involved in the process argued 
that at the time when NEPP 3 was finalised the “discussion on the limits of it had already 
started: others should do the work, companies should to the work and the government 
should be in another role” (interview 7). In the same vein Keijzer pointed out that after 
three NEPPs a new way forward was needed to tackle sustainability issues (Keijzers 2000: 
191). An absolute decoupling of economic growth and adverse environmental effects had 
not been achieved despite the gains in energy efficiency. The Strategy Department within 
VROM  
“were thinking about a transition much before the NEPP4 was written and 
he [Vollenbroek, an influential civil servant within VROM] was looking 
for something to strengthen this view. He was involved and tried to push 
for this internally” (interview 2; similar point also made in interview 20).  
 
This led to a lot of exchange between academics and policy makers as described in the two 
previous sections. This exchange was only possible with “the quite open approach of 
VROM” (interview 20). According to a consultant involved in the process, a civil servant 
from VROM especially liked the idea of a transition “because of the broader societal scope 
going beyond a technological innovation concept” and because of the notion that transitions 
can start through cultural or legislative changes (interview 23).  
 
An observer sums up this process by saying that researchers developed the idea of TM “at a 
time when VROM wanted to revive environmental policy” (interview 21; confirmed by a 
VROM civil servant, interview 24). According to him NEPP 4 followed the recognition 
that persistent environmental problems in the Netherlands cannot be solved by incremental 
steps or end-of-pipe technologies. There was a belief that ‘system changes’ were needed.  
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The internal dynamic of policy learning within VROM and the articulation of a new policy 
approach by a discourse coalition around civil servants, researchers and consultants 
coincided. 
 
 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
 
For the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ), responsible for energy policy, the problem of 
carbon dioxide emissions was seen as a major market failure in the energy sector which 
necessitated some kind of government intervention – at a time when government had pulled 
back since the early 1990s because of liberalisation. The discursive commitment of EZ to 
the liberalisation agenda was analysed in section 4.2. Smith and Kern have argued that  
“Energy liberalisation was disrupting traditional, corporatist energy policy. 
Policy-makers were preoccupied with learning how to regulate new energy 
markets and ensure investment in energy infrastructure. At the same time, 
political agendas were opening to the implications of climate change” 
(Smith and Kern 2009: 88). 
 
According to a senior researcher who was part of the discourse coalition, EZ saw the 
potential of using TM because they were in a difficult situation given that this was the high 
point of liberalisation, which led to a loss of steering power for EZ. He claims that EZ saw 
transition management as a new way of steering in-between traditional regulation and the 
market (interview 17). A civil servant from EZ confirmed this interpretation. She argued 
that before liberalisation the social functions of energy companies in addressing 
environmental and social issues were more prominent and companies worked very closely 
with the Government (interview 1). After liberalisation the energy companies were far 
more short-term profit oriented, were less willing to invest in pilot projects for new 
technologies and did not show the same level of commitment to the Government’s 
environmental goals14. EZ was looking for a way to increase cooperation with companies to 
                                                 
14 One example where this changed attitude became visible was the green label trading scheme for green 
electricity. This system was set up to implement the voluntary targets of the Dutch energy distribution 
companies which were agreed upon with the Government in the 1990s. The system was only operational for 
two years and was terminated in 2001. It has been claimed that with the liberalisation in the electricity 
markets “a new voluntary target with energy companies could not be agreed upon” (Dinica and Arentsen 
2003: 610). 
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address environmental and social issues more prominently and TM offered an appealing 
way to do this.  
 
Part of the appeal of the ‘transitions’ storyline for EZ was that transition management was 
seen as a potentially successful approach “to get stakeholders buying into the idea of low 
carbon: the challenge now is to make them interested in solving the persistent problems by 
shifting from a ‘sense of urgency’ to a ‘sense of opportunities’ approach” (interview 1). 
Bruggink talks about the ‘magic of transition management’: 
“Policy makers are no longer viewed as detached and clinical observers of 
sociotechnical change, they are considered as active participants able to 
promote technological innovation in the right direction. They cannot only 
offer a promising perspective towards sustainability; they can actively 
make it happen… The idea of energy transitions thus magically transforms 
the bleak landscape for global sustainability into a promising avenue for 
action. It marries the sense of urgency with an equal dose of the sense of 
opportunity” (Bruggink 2005: 10-11). 
 
Besides the usual EZ agenda, which is to stimulate growth, business and innovation, there 
was also the aim of developing a new partnership with businesses, which made the ideas of 
TM appealing for EZ as it appeared to be a way to do this (interview 20). Similarly, another 
senior researcher claims that the idea of transition management was linked with the 
innovation agenda of EZ and the Lisbon Strategy. The idea of combining economic growth 
and sustainable development through ‘system innovations’ which could possibly offer 
opportunities for Dutch firms was attractive for policy makers within EZ (interview 2). The 
‘transitions’ storyline therefore provided possibilities for EZ to link this agenda to their 
priorities, thereby creating a win-win situation. 
 
Civil servants in EZ also started to accept the argument of the ‘transitions’ discourse 
coalition that standard policies are not able to provide an adequate answer to persistent 
environmental problems such as CO2 emissions (EZ 2004a: 9). System improvement was 
seen as eventually reaching its limit and a new approach outside of existing policy 
frameworks was needed, as an EZ civil servant explained: “our assumption is that 
incremental change is useful but will not do the job” (interview 12). He reasoned that 
unchanged or present-day policies might be enough to meet the Kyoto targets, but to 
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achieve sustainability ‘system innovations’ are needed and this requires a different policy 
approach as system changes are “not only a matter of technology but also a matter of new 
roles, new rules, new playing fields”. Another civil servant within EZ added that to solve 
the persistent environmental problems such as climate change and biodiversity loss requires 
a new policy approach and that the capacity to evoke change has been too low in some 
areas (interview 1). One criticism of existing energy policies was the relatively short time 
horizon. During the process of preparing NEPP 4 EZ found that  
“we had too little ideas about the far future of the energy system. We 
always had traditional scenarios of the central planning office going up to 
2010, 2020, but we were so far not too concerned with the distant future as 
opposed to our ‘competitors’ from VROM who did have a view on what 
should be done. We should have a story of our own” (interview 12). 
 
However, not everyone within EZ adopted the new discourse. Clearly some civil servants 
saw the role of the Government as a facilitator, mainly relying on market mechanisms and 
price incentives. Some civil servants questioned whether governments can facilitate energy 
transitions and advocated that they should ‘let the market do it’. The adoption of the 
transition storyline’s ambitions as official policy thus produced a number of internal 
conflicts within EZ (interviews 4; 6). 
 
4.4.1.4 Summary of the analysis of the coordinative discourse 
 
The coalition behind the ‘transitions’ storyline was successful in formulating the transition 
management policy programme and getting this idea adopted into national policy for a 
number of reasons: the successful reframing of the problem to achieve sustainability 
through ‘system innovations’; the claim that TM was additional to existing policies, as well 
as the interpretative flexibility of the storyline which allowed win-win situations with a 
number of other policy objectives to be created.  
 
Firstly, as argued above, a coalition of researchers, consultants and civil servants reframed 
the problem of how to achieve sustainability in terms of ‘system innovations’. Based on the 
experience and learning from a number of research programmes, structural change in 
societal subsystems was considered as the only option for solving persistent environmental 
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problems. A steering philosophy (transition management) to foster such ‘system 
innovations’ was developed jointly. 
 
The second crucial factor for the success of the ‘transitions’ storyline was the interpretative 
flexibility of the concepts. Transition management ideas could be linked to ongoing 
discourses and demonstrated resonance with problems that different ministries were facing 
at that time. The crises in the agricultural industry (food scares, BSE), in environmental and 
energy policy (climate change, biodiversity loss), in transport (legitimacy crisis of 
engineering, failure of ‘predict and provide’ approach) and in economic and innovation 
policy prepared the ground for a new approach. In other words, each ministry had different 
reasons for acknowledging the need to change its approach and the sectors which they 
oversaw. According to a senior researcher, civil servants picked out notions which fitted 
with their prior commitments: 
“We are a consensual political system so transition management had to be 
linked to dominant discourse (less state, new public management, 
liberalisation). People who picked it up were heavily embedded in that 
discourse. What especially civil servants, but some of the scientists 
promoting it, picked out of it, were things that connected to that dominant 
discourse because that would make it land. There has been much emphasis 
on the ideas of interactive policy making, stakeholder involvement, 
government in the second line. All of this is there [in the TM approach] 
and it is interesting but it is not the definitional feature of ‘system 
innovations’” (interview 10). 
He argues that the unique aspect of TM is not so much this interactive component but rather 
the thinking in terms of structural change. This more radical interpretation of the TM 
concept has not been at the core of the described policy discussions. Instead those were 
more focussed on the participatory elements of TM. A proponent of TM agrees with that 
point and states that “policy makers only use the ideas which suit them, those which fit into 
their agenda, not the whole approach” (interview 18). 
 
The convergence around the ‘transitions’ storyline occurred despite the different interests 
of government departments because its concepts and language were flexible. Proponents of 
TM admit that at the point in time when the approach was adopted in NEPP 4 the concepts 
were only roughly developed (interviews 17; 18) and this contributed to the flexibility. The 
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concept of TM is flexible in several senses: with regard to the goals (structural system 
innovation alongside ‘normal’ innovation), the means (emphasis on participatory process 
versus elaborate process architecture including participation and control policies), the 
language (innovation, participation, learning) and the role of government (facilitator versus 
taking the lead while putting the regime under pressure). One observer pinpoints this by 
saying: “TM was a mobilising concept which was vague enough to be inspiring” (interview 
7). 
 
 
4.4.2 The communicative discourse deliberating and legitimising the 
‘transitions’ storyline 
 
As pointed out above, in democracies policy ideas need to be publicly deliberated and 
legitimised. This includes communication with the ‘informed publics’ about policy 
problems and their suggested solutions. This process usually involves politicians, campaign 
groups, party members, citizens, experts and the media who discuss the ideas developed in 
the coordinative discourse with the public. Ideas cannot be seen as a one-way street but are 
in this process discussed, deliberated and potentially changed (Schmidt 2006a: 254-255). 
Important actors involved in the communicative discourse in this case were: 
- government advisory councils such as the general energy council and the VROM 
council; 
- parliamentarians; 
- business stakeholders. 
 
 
The ideas of the ‘transitions’ storyline were discussed publicly between the ministries and 
influential advisory councils a long time before the ideas were adopted as official policy in 
2001. The VROM council15 had already introduced the term ‘transition’ in 1998 in its 
advice for the Climate Policy Implementation Document, entitled Transition to a low-
carbon energy economy. The document does not have a clear conceptualisation of what a 
transition is but states that “radical changes will be needed in our energy economy 
(transition process) in order to meet the CO2 emissions objective for the longer term” 
                                                 
15 The Dutch Council for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM council) is charged with 
advising Government and Parliament on the main aspects of policy on the sustainability of the environment 
and on housing, spatial planning and environmental management.  
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(VROM-Raad 1998: 7). Their recommendations include that the policy process for a long-
term strategy but also for short-term measures needs to be shaped according to these long-
term goals. They also point out that more regulation is not the answer and that market-
based instruments should be in the fore while emphasising that societal actors (companies, 
other institutions, consumers) must be given a stake in the transition process. This shows 
that from early on the advisory council publicly supported key ideas of the ‘transitions’ 
storyline. 
 
In the cabinet’s reply to the recommendation of the VROM council, minister Pronk agreed 
that self-governance of target groups in combination with market-based instruments was 
central to climate policy but he does not use the term ‘transition’ (Tweede-Kamer 1999: 9). 
Subsequently, the VROM policy document The Netherlands’ Climate Policy 
Implementation Plan. Part 1: Measures in the Netherlands published in 1999, explicitly 
referred to the advice from the VROM council and agreed that a long-term strategy 
focussing on technological and policy innovation was necessary to achieve deep cuts in 
CO2 emissions. It acknowledged that “fundamental changes in the national energy 
economy” were required (VROM 1999: 5). This indicates that even before NEPP 4 VROM 
had started to think about a long-term strategy to tackle climate change, had accepted the 
transitions idea and was looking for policy innovations to foster a “transition to the desired 
situation” (VROM 1999: 92). 
 
In a joint report in 2004 two Dutch advisory councils welcomed the transitions approach. 
The councils acknowledged the progress that the Ministry of Economic Affairs had made 
while emphasising that “the transition approach should form the guiding principle for 
energy policy as a whole” (VROM-Raad and AER 2004: 24). The councils also emphasised 
that the approach should be more international and urged the Government to increase their 
commitment to the goals of the energy transition. The report used key elements of the 
‘transitions’ storyline and supported the transitions approach publicly. 
 
However, the ‘transitions’ storyline also encountered some public criticism from 
parliamentarians and stakeholders. One of the criticisms raised by members of Parliament 
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was that the ‘transitions’ approach in NEPP 4 was not budgeted in the same way as other 
NEPPs and that clear goals and instruments were missing from it (criticisms raised by, for 
example, MP Samsom and MP Duyvendak)16. NEPP 3 contained a summary of expected 
costs of existing environmental policy without new policy and including the NEPP 3 policy 
package (VROM 1998: 251). NEPP 4 on the contrary only acknowledged that the transition 
policies outlined in the document “will lead to social costs and costs to be borne by the 
government. The funding of these policies has not yet been guaranteed” (VROM 2001: 75). 
Nooteboom finds that “Despite being unspecific and unaccountable, Parliament accepted 
transition management. It gave NMP4 [Dutch abbreviation for NEPP4; FK] the benefit of 
the doubt, but requested annual progress reports” (Nooteboom 2007: 88). 
 
The government publicly promoted its transitions approach as a potential third way 
(between the market and governmental planning) suitable in times of liberalisation (EZ 
2004a). As mentioned earlier, a number of business actors were involved in the predecessor 
programmes such as NIDO (interview 7) and supported the ideas behind it. Business actors 
were consulted about their willingness to participate in an energy transition process (EZ 
2002: 60) and responded positively. A senior researcher observed: “EZ managed to get 
industry really involved in the process and they are very happy with that” (interview 20). 
The support from business therefore strengthened the ‘transitions’ storyline. 
 
This storyline, and its policy value, was thus publicly supported by a number of key actors 
and this contributed to the discourse structuration. Points of public critique included the 
domestic focus of the transition initiative (VROM-Raad and AER 2004), and its practical 
value was questioned by some parliamentarians (‘no clear goals, no clear instruments, no 
clear financial implications’). However, the modularity of the storyline meant that most 
actors could focus on elements meaningful for their agendas and interests, which thus 
helped maintain overall support. 
 
 
                                                 
16 See Tweede Kamer, Vergaderjaar 2005–2006, 27 801 en 28 663, nr. 43. 
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4.5 The institutional context in the Netherlands 
 
As discussed above, institutions can have an important impact on policy processes. The 
framework combines attention to formal institutions (such as the governance structure, the 
electoral system) and informal institutions (such as organisational routines and norms) to 
assess the impact which this context has on discursive developments. It will be argued 
below that informal institutions such as rules and administrative practices play an important 
role in explaining the adoption and the shape of the implementation of the ‘transitions’ 
storyline. 
 
The Netherlands is a unitary state in which state power is centralised and there is a strongly 
corporatist polity, “where the state acts as a coequal with certain ‘privileged’ interests, 
generally business and labour, in policy formulation and implementation” (Schmidt 2006a: 
224). The Dutch political system is heavily based on the consensual polder model with 
close cooperation between political parties, trade unions, industry and environmental 
organisations to solve societal problems: “consensual legitimacy is a vital norm in the 
history of the Dutch political system” (Schenkel 2000: 167). In the energy area the 
Netherlands is well known for its approach to target-group involvement and its tradition of 
cooperation between government and energy companies (Weale 1992; Gouldson and 
Murphy 1998; Breukers and Wolsink 2007a), although liberalisation has had an impact on 
the governance of the energy system, putting more emphasis on market mechanisms 
(Agterbosch, Vermeulen et al. 2004). Traditionally, the market players are “used to 
cooperating on a voluntary basis with the government and among each other” (Arentsen 
and Künneke 1996: 550). This is particularly reflected in the use of covenants: “Reflecting 
the "voluntary" agreement philosophy that is so central to Dutch political culture, an 
increasing number of collective and individual target groups have become participants in 
covenants” (Schenkel 2000: 176). Under the Dutch polder model the policy preference (for 
example in encouraging energy efficiency) is thus not regulation, but voluntary covenants 
(interviews 18; 20). 
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However, the culture of consultation and consensus building of the polder model, according 
to a VROM civil servant, encourages consensus at the lowest common denominator as it is 
targeting non-active companies in terms of innovation. In contrast, transition management 
tries to support pro-active, leading companies (Vollenbroek 2002). So while the covenant 
approach was considered quite successful in encouraging energy efficiency (Krarup and 
Ramesohl 2000; Rietbergen, Farla et al. 2002), the polder model has been criticised for 
being too corporatist and for removing environmental issues from the political agenda 
(Martens and Spaargaren 2005) as well as being incapable of dealing with persistent 
environmental problems (Rotmans and Loorbach 2008).  
 
The heritage of the polder model is of relevance for the analysis presented here as interview 
evidence suggested that the terminology used in TM, such as ‘arenas’, is very similar to the 
polder model and that this was one of the reasons why TM was adopted (interview 19). 
Similarly, another senior researcher argued that in a consensual political system like the 
Netherlands any new approach has to be linked to dominant discourses of the time, such as 
‘less state’, ‘new public management’ and ‘liberalisation’ (interview 10). Also, Nooteboom 
described a merger of the ideas of TM with the heritage of the polder culture (Nooteboom 
2005: 28). So while according to transition management advocates (interviews 17; 18) as 
well as civil servants (Vollenbroek 2002; also interviews 6; 15) the ‘transitions’ storyline 
was intended as a break with the polder model, focussing on visionary ideas of frontrunners 
and making choices instead of consensus-seeking stakeholder participation, the promoted 
ideas appealed to a wider range of stakeholders because they were re-interpreted in line 
with existing normative commitments of the polder model (interview 19). Other TM 
proponents were sceptical from the outset claiming that “any kind of model in a consensual 
culture will be used in a consensual way” (interview 20). 
 
Another important institutional feature of the Netherlands in this context is the electoral 
system. Schmidt argues that representative systems in unitary states such as the Netherlands 
diffuse the power of the executive between a wider range of parties, “tend to promote 
compromise among state actors and to depend on cooperation with societal actors” 
(Schmidt 2006a: 227). Because power is dispersed between a number of different parties, 
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consensus-seeking and coalition governments are normal practice (Lijphart 1999: 67). 
According to Timmermans and Andeweg, “All postwar Dutch cabinets have been 
composed of at least two but more often three or more parties” (Timmermans and Andeweg 
2003: 500). At the time of NEPP 4 in 2001 the Netherlands had a coalition government 
consisting of the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the Social Liberal 
Democrats. According to van der Straaten (1992), Dutch political culture follows a tradition 
of tolerance and consultation, as the political ‘enemy of today’ could be tomorrows 
coalition partner. The necessity of coalition governments thus requires consensus 
orientation but it has in turn also enabled the Energy Transition initiative to ‘survive’ 
several changes in government. 
 
A third institutional factor important in shaping the emerging ‘transitions’ storyline and 
facilitating its adoption as national policy was the open culture of the civil service in the 
Netherlands (interview 20). The analysed processes of coalition formation and storyline 
creation were only possible through a substantial amount of informal cooperation between 
civil servants, consultants and researchers. According to Kemp and Loorbach, 
“The people involved in this group were not bonded by departmental 
rules; they were acting rather as free individuals. The working group was 
not used as a platform for interdepartmental negotiations, which probably 
facilitated its functioning as a think tank within the government” (Kemp 
and Loorbach 2005: 127). 
It seems to be an important detail that, within this network, civil servants from different 
ministries were allowed to experiment with new ideas and think creatively about future 
policies. The open culture of the civil service in the Netherlands thus facilitated the 
emergence of the ‘transitions’ storyline and its adoption into national policy. 
 
 
As pointed out already, existing institutions can have a constraining as well as enabling 
impact on storylines and discursive interactions legitimising new policy initiatives. In the 
case of the ‘transitions’ storyline the open civil service culture enabled the interactions of 
the discourse coalition to develop the ideas around transitions and transition management 
jointly with researchers and consultants. Dominant institutional norms around consensus, 
deliberation and cooperation shaped the development of the ‘transitions’ storyline away 
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from the initial focus on frontrunners, which had subsequent implications for the 
institutionalisation of the storyline, as will be dealt with in more detail below (also see Kern 
and Smith 2008). 
 
 
4.6 Change in policy practices and institutions?  
 
After having analysed the emergence of the ‘transitions’ storyline, this section analyses 
what impacts its emergence had on Dutch energy policy. While section 4.4 analysed the 
discourse structuration, the following section will analyse the discourse institutionalisation 
of the ‘transitions’ storyline by describing the main activities of the Energy Transition 
project. The subsequent section will investigate to what extent this implementation is in 
line with the ‘transitions’ storyline. 
 
 
4.6.1 Setting up of the Energy Transition17 
 
The emergence of the ‘transitions’ storyline and its endorsement through the Fourth Dutch 
National Environmental Policy Plan (VROM 2001) led to a new policy initiative. In March 
2001 the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) appointed itself as the ‘transition manager’ of 
the Energy Transition (EZ 2004a: 15). The Energy Transition is based mainly on the 
activities of transition platforms (Aubert 2007). Within seven platforms individuals from 
the private and the public sector come together to develop a common ambition for 
particular areas (the so-called transition themes), develop pathways and suggest concrete 
transition experiments (Oudshoff and Klinckenberg 2003; VROM 2003; EZ 2004a).  
 
The initial selection of transition themes was based on stakeholder consultations as well as 
an intensive scenario study, the Long-Term Energy Supply Strategy (LTVE) project, which 
was drawn up in 2000. It outlined the Ministry’s vision of the future energy supply (clean, 
affordable, and secure). Its intention was to stimulate discussions about the energy supply 
in the Netherlands in 2050 and it focussed on devising a portfolio of strategies for 
                                                 
17 Parts of this analysis have been published as (Kern and Smith 2008). 
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investment decisions, sustainability and R&D “which result in minimum regrets” (IEA 
2003: 44). The project’s final report distinguished four scenarios (see Kemp and Loorbach 
2005: 137). The project brought up themes that would be important cornerstones for a 
sustainable energy system in any of the four scenarios. Those four themes (new gas, chain 
efficiency, sustainable mobility, green resources) also emerged from the stakeholder 
consultation as ideally suited for a transition approach given the international state-of-the-
art of technology development and the specific position of the Netherlands (EZ 2002: 60). 
Later three more themes (sustainable electricity, energy in the built environment, 
greenhouses as energy sources) were added so that the Energy Transition now encompasses 
seven themes 18. It is stated that these themes “will be worked out in more detail to give 
direction to energy and innovation policy” (EZ 2004b: 5).  
 
After developing strategic visions for the selected themes for 2030, the task of the 
platforms is to work out possible transition pathways along which an energy transition can 
be achieved. A transition path is understood as a “consistent set of actions, fulfilled 
preconditions and learning experiences that lead to fulfilment of the ambition formulated” 
(EZ 2004a: 19). As the transition paths serve as criteria of eligibility for obtaining public 
funding they had to be officially certified by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. By 2006, 15 
out of the 26 transition paths suggested by the stakeholders had been accepted 
(SenterNovem 2006b). This number has since increased to 3119. 
 
The pathways are explored further by transition experiments carried out by coalitions of 
stakeholders. The experiments propose ways to travel along the suggested transition paths 
(EZ 2004a: 5). The declared aim of the transition experiments “is to see how a new energy 
system behaves in a specific practical situation and how the surrounding area reacts to this 
new system” (EZ 2004a: 19). The first transition experiments started in 2005 (see Figure 6 
for examples).  
 
                                                 
18 For more information on the themes, see: http://www.senternovem.nl/energytransition/themes/index.asp. 
19 For a full listing of transition pathways under each theme, see: 
http://www.senternovem.nl/energytransition/themes/index.asp. 
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Figure 6: Examples for transition experiments 
One of the experiments is a micro heat and power project. In a trial project 50 homes in 
Groningen have been supplied with home power plants which produce heat and electricity 
from natural gas boilers. Any surplus electricity can be sold to the electricity company. It is 
planned to upscale the project to 1000 units by 2007 and 10.000 units in later stages. 
 
Another example is the 50% project by the Dutch paper industry. The ambition of the 
Dutch Paper Industry Association is to save 50% energy use along the production chain of 
paper by 2020. The association cooperates with actors from the entire production chain – 
from raw materials and machine suppliers to end users and waste processors – to fulfil this 
ambition.  
 
A third example for a transition experiment is the ‘residual heat’ project in Rotterdam. 
This project aims at providing a residential area in the South of Rotterdam with residual 
heat from industry in the Rotterdam Harbour District (Shell-Pernis).  
 
Source: (EZ 2004a) 
 
 
The Energy Transition is funded through public subsidies and investments by companies. 
The National Energy Research Strategy (EOS) has an annual budget of €135 million (EZ 
2001: 3). Its scheme to support demonstration projects (EOS-DEMOS) has been closely 
aligned with the existing transition paths and has contributed funding of more than € 41 
million between 2004 and 2007 (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Subsidies under EOS-DEMO scheme, 2004-2007 
 
Source: (SenterNovem 2008: 113) 
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The Energy Transition also led to an additional subsidy scheme under EOS, the Unique 
Chances Subsidy Scheme (UKR), which provides funding for transition experiments. It was 
preceded by a limited subsidy scheme to support feasibility studies which ran between 2003 
and June 2004 and had a total budget of €1.5 million (Novem 2003: 5). The UKR initially 
had a budget of €35 million over several years (EZ 2004a: 29) but provided subsidies of 
€118 million between 2004 and 2007, which supported private investments of more than 
€957 million (see Table 4). The UKR was set up because “existing energy and innovation 
instruments do not yet fit in well with the set-up of transition experiments” (EZ 2004a: 29). 
 
Table 4: Subsidies under UKR scheme, 2004-2007 
 
Source: (SenterNovem 2008: 112) 
 
 
Two institutional changes occurred as part of the Energy Transition: firstly, the transition 
platforms were complemented by an energy transition taskforce (TFE). The TFE consisted 
of 17 high-level members mainly from industry and the public sector and was chaired by 
the CEO of Shell Netherlands. This advisory group was charged with the task of overseeing 
the transition process and identifying strategic directions. The taskforce was “intended to 
strengthen the role of the platforms and to determine which technological spearheads offer 
the best prospectus for the Netherlands” (EZ 2005: 30). Since then the taskforce has 
become a dominant actor in the process, e.g. through publishing a national transition action 
plan in May 2006 (Taskforce Energy Transition 2006). In interviews with researchers and 
NGOs the taskforce has been criticised for being dominated by large energy companies 
from the existing energy regime such as Shell, Essent, Electrabel and Gasunie (interviews 
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17; 18; 20). In 2008 the taskforce was replaced by an Energy Transition Board, initiated by 
VROM and EZ for a period of five years, which is hoped to provide a continuation of the 
taskforce’s work20. It includes all platform chairs as well as three independent members and 
is chaired by Theo Walthie, a senior advisor and board representative from the Dow 
Chemical Company. Its tasks are: creating support for the energy transition; developing, 
implementing, initiating and evaluating transition paths; advising the Government and 
providing information; being the voice of the market towards the Government; looking for 
international cooperation; helping prioritise developments; and monitoring the cohesion of 
the activities. 
 
Setting up a taskforce along the lines of traditional advisory councils similar to already-
existing councils such as VROM council and SER is not particularly innovative and 
replicates existing institutional set-ups. Thus, in part, the Energy Transition follows polder-
model patterns of establishing arenas for dialogue between social partners (government, 
firms, NGOS, interest organisations, and researchers). The taskforce is therefore 
“reminiscent of neo-corporatist (Dutch polder model) policy-making” and “in practice 
transition management replicates the very kind of network structures that transition scholars 
suggest we avoid” (Hendriks 2008: 1017). This examples shows how institutional 
commitments influence the implementation of the ideas of the ‘transitions’ storyline and 
shape them into familiar ways of doing things. 
 
A second institutional change was the creation of an interdepartmental directorate 
Energietransitie (IPE). This new directorate is located at the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and encompasses 30 civil servants from six ministries 21 . It is hoped that through the 
directorate “a good fit between ongoing policy dossiers and policy conditions for ‘system 
innovations’ over the longer term” will be achieved (EZ 2005: 52). The impulse for the 
directorate came from stakeholders involved in the Energy Transition who “developed 
pressure on government to re-organise policies and combine them” (interview 24). This 
                                                 
20 For details, please see: http://www.senternovem.nl/energytransition/energy_transition_board/index.asp. 
21 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Transport. 
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example demonstrates how the adoption of new policy ideas raises stakeholder expectations 
with regard to policy coherence. 
 
 
 
4.6.2 Influence of the ‘transitions’ storyline on practices of the ET 
 
While the Energy Transition has been described above as a new policy initiative which was 
designed based on the ‘transitions’ storyline, the question is whether its practices have been 
shaped by core elements of the storyline. 
 
In the energy sector the institutionalisation of the ‘transitions’ storyline took place through 
the Energy Transition led by the Ministry for Economic Affairs as analysed above. In line 
with central elements of the storyline, public-private transition platforms to develop a 
vision for a sustainable energy system; a portfolio of transition pathways; a support scheme 
to fund transition experiments; and an interdepartmental directorate to coordinate the 
activities across different Ministries were set up. At first sight the adoption of the 
‘transitions’ storyline by policy makers thus led to substantial change in policies and 
institutions.   
 
However, a number of practices in the ET are not in line with the original storyline and thus 
cannot be explained by relying on discursive factors. Among these elements are the 
dominance of incumbent actors in the project, the focus on technologies, and the choice of 
experiments according to narrow ‘market potential’ considerations and cost benefit 
analyses, as well as the reliance on traditional policy instruments. 
 
Despite the suggested focus on frontrunners in the ‘transitions’ storyline, policy makers fell 
back on ‘the usual suspects’ and implemented the ET according to the dominant 
administrative culture in a consensual way. The process came to be dominated by 
incumbent energy companies (Kemp, Rotmans et al. 2007; Kern and Smith 2008). 
Stakeholders recruited from existing policy networks were the starting point for the public-
private transition platforms which were established for each theme (interviews 1; 21; 24). 
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Another mechanism to enrol stakeholders was to create publicity about the project so that 
interested parties could contact the Ministry (interviews 1; 6; 15). EZ appointed business 
representatives as chairs for all platforms who then identified other interested stakeholders 
(interviews 6; 12; 16; 17).  An analysis of the composition of the six platforms (see Table 
5) shows that businesses are the dominant actor group while civil society organisations are 
few.  
 
Table 5: Participation in the private-public platforms of the Energy Transition 
Platform Government Business NGOs Intermediaries
22 
Science Total 
Green Resources 1 6 1 1 6 15 
New Gas 1 6 1 1 3 12 
Chain Efficiency 1 6 0 1 3 11 
Sustainable 
Mobility 3 10 3 0 0 16 
Sustainable 
Electricity 1 3 0 0 3 7 
Built 
Environment 0 4 4 2 1 11 
Source: own compilation based on list of participants obtained from the secretaries of the platforms from 
SenterNovem (as of June 2006); the platform on ‘Greenhouses as an energy source’ did not exist at that time 
 
 
The only environmental NGO actively involved in the Energy Transition project is 
Stichting Natuur en Milieu (Society for Nature and Environment). Larger companies are 
much more represented than SMEs (interviews 3; 5; 12; 19; list of participants). The 
Government shows a surprisingly low degree of participation. The involvement of 
researchers varies greatly across platforms. Critics argue that the platforms are dominated 
by regime incumbents (interviews 2; 3; 11; 13). 
 
Building on existing networks and appointing business chairs who themselves pick more 
participants led to a self-organising network derived from the incumbent energy regime. 
Kerkhof and Wieczorek cautioned that such a self-organising network strategy will lead to 
                                                 
22 The category Intermediaries encompasses representatives from municipalities, SenterNovem (excluding the 
secretaries), the provinces, regional initiatives (such as Rijnmond) or national advisory boards such as SER. 
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the dominance of regime incumbents and exclude the viewpoints of less prominent actors, 
which may provide insufficient room for learning and innovation (van de Kerkhof and 
Wieczorek 2005: 738). 
 
While the academic TM advocates emphasised the importance of social factors in 
transitions, Hendriks points out that the depiction of a sustainable energy system by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs rests on only two actor groups: government and the market; 
citizens are not thought to be playing a major part (Hendriks 2008: 2019). This example 
shows how the Ministry re-interpreted the transitions ideas in line with their departmental 
agenda, which puts emphasis on creating business opportunities. Therefore citizens are not 
believed to be crucial stakeholders. 
 
A senior researcher argued that  
“EZ gets a certain amount of innovative space to develop this transition 
policy and on the other hand they are victims of the same structure and 
the same culture they have been within for years or decades. Hugo 
Brouwer23 is infected by the polder model on the one hand but on the 
other hand he sees that the Ministry should not necessarily take the lead 
but very much the private sector” (interview 17).  
 
This example shows that while storylines need to appeal to existing norms and values to 
become accepted, they are vulnerable in their institutionalisation to being reinterpreted in 
line with embedded institutional norms (such as the polder model). The dominant 
corporatist policy-making patterns thus strongly influenced the implementation of the ET 
and led to a capture by incumbents. Hendriks confirms that neo-corporatist ideas persist in 
political practice and shape the Energy Transition (2008: 1026). 
 
Despite the importance of non-technological factors in ‘system innovations’ in the 
‘transitions’ storyline, the implementation of the Energy Transition focussed on 
technological innovations while social, cultural or institutional factors were downplayed. 
The focus on technologies was criticised by researchers (interviews 17; 18; 19) (Kemp, 
Rotmans et al. 2007; Kern and Smith 2008) but also self-critically acknowledged by civil 
                                                 
23 Hugo Brouwer is the director of the energy transition. 
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servants involved in the Energy Transition (Dietz, Brouwer et al. 2008). The above-
described dominance of business actors in combination with the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs’ aim to create new energy business led to a focus on technological innovation on 
the supply side rather than social or institutional changes. Even though energy conservation 
is generally believed to play a major role in sustainable energy systems there is no ‘80% 
lifestyle’ 24  platform, or experiments in which behavioural change is central. A senior 
researcher argued that in the Energy Transition project demand-side aspects are only 
recognised in narrow economic terms, and deeper lifestyle issues are not part of the 
transition policy discourse (interview 20).  
 
Another example of the persistence of existing norms and familiar administrative routines 
is the use of tools like cost benefit analysis or criteria like effectiveness to select transition 
pathways and experiments (Kern and Smith 2008) which can be considered as contradicting 
ideas that see experiments as high risk, high potential endeavours (Rotmans 2005). In the 
practice of the ET, market potential remains the dominant selection mechanism even in the 
early stages of niche development. The selection criteria for themes, platforms and 
transition experiments are quite narrow in emphasising conventional economic efficiency 
criteria. The criteria reflect existing strengths, and focus on ‘minimum regret options’, cost-
effectiveness and business opportunities. Transition themes and research priorities were 
originally selected on the basis of the competitive technological advantage and capabilities 
of the Netherlands (EZ 2002: 60; ECN 2004: 47). The criteria thus unduly neglect social 
and institutional innovations and accentuate marketable technological fixes25. New forms 
of energy business (such as energy service companies) and social change are being 
neglected. This practice undermines the goal of the Energy Transition project. Markets for 
radically new technologies are not easily formed. Such niche innovations may be ill-
adapted to the existing system and often have cost disadvantages to incumbent technologies 
for the individual investor (whilst offering societal benefits such as emission reductions) 
(Jacobsson and Bergek 2004: 16). The criteria for experiments reduce options for long-term 
                                                 
24 I.e. a lifestyle in 2050 that is 80% less carbon intense than today. 
25 In part this default to more familiar tools for civil servants is understandable as the TM model was by no 
means developed in detail at the time it was adopted (interviews 1, 18, 15). Thus, policy makers followed a 
learning by doing approach (EZ 2004a), relying very much on intuition (interview 17). 
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change and favour technological options that are already economically viable or close to 
the market.  
 
Another mismatch between the ‘transitions’ storyline and the practices of the Energy 
Transition is the reliance on traditional policy instruments such as the UKR scheme to fund 
transition experiments and the EOS-DEMO scheme of the national research strategy to 
fund demonstration projects through grants. Instead of ‘policy innovations’ to foster system 
innovation, more traditional instruments persist and new ‘control policies’ to put the 
existing electricity regime under pressure as part of a transition strategy are absent. Putting 
the regime under pressure will inevitably harm stakeholder commitment by the incumbents 
dominant in the process and therefore seems politically difficult to achieve (Kern and Smith 
2008). It has already been argued that the set up of the taskforce is very much in line with 
neo-corporatist polder-model policy making (Hendriks 2008: 1017). 
 
 
These examples show that despite the reframing of the policy discourse in terms of the 
‘transitions’ storyline, policy practices are shown to be quite resistant to change. This has 
been argued to be partly due to the persistence of existing institutional norms and routines 
and partly due to the diverging interests of EZ as well as of incumbent business actors 
which have not been sufficiently been reframed through the ‘transitions’ storyline. 
 
 
 
4.7 Conclusions regarding the Dutch Energy Transition case 
study 
 
This analysis has shown that in the Netherlands a coalition of researchers, consultants and 
civil servants, through collaboration in a number of programmes aimed at promoting 
sustainable technologies, started to share a storyline around the necessity for long-term 
structural changes in socio-technical systems. This discourse coalition used a routine policy 
strategy development process to promote a new ‘transitions’ storyline which emphasised 
the necessity of structural change in societal subsystems and the failure of existing policy 
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approaches to foster such change. The coalition made strategic use of existing policy 
commitments to innovation, liberalisation and creating business opportunities. Ideas around 
concrete proposals to steer such long-term change processes gained currency at a time 
when a routine review of the national environmental policy plan opened a ‘window of 
opportunity’. This process of discourse structuration culminated in the adoption of the 
‘transition management’ approach in the Fourth National Environmental Policy Plan in 
2001.  
 
The institutionalisation of the ‘transitions’ storyline took place through the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs’ Energy Transition project. Central ideas of the storyline, around creating 
visions, setting up transition arenas and developing transition experiments to explore a 
number of pathways, were implemented and shaped practices of civil servants and 
stakeholders committed to the storyline. However, the analysis of the Energy Transition 
also showed that despite the novel language used, a number of institutional practices 
remained unchanged, such as the focus on technological change and business actors, the 
use of conventional policy instruments and institutions such as taskforces, or choosing 
transition experiments in terms of cost effectiveness and cost benefit analysis, which 
hinders more radical reform. This has been explained by a number of factors: the 
persistence of existing institutions which have not been altered by the new discursive 
commitments, the ambivalence of the ‘transitions’ storyline which led to a capture by 
incumbent actors, but also the prevailing interests of EZ and business actors. 
 
The interpretative flexibility of the transitions storyline, which enabled its political success 
during the discourse structuration, made the ambitious storyline susceptible to being 
narrowed down during its institutionalisation. Because of this narrowing-down through the 
capture of the process by incumbent firms and the persistence of existing institutional 
norms such as polder model practices, it is doubtful whether this policy initiative will 
achieve its ambitions but it is too early to formally assess the success of this initiative. 
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5 Case Study II: The Carbon Trust in the UK 
 
The following analysis sheds light on how and why the Carbon Trust was set up and how 
this new policy initiative was implemented. 
 
 
5.1 The Carbon Trust 
 
The Carbon Trust (CT) was announced as one of the policy initiatives of the 2000 UK 
Climate Change Programme. It was jointly set up in 2001 by DETR/DEFRA and DTI. The 
CT’s mission is to ‘accelerate the move to a low carbon economy’ (Carbon Trust 2007a) 
and its work is organised around five complementary business areas: Carbon Trust Insights 
to inform businesses and policy makers, Carbon Trust Solutions to help companies to 
reduce their emissions, Carbon Trust Innovations to help develop low carbon technologies, 
Carbon Trust Enterprises to create new low carbon businesses using existing technologies 
and Carbon Trust Investments to finance the best ideas and business plans (Carbon Trust 
2007a: 5). All CT activities are aimed at reducing carbon emissions in the short, medium 
and long term, which needs to be balanced with the aim of improving cost efficiency year 
by year. In the business area of developing low carbon technologies the timescale of the 
activities is aimed at medium- to long-term CO2 emission reductions (Carbon Trust 2006a: 
50-51). The initial expectation of Government was that the CT would save 0.5 million 
tonnes of carbon equivalent (MtC) each year by 2010 while the climate change levy 
package as a whole was estimated to save 5 MtC per annum by 2010 (DETR 2000: 125). 
 
The Carbon Trust is often mentioned in the context of UK energy, climate and innovation 
policy (Foxon 2003; Wordsworth and Grubb 2003; Darkin 2006; Winskel, McLeod et al. 
2006; IEA 2007) but has not yet been analysed in any systematic way. In particular, the 
process through which the Carbon Trust came about and the ‘creation’ of the rationale for 
setting up this kind of organisation has not yet been researched. So how and why did this 
new policy initiative come about, and how has it been implemented?  
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Before these questions can be addressed in more detail below, the following section will 
describe the dominant discourse in UK energy policy as a background to the subsequent 
discursive developments which are argued to have brought about the Carbon Trust. 
 
 
5.2 The dominant ‘free markets plus taxation’ discourse in UK 
energy policy 
 
This section will outline the dominant discourse in UK energy policy in the 1990s, in 
particular how climate change and the move to a low carbon economy have been 
considered.  
 
UK energy policy, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, was mainly based on ideas around 
privatisation, liberalisation and competition (Helm 2005; Rutledge 2007). The former 
vertically integrated, state-owned monopolist utility companies supplying gas and 
electricity were broken up and privatised as far as possible. The ideas behind these policies 
were taken from neoclassical economic theory which suggested that competition would 
drive down electricity commodity prices, leading to lower retail rates (Kiesling 2009) and 
thus fulfil one of the central objectives of energy policy. Energy came to be seen as ‘just 
another commodity’ or, according to the then Energy Secretary Lawson, ‘a traded good’ 
(Helm 2003). In this discourse the “idea of turning the state monopolies from producer- to 
consumer-driven businesses had immense appeal” (Helm 2003: 258).  
 
Scrase et al argue that 
“Advocates of market liberalisation see unfettered competition as the best 
guarantee to market access and secure supplies. This view remains the 
orthodoxy in almost all energy policymaking institutions (at least officially), 
and it continues to frame policies and shape financing decisions in both 
national governments and international agencies” (2009: 6). 
 
In light of this dominant discourse the Department of Energy became unnecessary. Only a 
regulatory structure within which the market could operate would be required (interview 3). 
Consequently, the Department of Energy was abolished in 1992 (Helm 2002) and a 
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regulator for overseeing gas and electricity markets (Ofgem) was established to protect the 
interests of consumers (Rutledge 2007). 
 
The support for this discourse was not limited to the Conservative Government but also 
continued during the ‘New Labour’ Government from 1997 onwards 26 . The Labour 
manifesto for the 1997 election also supported the idea to ‘promote competition wherever 
possible’ (Helm 2003: 288) and was in stark contrast with ‘Old Labour’ energy policy 
which had focussed on long-term energy security (Rutledge 2007). The ‘New Labour’ 
Government did not feel responsible any longer for planning how energy demand was to be 
met. Public energy R&D budgets plummeted (RCEP 2000). Interview evidence confirmed 
that these ideas were very much present in the thinking of civil servants at around the time 
the Carbon Trust was envisaged. The dominant idea in energy policy was to ‘liberalise 
energy markets’, ‘privatise as much as possible’, ‘let the market do the job’ and follow a 
‘market-based approach’ to energy policy (interview 12). This necessarily required ‘light 
touch government’ to ‘give the market room to breathe’ (interview 8) and to ‘minimise 
interference with markets’ was a priority (interview 21). The dominant discourse was that 
‘government should never do anything unless you absolutely have to’ and that ‘markets 
deliver things’ (interview 26). 
 
Seen from the perspective of this discourse, the question is: under which circumstances 
would government interference with the market be acceptable? The government only 
intervenes in markets if it has identified a ‘market failure’, as the presumption is that 
consumer preferences are preferable over state planning (Helm 2003: 259). In the case of 
supporting innovation for a move to a low carbon economy several market failures played a 
role and two central ones are usually referred to (see for example Foxon 2003; Watson 
2009). Firstly, there is underinvestment in R&D due to the ‘public good’ character of 
knowledge since firms cannot easily appropriate the benefits of their innovation, as a new 
product or process may easily be copied by competitors. This failure is used to justify 
                                                 
26 According to Schmidt this is a criterion for a transformative discourse: that opposition parties are only able 
to win elections by embracing core ideas of the previous government’s discourse (Schmidt 2001). 
Traditionally, Labour – in opposition since 1979 – had “naturally sided against the Lawson policy agenda” of 
‘energy as a normal commodity’ (Helm 2003). Labour historically had favoured monopoly and state 
ownership. 
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public subsidies and tax credits for R&D investments. Secondly, the damage costs 
associated with carbon emissions are an externality in the energy market. Low carbon 
technologies are disadvantaged if these external costs are not fully internalised. Policies 
like the Climate Change Levy (CCL; which will be explained in more detail later) on the 
business use of energy, or the EU emissions trading scheme, are attempts to internalise 
these external costs. Again these ideas are based on neoclassical economic theory. 
Interviewees confirmed that in line with this discourse the rationale for UK energy 
innovation policy is based around the need ‘to correct market failures’ (interviews 3; 10; 
11; 21; 23; 26) while at the same time minimising interference in markets (interviews 17; 
20; 21; 26). However, there have been slight changes in that the ‘New Labour’ Government 
has been more open to the idea of ‘market intervention’ compared to the previous 
Conservative Government which “took the view that any intervention in the market was 
seen by definition [as] a bad thing. You had to really go through a lot of effort to 
demonstrate a market failure that justified the intervention” (interview 3). 
 
According to this discourse, when there is an identified market failure which requires the 
government to intervene, it is preferable for this intervention to be based on market-based 
instruments such as carbon taxation or emissions trading (Helm 2003). Lovell at al. have 
described this as a ‘market mechanisms’ storyline in which the central claim is that “the 
market itself would provide a solution to climate change if it took into account the societal 
and environmental cost of carbon emissions” (Lovell, Bulkeley et al. 2009: 98). The 
absence of a price for carbon is seen as the central problem. The International Energy 
Agency has argued that the UK is one of the countries which relies most on market 
instruments (IEA 2007: 9). One reason for this preference according to neoclassical 
economics ideas is that apart from market failures there are also ‘government failures’. 
These occur when governments perversely intervene in markets because of self-interests, 
limitations of their rationality and available information, as well as politics. The costs of 
government failures are often believed to be greater than the costs of market failures and so 
intervention makes things worse (Chang 2002: 540). The UK Government strongly 
supports this discourse and sees business as better placed to make decisions, for example 
about investments:  
127 
 
“We believe a market based approach within a clear policy framework 
provides an effective way to help us to deliver our energy policy goals.  This 
is because companies are best placed to weigh up and manage the complex 
range of interrelated factors affecting the economics of energy investments” 
(DTI 2007: 16).  
Watson has argued that the notion that policy makers are ill-placed to pick winners and that 
markets are more able to do so is an article of faith in many policy debates in the UK 
(Watson 2009: 127). Another reason for the preference for market mechanisms is that 
economic incentives like the CCL are seen to be more politically acceptable than other 
interventions, which was an argument used in the public discussions around the CCL 
(Belfast Telegraph February 20, 2001). 
 
The commitment to market instruments goes hand in hand with the idea that where there is 
a need for innovation support by the government this should be done in a technology-
neutral way to avoid ‘picking winners’ (interviews 3; 4, 10; 17; 21). ‘Picking winners’ 
would violate the principles of liberalisation and minimum interference and poses risks of 
government failure. One of the interviewees eloquently describes this way of seeing the 
world:   
“So there is generally this movement against [picking winners] and that 
the market is [the] best instrument to decide. It just became an object of 
faith that we do not interfere with the market or we minimise interference 
with the market” (interview 21). 
 
This element of the discourse is usually explained by the legacy of past government failures 
to back certain technologies in which historical examples such as the Concorde or the UK 
nuclear programme are used to justify that ‘picking winners’ is not desirable and is doomed 
to fail. This discourse is also publicly supported by influential academics, such as Helm 
(2006), who argue that government should only set appropriate frameworks and private 
investors should make choices about technology options. 
 
The technology-neutral idea also precludes any kind of industrial policy. Green industrial 
policy approaches are usually based on an institutional economics discourse. Campbell 
argued that the assumptions on which institutional economics is based deviate sharply from 
neoclassical economics (in that institutional economics does not assume that markets occur 
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naturally; that private competition is necessarily the key to economic innovation and 
growth or that government intervention always undermines market efficiency). Campbell’s 
research found that supporters of industrial policy in the US thus faced substantial problems 
as their ideas for policy programmes “did not resonate well with the dominant neoclassical 
paradigm” (Campbell 2001: 172). Similarly, in the UK there is an aversion to having an 
industrial policy strategy (interviews 4; 5; 21). Linking energy policy and industrial 
strategy is rejected in favour of a laissez faire approach (Watson 2009). 
 
One of the difficulties of the ‘free market’ discourse is that on the one hand it accepts 
government intervention in principle but on the other hand it needs to contain this 
interference very strongly as otherwise the dominance of the market would be at stake. One 
of the ways to overcome this dilemma is to argue that although the models, following the 
logic of market failures, may have strong interventionist policy conclusions, these 
interventions are argued to be too difficult technically (too little information) or too 
dangerous politically (bureaucratic abuse or interest-group capture) to be put in place 
(Chang 2002). The technology-neutral element of the discourse seems to be doing exactly 
that: while the need for support for low carbon technologies in principle is accepted on the 
basis of the existence of market failures, the government cannot be entrusted with selecting 
which technologies to support. Any instrument therefore has to be designed in a 
technology-neutral way.  
 
However, it has been acknowledged by civil servants that there is a tension between this 
principle and the need to make progress, e.g. with the development and diffusion of 
renewable energy technologies:  
“There is always this tension between being technology-neutral, 
technology-agnostic because it’s not for government to ‘pick winners’. But 
at the same time it is actually quite difficult to get anything moving unless 
you do do something intensive on particular technologies, do focus on the 
things which have the biggest chance of being material” (interview 12). 
This acknowledgement has led to policies taking an options-based approach to technologies 
(interviews 4; 12) and an ‘outsourcing’ of the decisions about which technologies to 
support to independent organisations, such as the Carbon Trust (interview 10). 
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5.3 The ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline 
 
This section argues that against the background of the dominant discourse in UK energy 
policy in the 1990s described above, a new storyline emerged during the policy process 
around the 2000 Climate Change Programme. In the following, the central cognitive and 
normative ideas of the emerging storyline are analysed. 
 
 
5.3.1 The Climate Change Levy as a revenue-neutral policy instrument 
 
The 2000 Climate Change Programme established the Climate Change Levy (CCL) – a 
business energy tax aimed at cutting carbon emissions (HM Treasury 2001: 106). This idea 
followed the Marshall report, which argued that economic instruments are the most cost-
effective way to reduce emissions (Dresner, Jackson et al. 2006). The idea to reduce 
emissions from business energy use through an economic instrument is very much in line 
with the ‘free market plus taxation’ discourse outlined above.  
 
This cognitive idea, based on a ‘logic of necessity’ in line with neoclassical economic 
theory, was combined with the normative promise made by the Chancellor for the new tax 
to be revenue-neutral. Ministers wanted to demonstrate that the CCL is a business neutral 
activity and wanted to ‘give something back to business’ (interview 2). The idea was to not 
only recycle the receipts via a reduction in national insurance contributions but to help the 
companies suffering most from the impact of the CCL (interviews 2; 3; 4; 7; 10; 11; 12; 20; 
22; 24). It was argued that recycling via general business taxation favours service 
companies over energy intensive businesses (Marshall Report 1998; also interview 10), so 
it was decided that some of the revenue should be directly targeted at energy efficiency 
improvements as well as low carbon technology development (interviews 2; 3; 7; 8; 10). 
This kind of hypothecation, returning business money back to business, was seen as highly 
desirable (interviews 11; 25) and tied in with the Government’s wider agenda of ‘taxing 
bads and reducing taxes on goods’ (Environmental Audit Committee 2008). A key concern 
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for government was not to be seen to increase tax burdens and it therefore proposed a full 
recycling of revenues (Helm 2003: 357). 
 
The main thrust in the discussions about the CCL levy was that this instrument needed to 
be revenue-neutral to avoid a further tax burden on UK business in order to avoid negative 
impacts on competitiveness, as for example Patricia Hewitt, the then Economic Secretary 
from the Treasury, insisted (Select Committee on Environmental Audit, Minutes of 
Evidence, Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120 - 139), Thursday 25 March 1999). It 
was within this context that the idea to set up a Carbon Trust gained support as a means to 
recycle CCL revenue back to business. The CT was part of the political deal at the time, 
which enabled businesses to agree to this downstream energy tax. The ‘cognitive necessity’ 
of having a tax on business energy use to correct a market failure was thus combined with a 
normative commitment to existing values in favour of not increasing the overall tax burden 
on businesses. 
 
 
5.3.2 Having a Carbon Trust separate from government 
 
The second core element of the emerging storyline was to set up an organisation 
responsible for recycling some of the CCL receipts separately from government. This 
element of the storyline was mainly based on normative arguments and followed a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’. The idea of separating policy making and the delivery of policy is a deep 
seated norm in the UK civil service (interview 26). The idea of having an organisation like 
the Carbon Trust set up outside of government as a delivery body thus resonates with this 
institutional norm. It is a Government’s general philosophy to set up ‘focused delivery 
bodies with a clear remit’ (interview 10). These and similar arguments were made by many 
of the interviewees when trying to explain why the CT was set up outside of government. 
They claimed that once it had been set up the CT could ‘go away and deliver and clearly 
has an impact’ (interview 5). It could ‘get on with the job’ and focus on ‘delivering 
outcomes’ (interview 13) and is seen as a ‘really good delivery body’ (interview 11).  
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The second key argument raised during this process for having the CT set up independently 
from government was to keep the day to day decision-making away from the politics of 
government. There was a perceived need to have an organisation at ‘arm’s-length from 
government’, ‘run in a non-political way’, with ‘freedom to operate’. The argument is that 
in order to have an organisation ‘free from political interference’ it is necessary to ‘get it 
out from the departmental space’ (interviews 2; 4; 5; 6; 7; 10; 12; 21; 20; 22; 23). The 
underlying assumption is that an independent organisation is able to make objective, non-
political decisions based on commercial grounds, free from government control and free 
from lobbying while the government simply sets the framework and defines goals 
(interviews 2; 12; 23). This ability for ‘rational decision-making’ (interviews 17; 23) 
wherein something needs to ‘make good sense in business terms’ and be ‘financially 
justifiable’ (interview 11) is claimed to be superior to ‘emotional’ decision-making by 
government.  
 
The idea of having the Carbon Trust set up independently from government resonates with 
neoliberal assumptions about politics, the role of the government and the free market. 
Chang characterises this worldview:  
“the neoliberal world of politics is populated by self-seeking bureaucrats, 
and politicians with limited capabilities operating under the influence of 
interest groups. In this view, politics opens the door for sectional interests 
to ‘distort’ the ‘rationality’ of the market system. The neoliberal solution 
to this problem is to ‘depoliticize’ the economy. This is, according to their 
view, to be achieved by restricting the scope of the state (through 
deregulation and privatization) and by reducing the room for policy 
discretion in those few areas where it is allowed to operate, for example, 
by strengthening the rules on bureaucratic conduct or by setting up 
‘politically independent’ policy agencies bound by rigid rules” (Chang 
2002: 549). 
 
In the case of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline, the ‘market failure’ 
argument provides a rationale for intervention and the support for moving to a low carbon 
economy is ‘depoliticised’ and outsourced to an independent organisation. This example 
shows how a dominant discourse shapes emerging policy ideas to make them palatable to 
policy makers, stakeholders and the public.  
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5.3.3 The Carbon Trust as a business-led organisation 
 
The third core element of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline was that the 
Carbon Trust should be a business-led body. This aspect of the storyline appealed to deep-
seated normative convictions about a business-led organisation being more efficient, 
professional, effective, more ‘trusted by business’ and ‘competent with money’, better able 
to speak the language of business and having more of a ‘can do’ attitude compared to a 
non-departmental public body or a government department (interviews 2; 3; 5; 6; 7; 8; 10; 
11; 12; 14; 19; 20; 22). In several public statements the Government emphasised that “a 
Carbon Trust is the most effective way of delivering the energy efficiency programme and 
funding research into low carbon technology” (see for example Select Committee on Trade 
and Industry, Annexes to the Report (I); 09.01.2001).  
 
In terms of cognitive ideas another important reason for having a business-led organisation 
set up was the belief that ‘business solutions matter’ (interview 25). The leverage27 of 
private investment is important and a business-led CT could act as a catalyst for this. 
Subsequently ‘leverage has become one of the key metrics’ of the CT (interviews 2; 4; 11; 
12; 17; 18).  The idea was that an independent, business-led organisation will have a real 
impact on the ‘market place’.  
 
In line with this thinking one of the key arguments for setting up a business-led body was 
also about the ability of such an organisation to attract high-caliber staff (interview 2) 
thereby ensuring success though the ‘quality of the management team’ (interview 5).  The 
idea was to ‘bring in business expertise’ (interview 19) and get people ‘speaking directly to 
business’ (interview 7) and that attracting staff with a ‘background credible to industry’ 
would be necessary for the success of the CT (interview 22). This would help in ‘creating a 
comfort zone for business’ (interview 17). It was also argued that a different skills set 
would be needed to engage with business (interview 2).  
 
                                                 
27 Leverage refers to the ratio between public and private investment. The CT for example invests alongside 
private investors and thus has a larger impact due to its leverage of private investment of about 1:10. 
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A report published by the National Audit Office cited two main reasons for the Carbon 
Trust being set up as a private company: “to allow it operational flexibility and to enable it 
to adopt a business focus” (NAO 2007b: 5). It also pointed out that setting up private 
companies was a more general approach that the Government was following, as with the 
Energy Saving Trust and the Waste and Resources Action Programme, for example. 
 
 
5.3.4 The need for supporting energy efficiency and for developing low 
carbon technology 
 
While the initial impulse for having an organisation to recycle revenues came from 
discussions around the CCL, the fourth element of the storyline established what exactly 
this body would be doing. The storyline outlined a dual role: on the one hand it would need 
to directly help businesses to cut their carbon emissions by fostering the take-up of 
available energy-efficient technologies and on the other hand it would need to support the 
development of low carbon technologies for the future. The storyline also amplified the 
idea that there are major economic opportunities for the UK in developing low carbon 
technologies and bringing these to market.  
 
A business person centrally involved in setting up the CT remembers: 
“the key areas we were to look at was first of all energy efficiency […] The 
other areas we set up were the R&D programmes. So we wanted to do two 
things: you know you have got this valley of death. You have got new 
technologies that are near market that need commercialisation. It needs a lot 
of money between something that is near market and actually getting it to 
the market. […] We wanted to fund near market demonstration projects. We 
also wanted to put money into the carbon technologies of the future […] at 
that time there was a definite market weakness in all of these areas” 
(interview 11). 
The idea of ‘valleys of death’ (interviews 2; 11) for new technologies or an ‘innovation 
gap’ (interview 10) are particular metaphors which were used to justify public support for 
low carbon innovation in this storyline. The idea is that new and emerging technologies 
‘get stuck’ at particular stages of the innovation chain, for example in the demonstration 
phase (e.g. doing field trials), which usually requires a large step in terms of resources 
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needed (interview 10) (see Figure 7 and Figure 8). A senior civil servant explained that the 
task of the organisation to be set up would be to  
“look at the process from early stage through demonstration, 
development, venture and out through the other side. You look at the 
whole [of] what we call the innovation chain. And you need an 
organisation that delivers that sort of model” (interview 7). 
 
Figure 7: The metaphor of the ‘innovation chain’ 
 
Source: (Grubb 2005: 118) 
 
Figure 8: The metaphor of the 'valley of death' 
 
Source: (Grubb 2005:121) 
 
These metaphors were used to argue that public support is necessary to overcome the 
‘valley of death’/‘innovation gap’ between R&D funding and market pull instruments such 
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as the Renewables Obligation (RO). A senior civil servant acknowledged that “the concept 
of an innovation chain is a very very powerful tool to sell the concept of innovation to 
people who don’t know anything about it” (interview 26). While DTI was already funding 
R&D into renewable energy technologies further from market, the idea was that the CT 
would focus on ‘closer to market’ technologies and on ‘getting businesses ready to exploit 
these technologies’ (interview 10). 
 
 
5.4 The interactive processes of policy construction and 
communication 
 
While the preceding section focussed on the substantive content of the key ideas of the 
‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline, this section focuses on the interactive 
processes by which they have been generated and conveyed.  
 
 
5.4.1 The coordinative discourse of policy construction 
 
In the coordinative discourse the main interlocutors are policy actors and it is focussed on 
constructing a policy programme (Schmidt 2006a: 254). The main actors involved in the 
coordinative discourse around the CCL and the recycling of funds were: 
- civil servants from DETR/DEFRA, DTI and the Treasury;  
- elected officials such as John Prescott and Michael Meacher; 
- think-tanks like the Institute for Public Policy Research; 
- business people like Lord Marshall and members of the Advisory Committee on 
Business and the Environment (ACBE). 
 
 
5.4.1.1 The discursive politics around the Climate Change Levy 
 
Neither the Climate Change Levy nor the Carbon Trust ideas were part of Labour’s 1997 
election manifesto. However, in that manifesto Labour committed to reducing CO2 
emissions by 20% by 2010 compared to 1990 levels and more generally promised to “put 
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concern for the environment at the heart of policy-making” (Labour Party 1997). The 
manifesto also committed to promoting new green technologies and businesses to create 
jobs, win exports and protect the environment. Energy efficiency is mentioned as a priority 
in this context. Helm claims that while under the Conservative Government energy policy 
had played a minor role, “Labour would want a much more active policy framework, 
eventually committing itself to the elimination of fuel poverty and support of renewables 
and energy efficiency” (Helm 2003: 280). Interview evidence confirmed that under the 
Conservative Government energy efficiency had not been a priority and that when the 
Labour Government came in “there was a shift in gear” (interview 3). When Labour took 
more interest in energy efficiency, fuel poverty and carbon reduction targets  
“they began to see some of the shortcomings of the competitive market in 
relation to promoting energy reduction because they set up the market to 
be useful to reduce the cost of energy and low cost was driving high 
consumption till they began to see there were issues there. That’s why they 
were interested in the possibilities of the climate change levy” (interview 
3). 
However, while Labour made the environment a key issue in the 1997 election campaign, 
the Party at the same time was also trying to avoid its reputation for being seen to dislike 
business (interview 11). In this endeavour, the idea of the Carbon Trust to help business to 
reduce energy use played a key role. 
 
In the coordinative discourse policy actors often use ideas which are conveyed by ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ (Schmidt 2006a: 254). Smith has argued that the Institute for Public Policy 
Research (IPPR) was such a “key policy entrepreneur pushing for an energy tax on 
business” (Smith 2004: 83). He points out that IPPR was influential in the Labour Party. 
Stephen Tindale at IPPR was commissioned to present ideas and strategies for 
environmental tax reforms by the then Shadow Secretary of the Treasury, Gordon Brown, 
before the 1997 elections. The Institute also ran seminars advocating a business energy tax, 
which were attended by civil servants as well as business and environmental groups. After 
the elections Tindale became a special advisor to the Environment Minister, Meacher 
(Beecroft 2002). Suggesting a market instrument to correct for a market failure was very 
much in line with the dominant energy policy discourse (see section 5.2).  
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These ideas were taken up by a high-level advisory report led by Lord Marshall in 1998. 
This report was of crucial importance as the CCL and other features of the 2000 Climate 
Change Programme were designed according to the recommendations of the report (Darkin 
2006; NAO 2007a). The idea of a carbon tax had been around for some time and the 1990 
Environmental White Paper ‘This Common Inheritance’ had already advocated the use of 
economic instruments (Helm 2003) but rejected the use of a carbon tax on fossil fuel for the 
immediate future (Aldhous 1990). Against this background  
“Labour set up a task force to look into the case for an energy tax, and asked 
Lord Marshall to lead it. The specific remit was to consider how best to use 
new economic instruments to improve the industrial and commercial use of 
energy and help reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Marshall had not 
been previously known for his environmental expertise, but he did have 
wide industrial experience, and therefore could be regarded as better able to 
‘sell’ an unpopular tax to industry. He also fitted into the New Labour vogue 
for businessmen, rather than academics or experts in helping to shape 
policy” (Helm 2003: 354). 
 
Marshall was a former president of the Confederation of British Industry (1996-1998), had 
been chairman of British Airways and was a well-respected business leader (Smith 2004: 
85). The report came out in November 1998 and advocated a tax to tackle business 
emissions, but argued that it should be designed in a way that would not harm the 
international competitiveness of British industry. Revenues should be fully recycled. It 
mentioned a ‘Carbon Trust’ as one possibility28 for recycling at least part of the receipts. 
The report recommended that  
“the revenues are recycled in full to business, with at least some of the 
revenues channelled into schemes aimed directly at promoting energy 
efficiency and reducing greenhouse gas emissions – perhaps through ‘carbon 
trust’ type schemes to promote low carbon technologies, and/or energy 
audits/advice for SMEs” (Marshall Report 1998: 2). 
 
Arguments in favour of schemes to promote energy efficiency or emissions reductions 
were that recycling via general business taxation would not provide any incentives for 
improving energy efficiency and emissions reductions and that it would favour low-energy 
users over energy-intensive businesses. While the report mentions the idea of a Carbon 
                                                 
28 The other option considered in the report was recycling via general business taxation such as corporation 
tax or employers’ National Insurance Contributions. 
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Trust it also states that this proposal originally came from ACBE (Marshall Report 1998: 
26). A senior energy researcher claims that the Marshall report was “really quite influential 
in shifting that agenda forward because it was the first time anybody from business had 
come and said ‘yeah we need economic instruments to take that forward’” (interview 24). 
The Marshall report provided the cognitive and normative basis on which the Government 
introduced the CCL and linked the tax proposal with ideas about how to recycle the 
revenues.  
 
In the 1999 Budget Report the Government argued that it was in agreement with the 
recommendations of the Marshall report that there was a role for a tax within a wider 
policy package. The budget announced the CCL and stated 
“The Government also agrees with Lord Marshall's recommendation that 
the levy must be designed in a way that protects the competitiveness of 
UK firms. The Government therefore intends to recycle the revenues to 
business through a cut of 0.5 percentage points in the main rate of 
employer NICs [National Insurance Contributions]. Businesses will also 
benefit from schemes aimed at promoting energy efficiency directly and 
stimulating the take-up of renewable sources of energy, like solar and 
wind power. The introduction of the climate change levy will therefore 
entail no increase in the burden of taxation on business” (HM Treasury 
1999: para 5.64). 
The Government thus accepted the discursive framing of the problem and the linkage 
between competitiveness concerns and direct incentives for energy efficiency and the take-
up of renewable energy technologies29. 
 
The setting up of the Carbon Trust was thus part of a political deal between the 
Government and interest groups that was linked to the CCL (interviews 2; 3; 4; 5; 7; 10; 11; 
12; 20; 22; 24; 26; also Environmental Audit Committee 2008: 28). An observer notes: “it 
was part of the political trade-offs at the time. In order to get the CCL business had to get a 
certain price for it to happen and so a business-led CT was almost the inevitable outcome” 
(interview 24). Out of the discussions about the necessity for a new business energy tax a 
discourse coalition formed which linked the new tax with the need for a recycling 
                                                 
29 This resonates with the findings of Barry and Paterson who argued that ‘New Labour’ saw ecological 
modernisation strategies as viable “to the extent that policy initiatives can be articulated as contributing to the 
‘competitiveness’ of a national economy” (Barry and Paterson 2004: 779). 
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mechanism used to foster the take-up and development of low carbon technology. The 
discourse coalition in support of this political ‘deal’ did not only include government, 
business interest organisations and experts such as IPPR, but also green lobby groups. The 
environmental think-tank Green Alliance was involved in the preparation of the Marshall 
report by giving evidence to his team30 and it also engaged several times between 1999 and 
2001 with ACBE through its emissions trading NGO liaison group. The environmental 
organisations were very much in favour of a business carbon tax and also supported the 
idea of hypothecation (interview 22).  
 
 
5.4.1.2 The discursive politics around the idea of having an independent, 
business-led Carbon Trust 
 
While the previous section focussed on the discursive politics around the CCL, this section 
will focus on the politics around the recycling of funds through an independent, business-
led organisation. It will be argued that the Advisory Committee on Business and the 
Environment (ACBE) and a small number of civil servants played a key role in establishing 
the storyline which subsequently led to establishing the Carbon Trust. 
 
ACBE was set up in 1991 by the Secretary of State for the Environment and the Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry. It consisted of a group of senior business leaders “who are 
appointed on a personal basis [and] who are charged with taking a strategic view on some 
of the key environmental issues of the day” (interview 11). ACBE reported to the Cabinet 
Office and its membership was appointed by the Secretaries of State for the Environment 
and for Trade and Industry. While the Confederation of British Industry’s (CBI) 
environmental committees used to be dominated by the ‘smoke-stack industry’, 
membership of ACBE was more progressive (Smith 2004). During the process of policy 
construction around the CCL, ACBE published three reports which were of major 
importance in designing the Carbon Trust (‘Climate Change: A Strategic Issue for 
Business’, 1998; ‘Carbon Trusts – Exploiting the Potential of Low Carbon Technology’, 
1999; ‘ACBE Proposals for Establishment of the Carbon Trust’, 2000).  
                                                 
30 Lord Marshall in the foreword to his report explicitly thanked ACBE and the Green Alliance for their time 
spent responding to the consultation. 
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ACBE’s first report promoted the idea that if a carbon tax is thought to be necessary to 
meet the Government’s carbon reduction targets, then this tax should be revenue-neutral to 
prevent negative impacts on business competitiveness. This should be done by encouraging 
low carbon technology (ACBE 1998). In this context ACBE mentioned the idea of Carbon 
Trusts for the first time in the political discussions. As discussed above this idea was 
subsequently taken up in the Marshall report.  
 
In its second report ACBE recommended that the Government should adopt the principle of 
an independent, business-funded Carbon Trust as an integral component of the Climate 
Change Levy. The report argued that the revenues “should be recycled to support research, 
innovation and investment in a way which will directly stimulate more rapid take up of low 
carbon technology” (ACBE 1999: 11). ACBE was particularly interested in the 
“development of mechanisms such as Carbon Trusts to allow greater business involvement 
in recycling of revenues” (ACBE 1999: 2).  
 
ACBE’s third report was the most detailed and covered not only questions around the 
mission of the to-be-established Carbon Trust, but also a workplan, level of funding, its 
cooperation with other initiatives, governance and management structures and its 
embedding within a wider policy framework. ACBE recommended that the CT be 
established as a company limited by guarantee “in order to provide independence, and 
flexibility in objectives, powers, and membership, and to enable it to seek a variety of 
funding sources” (ACBE 2000: 2). It also strongly stressed the idea that because the CCL 
revenue comes from business and needs to be recycled back to business, the CT should be 
business-led to “gain the confidence of business, and support for its activities” (ACBE 
2000: 2). ACBE also recommended that the CT would need to be closely engaging with 
government in policy debates and “help to steer Government thinking” (ACBE 2000: 8).  
 
Most of these ideas promoted by ACBE have been identified in section 5.3 as key aspects 
of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline and were subsequently taken up in the 
design of the CT. The Government repeatedly referred to the recommendations of ACBE in 
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explaining and justifying this policy initiative. Interviewees confirmed the major 
importance of ACBE in developing and driving forward the ideas around a Carbon Trust 
(interviews 2; 3: 8; 10; 11; 12). ACBE was a very influential body at the time and had free 
access to cabinet members (interview 11).  
 
ACBE was involved in this process not only by giving policy advice in the form of reports 
but also in terms of close face to face interaction between itself and DETR civil servants. A 
project team was set up which included civil servants from DETR and ACBE members. 
During the year 2000 the DETR team engaged extensively with ACBE to further develop 
the idea of a CT based on ACBE’s 1999 report (interview 2). The detail of what the CT 
would do, its mission, its area of activity and how it would be governed was sketched out 
by two civil servants from DETR and two ACBE people (interview 3). ACBE seconded a 
business person to DETR to help with this process. The secondee explained that DETR was 
willing to support ACBE’s idea of establishing a business-led CT but needed support from 
ACBE because ‘“setting up companies and establishing governance, sorting out corporate 
budgets etc. etc. isn’t the sort of thing that we [DETR] do. We haven’t got the time or 
money to hire someone, so lend us someone for free’ and that’s how I came in” (interview 
8). The senior civil servant in charge of the ‘Energy, Environment and Waste’ directorate 
who was responsible for the recycling of CCL revenues also acknowledged the central role 
of ACBE: “One of the members of my team was given the job of creating the CT, working 
with Ian Stephenson, and they [ACBE] put a lot of work in for us” (interview 3). Ian 
Stephenson from ACBE was seen by several interviewees as crucial in the setting-up of the 
CT (interviews 2; 3; 7). The cooperation went so far that according to a DETR press release 
Ian Stephenson “led the team that designed the Carbon Trust”31. 
 
This close cooperation led to trust between officials and ACBE members who  
“were thinking along similar lines. There should be either Carbon Trust 
or Carbon Trusts whose job it would be to work with business to find 
technologies, to develop technologies to reduce emissions, to improve 
energy efficiency” (interview 2).  
                                                 
31 DETR press release, 12 February 2001,  
http://www.gnn.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID=24686. 
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The central rationale for developing the Carbon Trust model and its design was thus 
constructed in close interaction between civil servants and ACBE and led to the 
‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline. The business involvement lent credibility to 
the storyline and helped convince ministers about this policy programme. The Government 
followed the storyline and announced a business-led Carbon Trust, set up as a company 
limited by guarantee.  
 
All of this has to be seen in the context of ‘New Labour’ more generally. ‘New Labour’ has 
been very careful to involve business in its decision-making and has effectively engaged 
with the business community (Darkin 2006). ‘New Labour’ tried to detach itself from the 
union interests and made clear efforts to secure business confidence by positioning 
themselves openly as a pro-business party (Gamble and Kelly 2001; Ludlam 2004). Central 
to achieving credibility for the ‘New Labour’ project was the adoption of policies which the 
financial markets in the City considered sound such as a code for fiscal stability. Labour, 
since 1992, courted domestic industry, the City (‘prawn-cocktail offensive’) as well as 
international investors. Hay termed this political strategy as ‘capital appeasement’ with 
Labour presenting themselves as the representative of the interests of industrial and 
financial capital (Hay 1999)32. The ‘New Labour’ mantra was that ‘minimal government is 
good government’ because the complex and increasingly integrated world economy was 
seen as constraining the potential role of government (Watson and Hay 2003). Market 
advocacy and ‘capital appeasement’ was seen as a necessity in a world of free capital 
movement. Under ‘New Labour’, “the market, and with it the private sector, has assumed a 
central place, and the commitment to the public sector as both morally superior and 
economically more efficient has disappeared” (Gamble and Kelly 2001: 182). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Hay argues that ‘New Labour’ behaved as if the structural dependence thesis was true (Hay 1999: 149). 
This thesis claims that the state must respect and protect the interests of capital as it is dependent on its 
investment and that parties seeking election must accommodate the perceived preferences of capital if their 
election is not to produce an exodus of capital and subsequent economic crisis. 
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5.4.1.3 The departmental politics around the need for a Carbon Trust 
 
Two departments in particular were closely involved in the coordinative discourse of policy 
formulation: DETR (now DEFRA 33 ) and DTI (now BIS). The Treasury indirectly 
contributed to setting up the Carbon Trust by supporting the CCL and insisting that it 
should be revenue-neutral, which gave rise to discussions about different recycling 
mechanisms. 
 
 
Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions 
 
The Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) at the time was 
responsible for environmental, climate change and energy efficiency policy and was 
therefore the lead department for the Climate Change Programme. DETR was led by the 
Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, who was quite remote from the process and did not 
play a crucial role in setting up the CT according to civil servants (interviews 3 and 7). 
Prescott is claimed to have agreed to the CT idea because it was “shiny, happy, M-plated 
new stuff” which Prime Minister Tony Blair liked and so he liked it too (interview 7), but 
he did not have a great deal of input into how the CT would operate (interview 3). However, 
he was involved in the selection of the chairman and made sure there was political cover 
from the Treasury and the Prime Minister. 
 
There was some internal opposition against the idea of a Carbon Trust. According to 
interview evidence, Meacher, the Environment Minister at the time,  
“was vehemently opposed. I had to brief around him. It was really quite 
difficult in the end because it wasn’t going to happen according to him 
but we had the Treasury on board and we had business onboard” 
(interview 7)34.  
                                                 
33 DEFRA was set up in June 2001 when the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was 
merged with part of the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). In 2008 a new 
Department for Energy and Climate Change was created which took over responsibility for energy policy 
(from DBERR) as well as climate and energy efficiency policy from DEFRA. 
34  The interviewee explained Meacher’s opposition by claiming that he was lobbied by interest groups 
benefiting from EST programmes which therefore wanted to see EST’s budget grow instead of setting up a 
CT (interview 7). 
144 
 
The discourse coalition in favour of the Carbon Trust thus managed to overcome some 
internal resistance by forming an alliance with the Treasury and business. It was mainly the 
‘pragmatic market civil servants’ who were supportive of the CT idea (interview 7). Other 
civil servants were not initially convinced as the feeling was “oh no let’s not set something 
else up again” (interview 7). However, proponents were able to make the case that there 
was a real need for a body to take these ideas forward because “this is not something that 
you can leave to existing mechanisms to implement because they haven’t worked for nearly 
25 years. Something else is needed. It needs to be out there. It needs to be business” 
(interview 7).  
 
 
 
Department for Trade and Industry 
 
DTI at the time was responsible for innovation policy and business support as well as 
energy policy. While DETR was the lead department for the Climate Change Programme 
and therefore also the Carbon Trust initiative, the ideas around developing low carbon 
technologies touched on DTI’s remit. However, DTI was not involved in the initial thinking 
about the CT (interview 12). According to interview evidence DTI took a supportive stance 
towards the possibility of establishing a Carbon Trust, but emphasised that this initiative 
was DETR led and that they would not contribute additional funding (interviews 2; 12; 19). 
DTI took part in all the meetings, was involved in the process and consulted with DETR 
(interviews 8; 19): “They allowed the DETR to get on and innovate and so I certainly 
would not think it is fair to portray their involvement as minimal or disengaged. I think they 
were interested and very helpful” (interview 8). Another interviewee confirms that the 
business-support part of DTI rather than the energy part of DTI was taking an interest in the 
CT idea (interview 3). Their main concern was the potential impact of higher energy prices 
on business competitiveness and therefore the idea of recycling the revenues back to 
business to help them improve their energy efficiency appealed to DTI. While being 
supportive, DTI did not engage with the detail very much. A senior DEFRA civil servant 
confirmed: “I don’t remember them being particularly dominant or forceful in thinking 
about how the Carbon Trust might be created, what its remit might be or anything of that 
sort. I think they left it entirely to us” (interview 3). 
145 
 
 
Civil servants from the energy side of DTI did not see an overlap with their own policies 
such as the renewables obligation (RO) or PV grant programmes and thus did not perceive 
the initiative as a threat:  
“our policy was aimed primarily at electricity generators. The CT was 
not targeting primarily electricity generators. It was targeted primarily at 
ordinary businesses trying to get low carbon technologies into ordinary 
businesses” (interview 19).  
Another interviewee revealed that in fact there were discussions about whether certain 
DTI-funded renewables programmes should be taken up by the Carbon Trust but it was 
decided against as DTI did not agree. DTI’s position was that the rationale for the CT 
“was much more focussed around businesses and closer to market stuff, 
getting businesses ready to exploit these technologies etc. whereas the DTI 
programme was funding much more further from market research. And so 
the fit wasn’t quite there” (interview 10). 
 
These points illustrate that although developing low carbon technologies was a central 
element of the storyline, DTI did not feel threatened by this initiative but rather perceived it 
as complementary to their own policies because the CT would promote innovations ‘closer 
to market’ and focus on energy efficiency. The DTI’s focus was on electricity generation 
technologies that were ‘further from market’. The division of labour was thus based on the 
linear understanding of innovation, which was part of the storyline.  
 
 
Treasury 
 
The Treasury supported the idea of the CCL but insisted on it being revenue-neutral (HM 
Treasury 1999; interviews 10; 12; 24). The idea of hypothecation had already been 
previously accepted by the Treasury for the landfill tax (interview 7). The Treasury’s main 
worry was the impact of the planned levy on economic competitiveness and the Chancellor 
thus emphasised from the beginning that this policy initiative was about shifting the tax 
burden rather than increasing overall taxation (interview 3). Similar concerns were voiced 
by DTI. The idea of recycling money back to business to help them become more energy 
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efficient and thus reduce the impact of the levy on competitiveness was therefore appealing 
to the Treasury. The Treasury accepted the link that the coalition promoting the ‘developing 
low carbon technology’ storyline forged between the necessity to recycle the CCL revenue 
and the idea of providing direct incentives for energy efficiency and the take-up of low 
carbon technologies. 
 
 
 
Summary  
 
The ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline was supported by all of the involved 
departments because it allowed them to advance their departmental interests. It spoke to the 
Treasury’s concern for revenue neutrality, gave DETR/DEFRA the opportunity to 
substantially increase funding for their energy efficiency work, was not perceived to 
negatively interfere with the interests of the DTI’s energy group and was in line with DTI’s 
business group’s interest in fostering green business. ACBE and Lord Marshall, with their 
business credibility, played a key role in promoting this storyline which helped to foster 
agreement between departments. The discourse coalition did not only include civil servants 
from various departments but business actors were also centrally involved in developing the 
policy programme around the Climate Change Levy and the Carbon Trust. A central 
success factor in achieving agreement was the interpretative flexibility of the storyline, 
which allowed actors to interpret the initiative as being in line with their interests. 
 
 
5.4.2 The communicative discourse deliberating and legitimising the 
‘developing low carbon technology’ ideas 
 
Important actors involved in the communicative discourse around the ‘developing low 
carbon technology’ storyline were: 
- Parliamentarians through different select committees of the House of Commons 
(Environmental Audit, Trade and Industry, Environment, Transport and Regional 
Affairs, Science and Technology) and the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities; 
- Government spokespeople; 
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- Interest groups such as ACBE, ACE, RSPB, CBI, WWF, the Association of 
Electricity Producers, the Combined Heat and Power Association and the Green 
Alliance. 
 
 
One of the most important issues for gaining public acceptance of the storyline around the 
CCL and the Carbon Trust was the idea of revenue neutrality and the recycling of receipts. 
This is particularly true for businesses, as several interviewees pointed out: “the issue was 
when the CCL was established, business bought into it only on the premises that money 
would be recycled” (interview 24; similar points were also made by interviewees 2; 3; 4; 7; 
10; 11; 12; 20; 22; 25). Independent experts like Terry Barker (University of Cambridge 
and Chairman of Cambridge Econometrics) publicly supported the idea that the sectors 
most affected by the CCL would have to be safeguarded in order to achieve a reasonable 
consensus, and he regarded the idea of having a Carbon Trust as just such a suitable 
safeguard (Select Committee on Environmental Audit, Minutes of Evidence, Examination 
of Witnesses (Questions 40 - 59), Tuesday 16 March 1999).  
 
The support of business actors for the storyline also played an important role in the 
communicative discourse. The Marshall report was not only very important in the 
coordinative discourse, as analysed above, but also contributed to the communicative 
discourse. Almost any public statement by the Government, for example about the design 
of the CCL or the recycling of its revenues explicitly referred to Lord Marshall’s 
recommendations and the fact that the Government was following the report’s suggestions. 
One example of this is the Government’s response to a request by the Environmental Audit 
Committee, which had recommended the Government to consult on a scheme to promote 
investment in specified environmental technologies. The Government’s reply explicitly 
referred to the Marshall report in saying that “[t]he possibility of introducing tax reliefs for 
energy saving technologies was one of the options discussed by Lord Marshall”35 (Select 
Committee on Environmental Audit Eighth Report, Appendix 1). The 2000 Climate 
Change Programme explicitly referred to the 1999 ACBE report and emphasised the 
commercial opportunity associated with developing low carbon technologies and explained 
                                                 
35 This ideas was later implemented through the energy technologies list administered by the Carbon Trust. 
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the CT as part of a strategy to equip businesses to move to a low carbon economy. In line 
with its belief in the importance of business advice36 the Government used the ACBE 
reports and the Marshall report to foster the credibility of the ‘developing low carbon 
technology’ storyline. 
 
Some of the main criticisms which emerged in the communicative discourse around the 
‘developing low carbon technologies’ storyline were to do with the question of why a new 
organisation was needed instead of expanding the remit of the Energy Saving Trust and 
whether the Carbon Trust would have too little funding to support both energy efficiency 
and renewable energy technologies. These controversies will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
Most importantly, there was a controversy as to whether the new Trust should be part of the 
Energy Savings Trust (EST) rather than being set up as a separate organisation. Initially, 
there was some strong opposition from interest groups such as the Association for the 
Conservation of Energy (ACE), the British Energy Efficiency Federation (BEEF), the 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) to having the CT set up separately. These groups argued that instead of setting up a 
new organisation the remit of the EST should be expanded. A senior civil servant from 
DETR involved in the process of setting up the CT recalled that ACE and BEEF, as well as 
the EST itself, fiercely opposed the setting up of a new body and instead wanted to develop 
a business stream within the EST (interview 7). One argument from ACE was that there is 
no “need for a new bureaucratic device in the form of any Carbon Trust” and that the EST 
“has a proven track-record regarding the effective operation of energy efficiency schemes, 
which should be capitalised upon” (Select Committee on Trade and Industry, Appendices 
to the Minutes of Evidence - Ninth Report, Appendix 11). The CBI argued that setting up a 
new organisation “would take time to set up (probably two years) and waste precious funds 
unnecessarily” (Select Committee on Environmental Audit Minutes of Evidence, 
13.06.2000, Appendix 1, Annex 1). Also, the RSPB argued that the EST should be 
                                                 
36  As mentioned earlier Helm argued that New Labour relied on advice from businessmen rather than 
academics or experts in helping to shape policy (Helm 2003). 
149 
 
expanded rather than a new body like the CT be established (Select Committee on 
Environmental Audit Minutes of Evidence, Memorandum submitted by the Royal Society 
for the Protection of Birds). In addition to this, the Select Committee on Environmental 
Audit also initially suggested that the EST should administer the funds for sustainable 
energy from the Climate Change Levy. In response to a query by the Committee about why 
the Treasury felt it was necessary to set up a separate body, a spokesperson for the Treasury 
argued: 
“The Carbon Trust has a very clear role in taking forward work which has 
been carried out in the past but in a more effective way, not least because 
it will have significant extra resources available from the proceeds of the 
Climate Change Levy” (Select Committee on Environmental Audit 
Minutes of Evidence, Examination of witnesses (Questions 40-59), 
Wednesday 14 March 2001). 
This quote illustrates again how the effectiveness argument was used to counter criticisms 
and to promote the idea of an independent, business-led Carbon Trust. 
 
A further criticism by ACE and CBI was that the suggested funds for the CT were too small 
to support both energy efficiency and R&D into renewable energy technologies and that it 
should focus on energy efficiency measures to help the businesses paying the levy. The CT 
was not seen as an appropriate mechanism for developing renewable energy technologies 
and both groups felt that priority should be given to supporting energy efficiency (Select 
Committee on Trade and Industry Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence - Ninth Report, 
Appendix 11; Select Committee on Environmental Audit Minutes of Evidence, 13.06.2000, 
Appendix 1, Annex 1).  
 
A key civil servant remembered the debate:  
“I do recall that we had quite a long debate about whether the best way to 
do this was to create a separate Trust or whether to expand the remit of the 
EST. And the business view on that was really very instrumental because 
those at the business end looked at the EST, saw that it was essentially a 
business to consumer organisation and felt that they wanted something 
which was focused much more on business to business. And also I think 
something that they saw themselves having more direct influence over 
than the EST which had a board which reflected its main mission” 
(interview 3). 
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So while discursively the case was presented as one of ‘needing a business-led body’ with 
the right skills set, behind closed doors ‘politics as usual’ was playing out. There was “the 
feeling was that the EST wasn’t the right place for that, because the EST was very much 
associated with domestic savings, maybe small businesses but not big businesses” 
(interview 22). The “CBI and the intensive energy user group were very much the view that 
the EST was a fundamentally flawed vehicle and you needed to set something up that had a 
much more business focus” (interview 26). ACBE, as an lobby organisation mainly made 
up of large businesses, therefore supported the CT to be set up separately instead of giving 
the funding to the EST. An important factor was that these (Climate Change Levy-paying) 
businesses had an interest in ring fencing this money. The fear was that in the EST it could 
‘leak across’ different areas (interview 8). Also businesses believed to have fewer 
possibilities of controlling the spending as the board of the EST was already established 
representing other interests (interview 3). 
 
Other business interest organisations of sectors which were main beneficiaries of the 
existing EST programmes such as insulation manufacturers, the lighting industry or the 
British Energy Efficiency Federation lobbied heavily for the new funding to go to the EST 
(interviews 7; 11):  “There were some very difficult meetings. It wasn’t easy. It was a lot of 
vested interests and on the face of it quite a lot of money and so everybody wants a slice of 
the cake” (interview 11). Also the EST itself lobbied for having a business stream alongside 
their domestic stream of work (interviews 7; 11). 
 
These examples demonstrate how interest-driven lobbying took place during the 
discussions about the possibility of setting up a Carbon Trust. They show how incumbent 
business actors were trying to influence the policy development in line with their interests. 
Other business actors such as ACBE were in favour of setting the Carbon Trust up 
separately of the EST. What this simple reference to interests does not provide, therefore, is 
an explanation as to why the Government decided to set up the Carbon Trust separately 
from the Energy Saving Trust. The argument is that while ‘politics as usual’ played a role 
in this policy process, it does not necessarily explain the policy outputs without a reference 
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to broader discursive developments which add credibility and legitimacy to some views 
more than to others. 
 
Parliamentarians were involved in the communicative discourse mainly through a number 
of select committees (House of Commons Select Committees on Environmental Audit; 
Trade and Industry; Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs; Science and 
Technology; and the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities) in 
which the ideas around the CCL and the CT were discussed. This sometimes took the form 
of discussions with ministers as examinations of witnesses. Some parliamentarians also 
raised critical issues using the parliamentary ‘questions for written answer’ procedure to 
elicit statements or explanations from the Government, to which the Government mainly 
replied using core arguments of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline. One 
concern raised by parliamentarians was that ACBE was comprised only of large businesses. 
The role of ACBE was cross-examined by the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Environmental Audit and the then chairman of ACBE David Davies admitted that the 
advisory committee mainly represented larger businesses but also stressed that members 
served in a personal capacity and did not represent specific interests and bodies (Select 
Committee on Environmental Audit, Minutes of Evidence, 6 May 1998). Several MPs 
asked very critical questions about the way in which ACBE gave advice to government 
without taking on board the views and interests of SMEs. 
 
However, while there was some discussion amongst parliamentarians in a variety of select 
committees, there was very little involvement of parliamentarians during the crucial years 
when the Carbon Trust was being discussed and designed by the concerned departments 
and interest groups (between 1999 and 2000). Only in the year when the Carbon Trust was 
set up (in 2001) was there an increased interest in this policy initiative (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Parliamentary Records on Carbon Trust 
mentioning of 'Carbon Trust' in official Parliamentary 
Records between 1998 and 2002 (Hansard)
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(Source: own compilation, based on results of key word search for ‘Carbon Trust’ in Hansard) 
 
 
 
5.5 The institutional context in the UK 
 
As described in the theoretical framework, institutions can have an important impact on 
policy processes. The framework combines attention to formal institutions such as 
governance structures or the electoral system and informal institutions such as 
organisational routines and norms. 
 
One institutional feature of the UK which aided the development of the Climate Change 
Programme, including the CCL and the Carbon Trust, was the concentration of power in 
central government. The UK has been characterised as a centralised and unitary state 
(Lijphart 1999; Saalfeld 2003; Hill 2005; Schmidt 2006a). The ‘first-past-the-post’ 
electoral system in the UK (Lijphart 1999) leads to a concentration of executive power in 
one-party, bare-majority cabinets while power in coalition governments is naturally more 
dispersed. Coalition governments in the UK are rare. This institutional context matters 
insofar as the UK’s unitary, majoritarian governance system means that government can 
create new policies without too many checks and balances. The opposition is generally 
weak and does not have many opportunities to scrutinise policy programmes as their ability 
to generate information is limited, while the government is aided by the civil service (see 
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Saalfeld 2003). This enabled the Labour Party after they gained office in 1997 to revive 
energy policy and design and implement the 2000 Climate Change Programme, including 
the Carbon Trust, without the need to convince a coalition partner. 
 
Despite this power concentration, both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party have 
followed  
“a strategy of preference-accommodation. They have gradually adopted a 
greener rhetoric and developed a set of moderate policies to demonstrate 
that the environment would be safe in their hands, but they have resisted 
turning the environment into an area of party competition” (Carter 2007: 
132)37.  
 
The CCL can be seen as such a moderate policy which is in accordance with the dominant 
discourse and thus was not very controversial. Carter also points out that Labour “briefly 
struck an upbeat attitude towards the environment in the immediate aftermath of its 1997 
election victory, but failed to sustain this new-found enthusiasm” (Carter 2007: 133). This 
is claimed to have to do with the experience of the fuel duty escalator and the fuel blockade 
in 2000. The short phase of environmental enthusiasm led to the adoption of the Climate 
Change Programme (including the CCL and the Carbon Trust). 
 
However, as this policy process coincided with the devolution process, these institutional 
changes also had some implications for the setting up of the Carbon Trust. Devolution 
started with the Labour Government in 1997, which initiated a process by which a quasi-
federal model emerged in the UK (Winskel 2007). Labour’s devolution policy created a 
Scottish Parliament and a Northern Ireland Assembly with extensive legislative power and 
a Welsh Assembly with ‘secondary’ legislative discretion in applying UK legislation in the 
Welsh context (Jeffery 2000: 10). While overall energy policy remained a responsibility of 
the central government, the promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency was 
devolved, to the Scottish Executive (Winskel 2007). Wales has more limited powers as 
neither energy policy nor promotion of renewables or energy efficiency is a devolved 
                                                 
37 A preference-accommodating strategy “seeks out the perceived wants of the voters in the fashion of a brand 
manager” (Leggett 2005: 551). Legget argues that ‘New Labour’ has mainly followed this strategy of 
identifying and chasing supposedly fixed preferences and thus failed to engage in more transformative politics 
to mould the preferences of the electorate. 
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responsibility. However, support for innovation as well as environmental policy 
competences are devolved to the Welsh Assembly. This delegation of political power 
influenced the setting up of the CT insofar as central government had to convince the 
devolved administrations about the idea of a Carbon Trust (interview 8). While the decision 
to introduce the CCL was considered by the Treasury as a UK tax measure outside the 
discretion of the devolved administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland, which initially 
caused some disquiet (Belfast Telegraph, February 20, 2001), during the process of the set-
up of the Carbon Trust the devolved administrations had a choice of whether or not to 
support this policy initiative financially, as both renewable energy and energy efficiency 
policy were devolved competencies.  
 
While the Carbon Trust was suggested to be a UK-wide body the communicative discourse 
emphasized that it would allow for ‘local voice’. In its advice on how the Carbon Trust 
should be set up ACBE had recommended that the CT be a UK-wide body and would need 
to be run in cooperation with the devolved administrations to ensure they meet local 
business needs (ACBE 2000). The 2000 Climate Change Programme took up this line of 
argument and indicated the government’s intention to set up the CT as a UK-wide body 
“taking into account the needs and characteristics of businesses in Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales” (DETR 2000: 75) and promised the devolved administrations as 
funding stakeholders to be involved in the running of the Trust. These instances show how 
the communicative discourse especially in the devolved parts of the UK tried to marshal 
public support as well as political support from the devolved administrations by appealing 
to norms about having a ‘local voice’ and putting ‘local needs’ centre stage. The project 
team preparing the Carbon Trust initiative, for example, went to Cardiff to explain the plans 
in a televised committee meeting to win over the Welsh Assembly. This process somewhat 
delayed the setting up of the Carbon Trust: “It was quite a lot more brokering that needed to 
be done to get it to happen” (interview 3). In return for agreeing to the idea and contributing 
funds the devolved administration wanted to be directly represented on the board.  
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More importantly, the devolution process created new policy arenas in which the devolved 
administrations took certain views that were different to those of the central government. 
The 1998 Scotland Act transferred some aspects of policy to the devolved administrations: 
“While a narrow reading of these arrangements may have offered little 
scope for devolved policy making, in practice, the Scottish Executive and 
Parliament interpreted their powers widely enough to encourage the 
development of a distinctive policy arena in energy” (Winskel 2007: 186). 
While in the UK the national government had not been in favour of creating industrial 
sectors, Scotland developed this ambition with regard to marine technologies38 (Winskel 
2007: 186). This subsequently also contributed to a change in thinking in central 
government (interview 5; also see Watson 2009: 140 for similar arguments). In particular, 
Scotland put pressure on the national Government by setting out ambitious targets for 
Scottish renewable electricity generation which went well beyond the UK targets (Winskel 
2007). The new policy arenas are also loci of alternative discourses. For example “[t]he 
emerging Welsh Assembly Government policy discourse reproduces some of the 
economically based ideas of national policy, but also introduces the global environment as 
a strong driver of their energy strategy” (Stevenson and Richardson 2003: 111). The Welsh 
Assembly Economic Development Committee published a consultation report in 2002 with 
a strong focus on the sustainable energy strategy, with environmental concerns taking 
precedence over other energy policy goals and a strong focus on economic opportunities in 
renewable energy technology development and on job creation (Stevenson and Richardson 
2003). Winskel talked about the emergence of multi-level governance which adds 
complexity to the system but also offers space for experimentation and different approaches 
to fostering low carbon innovation (Winskel 2007). Devolution opened up another level of 
policy making and discourses e.g. in Scotland were partly quite critical of UK wide policy 
around the RO and challenged major assumptions. Devolution thus opened up new policy 
arenas in which dominant discursive commitments of the central government were 
successfully re-framed which created pressure for policy change also on the national level. 
 
Another institutional factor important for the way in which the Carbon Trust was designed 
is the way the British civil service is organised. Generally characteristic of the UK is a 
                                                 
38 The ambition is for Scotland to become to marine energy what Denmark is to wind power (Winskel 2007). 
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“highly professionalized, non-partisan civil service with a low level of autonomy […] 
designed to avoid bureaucratic drift” (Saalfeld 2003: 620). The role of the civil service is to 
be one of ‘neutral competence’ “in which highly professional civil servants serve the party 
in power” (Saalfeld 2003: 638). The structure of the civil service changed substantially in 
the 1990s when a lot of the policy implementation was ‘outsourced’ to executive agencies 
and the civil service was to focus on the core needs of policy development and relations 
with Parliament. The main objective behind these changes was managerial efficiency 
(Saalfeld 2003). Public service agreements and management by objectives were new ideas 
implemented in the civil service. While the thrust of the reforms was to focus on policy 
development, the civil servants available for policy development shrank as four-fifths of the 
nearly 500,000 civil servants became employed in executive agencies and the overall 
number of civil servants was reduced drastically (Saalfeld 2003: 639). In addition, Helm 
has argued that because of the UK Governments’ belief in the liberalisation discourse in 
which the setting-up of regulators was believed to be sufficient energy policy, the 
intelligence of civil service with regard to energy policy was diminished as there was no 
need for other policies (Helm 2002). This factor partly explains why private actors were so 
dominant in the creation of the storyline and the subsequent design of the Carbon Trust. 
DETR simply did not have the expertise or manpower to develop this policy programme on 
its own. The institutional reforms of the 1980s and 1990s thus led to a growing influence of 
external policy advice.  
 
In terms of informal ‘rules of the game’ or standard operating procedures the described 
dominant discourse around ‘free market’ competition, market failures, and market-based 
approaches dominates the state actions in this policy field (see section 5.2). The policy 
approach followed can be described as outcome-driven rather then following a top-down 
strategic plan, as a senior civil servant from DBERR described vividly:  
“We want the market to deliver this. Therefore we set up lots of bodies 
which try to address these market failures. This is essentially what we are 
doing rather than that more interventionist approach which is taken by 
those European countries [referring to an earlier discussion of the 
Netherlands] in particular. Which all comes back to this obsession we have 
got about ‘picking winners’. We do not pick winners and that’s been 
drilled into every civil servant, the treasury. … We address market 
failures” (interview 10).  
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This discourse has been institutionalised in the norms of the civil servants and in executive 
agencies like Ofgem39 and thus provides a constraint on new policy initiatives which go 
against this grain. As argued above, in the case of the development of the Climate Change 
Programme this preference for market mechanisms led to the CCL, and the idea that the 
market can deliver the transition to a low carbon economy influenced the policy choice in 
favour of a business-led Carbon Trust. 
 
Generally, a “key international constraint on the British government is its membership in 
the EU” (Saalfeld 2003: 642). For the specific case analysed here the EU state aid rules 
have an important influence on how the state can support low carbon technologies and 
therefore what the Carbon Trust can do to fulfil its mission (interviews 2; 5; 8; 10; 17; 18; 
21; 24; 26). According to interview evidence, the EU state aid rules shaped what the 
Carbon Trust would look like. A senior manager of the Carbon Trust who was in charge of 
developing its investment and innovation programme admitted:  
“I don’t think what we came up with bore much resemblance with what 
was originally envisaged because of a number of reasons but primarily 
because the funders and those that scoped out the direction of the Carbon 
Trust had very little grasp of what public money could do and the 
constraints of state aid and government procurement rules. … The initial 
vision of it [the Carbon Trust] was not congruent of what a publicly 
funded body is allowed to do in terms of state aid” (interview 26). 
 
This example clearly shows the limits of ideas: they can meet ‘hard’ institutionalised rules. 
The EU state aid rules have been described by interviewees as one of the key institutional 
constraints which limit the activities of the CT in a variety of ways:  
- If the CT supports a device developer and patentable knowledge is created, the CT 
has to retain the IP which makes it less attractive for companies (interview 18); 
- State aid rules make it difficult to fund demonstrators (interview 10); 
- The CT as a whole needed EU state aid exemption; rules about maximum aid 
intensity: funding for R&D activities is usually 40% co-funding, only for 
Universities is 100% funding allowed (interview 2); 
- The EU state aid rules are one of the reasons that the CT does not have a larger 
commercial investment activity as they require co-investing (interview 26); 
                                                 
39 Ofgem has been criticised for having a very narrow view on consumer interests in low prices. However, 
recently the Government announced in its Low Carbon Transition Plan that it would change Ofgem’s remit 
from protecting customers’ interests to also include tackling climate change and security of supply as part of 
its duties. 
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- There can be no disproportionate benefit for companies out of cooperation with CT 
(interview 18); 
- The CT has to be reactive, wait for companies to approach them instead of being 
able to proactively target companies (interview 1); 
- The state aid rules need to be thought about in any decision the investment 
committee makes (interview 17). 
 
These examples show how EU state aid rules shape the activities of the CT. However, in 
April 2008 the European Commission published a revision of the Community Guidelines 
on State Aid for Environmental Protection (2008/C 82/01) to “ensure better targeted aid, 
improved economic analysis and more effective procedures” (p. 5). This illustrates that the 
institutional context cannot be seen as stable but also changes over time. 
 
 
Summary: The impact of the institutional context on the ‘developing low carbon 
technology’ storyline and the setting up of the CT 
 
As already pointed out, institutions can have a constraining as well as enabling impact on 
discourses shaping new policy initiatives. In terms of constraining influences the EU state 
aid rules were clearly shaping the design of the CT. However, this should not be seen as an 
absolute constraint as there seems to have been some flexibility with regard to the 
interpretation of these rules. This provided room for actors discursively making a case 
about which state actions were permissible. Another strong constraint pointed out above 
concerns the informal norms such as the faith in competition and non-intervention in 
markets by civil servants and policy makers. These norms make additional policy 
instruments superfluous or shape them in ways which are in line with these commitments. 
Devolution meant a challenge for the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline by 
introducing the need for it to be accepted by the devolved administrations. The reforms of 
the civil service and its limited capabilities in energy policy issues contributed to the 
dominance of ACBE in the development of the policy programme.  
 
In terms of the enabling influence of the institutional context the most important point to 
make is, despite devolution, was the existence of a strong central government which 
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enabled the new Labour Government in 1997 to come in and promote this policy change 
without much interference from the opposition or other ‘veto players’. The devolution 
process also opened up discursive space for alternative storylines. Despite the adversarial 
party politics in the UK there seems to have been no substantial protest from the 
Conservative Party against this policy initiative. This is arguably due to the fact that the 
discourse coalition promoting the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline anchored 
the initiative mainly in familiar policy discourses supported by the former Conservative 
Government (competition, market incentives, business opportunities). 
 
 
5.6 Change in policy practices and institutions? 
 
After having analysed the emergence of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline, 
this section analyses which impacts its emergence had on UK energy policy. While section 
5.4 analysed the discourse structuration, the following section will analyse the discourse 
institutionalisation of the storyline by describing the main activities of the CT. The 
subsequent section will investigate to what extent this implementation is in line with the 
‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline. 
 
 
5.6.1 The setting up of the Carbon Trust 
 
The main political change associated with this storyline was the setting up of the Carbon 
Trust. The sections above have already analysed the process of setting up the Carbon Trust, 
which was made possible by the emergence of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ 
storyline. This storyline was promoted by a coalition of civil servants from different 
ministries, ACBE, other sector interest groups, and green lobby organisations. The process 
led to the Carbon Trust being set up by DTI and DEFRA in April 2001. The idea that 
technology-specific innovation support is needed and that it is important to remove specific 
financial, technological, as well as institutional barriers that are hindering the wider 
deployment of low carbon technologies has been institutionalised in the Carbon Trust. In 
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line with the storyline its remit covers both improving energy efficiency and developing 
and deploying new low carbon technologies.  
 
The CT’s mission is to ‘accelerate the move to a low carbon economy’ (Carbon Trust 
2007a). Its activities cover a broad spectrum and can be divided into five complementary 
business areas (see Figure 10): Carbon Trust Insights to inform businesses and policy 
makers about climate change and increase awareness, Carbon Trust Solutions to help 
companies to reduce their emissions, Carbon Trust Innovations to help develop low carbon 
technologies, Carbon Trust Enterprises to create new low carbon businesses using existing 
technologies and Carbon Trust Investments to finance the best ideas and business plans. 
 
Figure 10: The Carbon Trust’s five business areas 
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Source: Carbon Trust, unpublished presentation 
 
The Carbon Trust is mainly financed by central government (Department for the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA; and the Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, DBERR), but the devolved administrations (Northern 
Ireland, Wales and Scotland) also contribute some funding. As of March 2007, the CT had 
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134 employees and received a total grant funding of £115.8 million for 2007/08 (Carbon 
Trust 2007c). Most of the programme expenditure is spent on helping organisations to 
reduce their emissions (Solutions), whereas about £20 million is spent on developing low 
carbon technologies. Spending on the Insights work has been roughly constant at around £9 
million per year (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: The Carbon Trust’s programme expenditure  
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(Source: based on the Carbon Trust’s Annual reports; note: helping organisations to reduce carbon emissions 
(Solutions); developing low carbon technologies (includes: Innovations, Enterprises, Investments) and 
helping organisations to respond to climate change (Insights)) 
 
The Carbon Trust Solutions programme is trying to directly help companies to reduce their 
carbon emissions and is where the CT spends most of its resources. In 2006/07 the CT 
invested £54 million in such activity (see Figure 11). As part of its Solutions programme, 
the CT offers advice to companies and public institutions on how to save energy or increase 
energy efficiency (through information booklets, a website and a call centre), offers free 
energy audits for large companies, offers tax breaks for energy-efficient equipment 
(enhanced capital allowances) and gives interest-free loans to small and medium-sized 
companies to purchase energy-efficient equipment.  
 
The CT supports the development of low carbon technologies through all stages of 
innovation from R&D to promoting deployment (IEA 2007: 168). As part of its 
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Innovations programme, the Carbon Trust funds RD&D projects in their applied research 
scheme. Through the applied research scheme, universities, local authorities or any 
business can receive up to £250,000 for research projects “that show genuine innovation, 
strong potential to reduce UK carbon emissions and a credible route to commercialisation” 
(Carbon Trust 2006a: 20).  
 
The CT also runs an incubator scheme offering advice to new companies in 
commercialising their R&D and attracting commercial investment. Incubator companies 
receive flexible consultancy support of up to £60,000. So far, 40 companies have been 
supported with approximately £2 million in total. The companies which receive help are 
mostly start-ups or spin-offs from universities or industry, such as Oxford Catalysts, which 
received support through the CT–ANGLE incubator providing a market analysis, help with 
a long-term management plan and identifying potential partners (Carbon Trust 2007b). The 
focus is not so much on the technology as on building a suitable management team, 
identifying a target market and making the company ‘investor-ready’ (interview 17). 
 
In addition, the CT runs technology acceleration projects, which are aimed at identifying 
regulatory, financial and technical barriers to the growth of technologies. This may include 
conducting trials and demonstration projects, carrying out engineering assessments and 
helping to accelerate technologies ‘down the cost curve’ (Carbon Trust 2006a). The CT 
typically helps projects with technical, infrastructure and financial support (Carbon Trust 
2005). The CT currently has five technology acceleration projects with a total budget of 
£25 million over five years. These are biomass heating, small-scale combined heat and 
power, advanced metering, low carbon buildings and marine energy. The aim is to 
accelerate the development of these technologies on a commercial scale (Carbon Trust 
2007a: 8). The projects are selected on the basis of two questions: “How much carbon can 
the proposed technology save over time?” and “How much difference can the Carbon Trust 
make to the success of the technology?” (Carbon Trust 2005: 1). 
 
A senior manager at the Carbon Trust sums it up thus: “We have a proven set of 
interventions in our Innovations business which have been very very successful” (interview 
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23). This comment is interesting as it highlights how much the CT thinking is based on the 
idea of market failures and ‘interventions’ to correct for these.  
 
To complement the other innovation programmes, the CT also co-invests in new low 
carbon technologies directly. With its Investments programme the CT aims to address a 
lack of private finance for small-scale investments between £250,000 and a few million 
pounds (Carbon Trust 2007a: 12). In 2005/06 the CT invested £2.1 million in two new 
companies and made follow-on investments in two other companies. The CT hopes that 
“acceptable investment returns should be generated from the portfolio over time” (Carbon 
Trust 2006a: 46). Overall, the first six equity investments totalled £6.7 million in 
technologies such as fuel cells and offshore wave generation. It is pointed out that this 
investment has also helped to leverage further private sector investment worth £67 million 
(Carbon Trust 2007a: 12). The Carbon Trust prides itself on a good reputation in the clean 
technology investment community and through its co-financing of investment often 
functions as ‘the last pound on the table that makes the deal work’ (interview 12). The 
support of the Carbon Trust lends credibility and reputation to technology developers and 
increases their chance of attracting investors (interviews 16; 18). This is also confirmed by 
companies which received incubator support from the Carbon Trust (Carbon Trust 2007b). 
 
The Carbon Trust has also expanded its role in commercialising low carbon ideas based on 
proven technologies by establishing Carbon Trust Enterprises Ltd. The first company it set 
up was a heat energy networks company, which will “identify, develop, finance and operate 
a series of heat energy networks across the UK” (Carbon Trust 2006a: 22) to transfer 
industrial waste heat to heat consumers in the nearby area. The company, called 
‘Connective Energy’, was established in July 2006 in cooperation with Doosan Babcock 
Energy and the Triodos Renewable Energy Fund (Carbon Trust 2007a: 11). It aims to 
construct ten heat pipelines for the utilisation of waste heat over the next three years, 
targeting a potential £1 billion UK market. The Carbon Trust also set up a company 
developing renewable energy projects on public sector land called ‘Partnership for 
Renewables’. The Carbon Trust invested £2.5 million in its Enterprises programme in 
2006/07 (Carbon Trust 2007c: 19). Again the Enterprises work was started because “we 
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knew this is another market failure … we knew there were a lot of near market technologies 
that weren’t really new technologies but nobody was making these things happen” 
(interview 11). 
 
The aim of the Carbon Trust’s Insights programme is to inform businesses and policy 
makers about the importance of reducing carbon emissions. Through independent and high-
quality reports on, for example, the impacts of the EU ETS on competitiveness or suitable 
policy frameworks to support renewables, the CT hopes to contribute to policy thinking in 
these areas. Through its current work, such as on the carbon footprints of production chains, 
the Carbon Trust also hopes to inform business about the possibilities for supply chain 
management and help in the creation of credible methodologies for carbon labelling. 
Through its Insights work the Carbon Trust “has built up a strong brand image and raised 
awareness in the business community and the public sector of the need to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions“ (NAO 2007b: 6). 
 
This section has provided a brief overview of the CT’s different business areas. In the 
following section it will be analysed to what extent the Carbon Trust’s activities have been 
shaped by the storyline. 
 
 
5.6.2 The influence of the storyline on practices of the Carbon Trust 
 
One of the key aspects of the storyline was that an organisation to support the development 
and deployment of low carbon technologies needed to be set up independently from 
government and led by business. This idea was implemented in the CT and has had a major 
impact on its organisational routines as compared to a public agency. In particular it 
translated into the Carbon Trust viewing itself as a politically neutral body conducting 
objective analysis, it enabled a business strategy based on brand capital, and it allowed the 
CT to develop a variety of innovative forms of support for low carbon innovation. 
 
Due to the strong commitment of the storyline for the CT to be independent from 
government and free from political interference, the Carbon Trust was set up as a company 
limited by guarantee rather than as a non-departmental public body. It also translated into a 
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self-understanding of the Trust as a non-political, independent body. It is difficult to say 
whether this commitment is part of a conscious strategy or whether it simply reflects the 
background of its staff (interview 20). Part of this commitment is the idea that the “CT 
wants to persuade government to take right decisions, not to lobby” (interview 7). The CT 
is committed to providing the Government with  
“fact-based, objective analysis of what the implications of different 
types of policies might be, on how much carbon they deliver, the cost 
effectiveness, impact on the economy and businesses. … We are not 
trying to lobby” (interview 23).  
Its independence from government makes it possible for the CT to challenge government 
thinking on low carbon policy issues (interview 6). One example of this is the report on 
policy frameworks to support renewable energy technologies which argued in favour of 
technology-specific feed-in tariffs (Carbon Trust 2006b) – an anathema for the Government 
at the time. 
 
The fact that the CT was set up as a business-led endeavour has also led to strategies based 
around building a brand:  
“A government body wouldn’t normally worry building a brand…We can 
do things because we have brand capital. So people want to be associated 
with us ... And in order to get there you have to invest what is relatively 
large amounts of money that the public sector couldn’t do. But we are 
doing it because we understand, coming from business, what the purpose 
of creating a brand is in a way that if you are in the public sector [you] 
would never understand. And the brand is important and is carefully 
managed. We have very high recognition and very high favourability” 
(interview 5).  
This quote illustrates the difference it has made to set up the CT as a business-led body. 
Several interviewees confirm that the CT has been “incredibly successful” (interview 15) in 
building a brand and that its brand awareness in the business community is very high 
(interviews 1; 10; 11; 15). The results of a survey by a SME business organisation amongst 
its members showed that 80% of businesses knew of the Carbon Trust (BCC 2006). The 
effect of that brand recognition is that it encourages companies to understand that carbon 
emissions are a “key issue for businesses, something that business needs to respond to and 
there is real money in it” (interview 11). The quality of the brand also helps the CT to lever 
significant private financial resources as, for example, venture capital investors see the 
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CT’s judgement on a company as a confidence builder which makes it more likely that they 
will invest (interviews 4; 5; 17).  
 
Most importantly, the independence from government enabled the CT to develop 
innovative forms of innovation support which a government agency could not have. If the 
CT had been established as a public body, “the modes of funding would not have been as 
varied and probably wouldn’t have been as successful” (interview 24). In particular the 
CT’s Investments or Enterprises activities would not be possible for government 
departments or public agencies because of public spending rules (interviews 4; 24). This 
allows the CT to pick winners more aggressively than would be possible for government 
(interview 4). One of the achievements of the CT is seen as having invented “those 
different intervention models, R&D, accelerators, incubators” (interview 23). It has been 
argued that the “Carbon Trust’s status as an independent company allows for novel 
intervention models which bring significant benefits:  
- Flexible, business-focussed and market-oriented approach; 
- Ability to leverage private sector funds; 
- Proven project selection based on CO2 and economic potential; 
- Ability to prioritise, to ‘pick winners’ and take risks; 
- End-to-end support for all project stages; 
- Innovative funding approaches including equity investment” (Shortt and Mallaburn 
2007). 
 
The key idea of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline of having an independent 
business organisation to support the development and deployment of low carbon 
technology was institutionalised in the Carbon Trust and led to practices in line with the 
storyline. This status allowed the Carbon Trust to develop a variety of funding modes 
which would have not been possible for a public agency. It also led to an organisational 
strategy based on developing ‘brand capital’. 
 
Another central idea of the ‘developing low carbon technologies’ storyline was that there 
was a ‘valley of death’/‘innovation gap’ in bringing low carbon technologies to market, so 
support for moving low carbon technologies along the innovation chain was necessary. 
Thinking about innovation support in terms of pushing innovations from the R&D stages 
through to market has been associated with the linear model of innovation which sees 
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innovation processes as a pipeline. This thinking is dominant within the Carbon Trust as for 
example a quote from its CEO Tom Delay illustrates: 
“Innovation is essential to achieving our goal of reducing long term 
emissions: as we move closer to full deployment of existing technologies, 
we need an ever stronger pipeline to maintain progress. In turn, this 
pipeline could provide major export opportunities for the UK” (Carbon 
Trust 2008: 5). 
 
Similarly, a senior manager in charge of one of the technology accelerators explains that  
“The accelerator concept is all about having some intervention in a 
technology innovation chain that can really progress it through that area 
where sometimes good ideas can get lost and good technologies can get 
lost and also push it through the areas where there is perhaps regulatory 
hurdles to go through and our intervention can help that” (interview 18). 
 
A senior academic confirmed that the innovation chain concept for the CT 
“is a way to thinking about how it develops its own activities because it is 
not claiming any particular part of that innovation chain for itself because 
its activities cover a range right from carbon vision, which was really basic 
research, all the way through to almost the kind of venture capital activity 
they have, which is right at the other end. So I think they are using it as a 
way to structure their own thinking about what they do” (interview 24). 
 
Michael Grubb, the chief economist of the CT, acknowledges that innovation is not a linear 
process but also promotes the idea of an innovation chain and policies to ‘narrow the 
innovation gap’ (Grubb 2005). He sees the Carbon Trust’s programmes as part of this effort. 
Also, policy makers see it as the role of the CT to invest in early-stage technologies and 
continue to support the ones “where you achieve moving the technology through the 
pipeline towards commercialisation” (interview 12). 
 
These quotes seem to suggest that the ideas of the innovation chain, the innovation pipeline 
and the presumed existence of ‘innovation gaps’ or ‘valleys of death’ from the ‘developing 
low carbon technology’ storyline have been institutionalised in the organisational routines 
of the Carbon Trust and shape their innovation programmes. However, this has been 
disputed by interviewees: a former senior manager of the CT argues that although an 
innovation chain does not exist (“The only people who believe in the innovation chain are 
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bureaucrats who have never done any innovation”), the idea of an innovation chain is really 
powerful in convincing policy makers to fund innovation support but that none of the CT’s 
programmes actually relied on the existence of an innovation chain (interview 26). Another 
interviewee points to the fact that people in charge of the innovation support activities 
know that innovation is not a linear process but find that it is difficult to picture non-linear 
processes so they use glossy pictures that show the innovation chain, which come from the 
chief economist rather than from the people responsible for the innovation programme 
(interview 24).  
 
This uncovers an instance in which the problem understanding of the storyline (‘innovation 
gap’) did not manifest itself in Carbon Trust practices, but is used by the CT management 
in their public rhetoric. Because policy makers were convinced of the existence of these 
gaps by the discourse coalition in the process of setting up the Carbon Trust, its 
management continues to use this language without itself believing in it. More recently the 
idea of an innovation chain has also been used strategically by the Carbon Trust to 
distinguish its activities from other organisations (such as the Technology Strategy Board, 
the Energy Technologies Institute or the Environmental Transformation Fund). The role of 
the CT compared to these other initiatives is often explained by referring to its particular 
role in reference to the innovation chain. The innovation chain concept is thus used as a 
differentiator. As a senior manager from the CT explains: “we have a very specific role 
within the innovation chain” (interview 23). The CT is claimed to be a unique organisation 
in that it operates across the whole innovation chain from early-stage work with universities, 
open call applied research to deployment and commercialisation (interviews 12; 22) and for 
always taking a business view (interview 5). Working across the whole innovation chain is 
seen as a distinct advantage of the CT compared to other initiatives because it enables the 
CT to learn from its early-stage work and apply this knowledge to initiatives further down 
the chain (interview 17). Here the storyline is used rather instrumentally to justify the 
existence of the CT to policy makers and vis-à-vis other quangos. 
 
The institutionalisation of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline in the Carbon 
Trust, with its acknowledgement of the necessity of differentiated support for technologies 
at different stages of development, can be interpreted as quite a radical change with respect 
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to the dominant ‘free market’ discourse and its commitment to technology-neutral policy 
interventions, which precluded any kind of industrial policy strategy. As pointed out earlier, 
there was an aversion to having an industrial policy strategy in the UK (interviews 4; 5; 21). 
Linking energy policy and industrial strategy has usually been rejected in policy 
discussions in favour of a laissez faire approach (Watson 2009). However, the Carbon 
Trust is seen as a small step towards an industrial policy by several interviewees 
(interviews 5; 12; 20; 21). The CT itself sees its role as partly being to develop low carbon 
industries:  
“Carbon Trust Innovations helps to develop new low carbon technologies. If 
we get this right the UK will benefit enormously. We can both address 
climate change and develop global industries. There is already the potential 
for the UK to be a world leader in several technologies or sectors. We are 
building that leadership — in partnership with universities and businesses — 
and creating vibrant new sectors” (Carbon Trust 2007b: 1). 
 
The institutionalisation of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline in the Carbon 
Trust de-facto introduced some element of an industrial policy into UK energy policy.  
 
It is argued that the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline has contributed to a 
wider change in government thinking and its informal rules of the dominant discourse 
about the preference for non-intervention in markets. Compared to the late 1990s when the 
storyline was emerging, a more active technology policy is now more acceptable and more 
institutions designed to directly support low carbon technologies have been set up, such as 
the Environmental Transformation Fund, the Energy Technologies Institute and the 
Technology Strategy Board. DBERR is offering direct support to build a full-scale CSS 
demonstration plant. The Low Carbon Buildings programme offers grants for the diffusion 
of low carbon micro-generation technologies. Most recently the Government even 
published a Low Carbon Industrial Strategy (BIS and DECC 2009). 
 
However, the larger context of this change needs to be considered. Greater support for 
stronger policy action to develop and deploy low carbon technologies (incl. nuclear) was 
partly due to the disappointing policy outcomes. The objectives of the renewables 
obligation (10.4% share until 2010/11) looked increasingly unlikely to be met as until 2005 
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only 4% of renewables had been achieved. Rutledge speaks of “an extremely feeble 
expansion of renewables and CHP” (Rutledge 2007: 916). Several influential reports 
suggested to the UK government to play a more active role in developing and deploying 
low carbon technologies (Stern 2006a; IEA 2007). Also academics argued for more 
government leadership in research, development, demonstration and deployment of energy 
technologies (see e.g. Anderson and Gross 2000; Foxon, Pearson et al. 2005; Sauter and 
Watson 2007). In contrast with the UK, other countries such as Germany or Spain were 
much more successful in deploying renewable energy technologies and developing a wind 
turbine manufacturing industry (notable Germany, the US and Denmark). In addition, the 
credit crunch and the following economic crisis made calls for a green industrial revolution, 
including the promotion of energy efficiency and low carbon technologies, much louder 
(see e.g. Monbiot 2008; Bowen, Fankhauser et al. 2009; Stern 2009). The advocacy of the 
Carbon Trust for more technology specific-policies is thus just one out of several factors 
which contributed to this wider policy change. However, without an established, credible 
storyline to support this policy change the government would have faced more opposition 
to this more active policy stance. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusions regarding the UK Carbon Trust case study 
 
The emergence of the Carbon Trust was initially a by-product of Labour’s commitment to 
the introduction of a revenue-neutral climate change levy, in line with the dominant 
discourse around ‘free market plus taxation’. A storyline of having an independent, 
business-led organisation to promote low carbon technology was strategically promoted by 
a number of business representatives to increase their involvement in the recycling of some 
of the receipts from the CCL and to avoid negative impacts on competitiveness. This tied in 
with the Labour Government’s stronger commitment to energy efficiency, which formed a 
strong coalition between civil servants and business actors promoting a ‘developing low 
carbon technology’ storyline.  
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The institutionalisation of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline took place 
through establishing a new organisation, the Carbon Trust. Central ideas of the storyline, 
around the need for its independence, and business-led, business-focussed support for 
energy efficiency and low carbon technology development, were institutionalised. The 
analysis highlighted the importance of the interplay between ideas and institutional factors 
in explaining the emergence and shape of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline 
and its institutionalisation in the Carbon Trust. 
 
Many of the central aspects of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline are in line 
with the dominant ‘free markets plus taxation’ discourse and have thus enabled cognitive 
recognition for the need for and normative acceptance of an organisation like the Carbon 
Trust. The ‘closeness’ of the storyline with the existing dominant discourse explains the 
absence of major opposition to these policy ideas. Because of the close link to the dominant 
discourse around the importance of market solutions to tackle climate change, the CT 
focuses its activities on technological innovations and the commercialisation (‘route to 
market’) of these technologies. The institutionalisation of the storyline in the Carbon Trust, 
for example, faced significant institutional barriers such as EU state aid rules. 
 
The establishment of the Carbon Trust provided a first crack in the dominant discourse 
which argued against technology-specific instruments and ‘picking winners’. The discourse 
coalition behind the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline used the drive of the new 
Labour Government for introducing a climate change levy to complement the levy with a 
more active low carbon technology development and deployment policy. Since being set up 
in 2001 the Carbon Trust has seen a substantial growth in its funding and has developed a 
variety of innovative vehicles to fulfil its mission, which are seen to be successful in 
achieving its carbon emission reductions targets. Based on this storyline the Carbon Trust 
has established itself as an actor in favour of a technology-specific approach and has, 
through a number of diverse initiatives, influenced wider policy developments (e.g. Insights 
work, experts in select committees, etc.) It has thus proactively widened its spectrum of 
activities in line with the perceived needs of the challenge and has therefore transcended its 
role as a ‘simple’ delivery body. The storyline has contributed, among other factors 
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discussed above, to the increased acceptability of technology-specific policy instruments 
and the desirability of industrial policy. A number of new policy initiatives have been set 
up along these lines. The CT has been challenged by the growth of other policy initiatives 
in this area and is struggling to differentiate itself from and legitimise itself vis-à-vis these 
initiatives. 
 
Despite highlighting certain discursive factors in explaining the emergence of the Carbon 
Trust, the case study also demonstrated several instances of ‘politics as usual’ that were of 
importance in this policy formulation and implementation process. The change to a Labour 
government gave a boost to renewables and energy efficiency policy. The policy 
formulation process, and in particular the decision as to whether to establish a new 
organisation or rely on the EST to recycle some of the receipts, was subject to lobbying by 
incumbent business actors in whose interest it was to be involved in the distribution of the 
CCL receipts. In these cases discourses were used strategically to fulfil existing interests. 
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6 The discursive politics of governing ‘system 
innovations’ towards sustainable electricity systems: 
Cross-case analysis 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to look across the two case studies presented in chapters 4 
and 5 to reflect on how they inform more general, theoretically formulated explanations of 
the politics of initiatives aimed at ‘system innovation’. Case studies can contribute to 
theory testing or development, for example by suggesting new hypotheses or causal 
mechanisms, by strengthening or reducing support for a theory and by narrowing or 
extending the scope of a theory (George and Bennett 2005: 109). 
 
The process tracing method applied to the cases was aimed at uncovering mechanisms 
which explain the observed policy and institutional changes. In this chapter the extent to 
which discursive institutionalism can explain the policy changes outlined in the case study 
chapters (6.1),  existing explanations for the case of the energy transition (in section 6.2) as 
well as alternative, interest-based explanations (in section 6.3), will be discussed. Section 
6.4 clarifies the role of discourses, institutions and interests in policy change. Section 6.5 
points to the limits of the analysis. 
 
 
6.1 Discursive mechanisms causing policy and institutional 
change 
 
The process tracing method applied in this thesis was aimed at uncovering mechanisms 
which explain the observed policy and institutional changes. So, which causal mechanisms 
of policy and institutional change have been hypothesised? The following section discusses 
the mechanisms that Hajer and Schmidt have highlighted in their work to see whether these 
can help to explain the emergence and shape of the two new policy initiatives analysed in 
the two case studies elaborated above. 
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Hajer points to a variety of ways in which discourses influence processes of policy change. 
These include ‘new storylines’, ‘disjunction markers’, ‘symbolic politics’, ‘the need for 
sensory experience’, ‘the discursive creation of macro actors’, ‘the social construction of 
ignorance’, ‘black boxing’, ‘positioning and mutual functionalisation’, as well as 
‘structured ways of arguing’ (Hajer 1995: 268-275). Based on evidence from the 
contributions in their edited book, Radaelli and Schmidt also highlight a number of 
mechanisms through which discourses can contribute to policy change. These include: 
‘providing actors with new ways of conceiving of a policy’, ‘rhetorical entrapment’, 
‘coordinating policy agreements’ (Radaelli and Schmidt 2005: 196)40. The mechanisms 
which have been found to play a role in the analysis of the case studies will be discussed 
below. 
 
It is important to be clear that these mechanisms are not meant to be exclusive, but rather 
that different mechanisms can play a role in policy processes simultaneously. They are 
merely distinguished here for analytical purposes in order to be able to assess the full 
spectrum of influence that discourses can have on policy making.  
 
 
6.1.1 ‘New storyline transforming interests’ 
 
Recalling the theory chapter, Hajer’s general claim is that new discourses can re-order 
existing understandings of policy problems, which can lead actors to reconceptualise their 
interests (Hajer 1995: 261). Similarly, Schmidt argues that new discourses can cause policy 
change by ‘providing actors with new ways of conceiving of a policy’, which leads to a 
reconceptualisation of interests and thus makes policy and institutional change possible 
(Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 188). According to Schmidt new storylines need to be 
cognitively convincing as well as normatively appealing (Schmidt 2001). Whether or not a 
                                                 
40 They also mention ‘legitimating policy through public communication’ as a factor. However, in line with 
the framework of this thesis, the coordinative dimension of discourses covers this aspect. Legitimating policy 
through public communication will thus be part of analysing the different mechanisms, rather then being a 
mechanism in its own right. ‘Providing actors with new ways of conceiving of a policy’ is equivalent to 
Hajer’s ‘new storyline transforming interests’ and will thus be taken as one mechanism. ‘Coordinating policy 
agreement’ is equivalent to what Hajer described as ‘positioning and mutual functionalisation’ and will 
therefore be dealt with in this section. 
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discourse is convincing depends on how the discourse is constructed in the coordinative 
sphere and how it is conveyed in the communicative sphere (Radaelli and Schmidt 2005: 
186). Hajer also talks about the importance of the social resonance of eco-modernist 
principles (Hajer 1995: 262). A new storyline which succeeds in redefining interests and 
leads to a change in policies and institutions is considered transformative. Schmidt argues, 
for instance, that Thatcher’s neoliberal discourse was transformative, because it 
successfully justified her policy programme. Its success rested not only on its cognitive and 
normative merits, but was also attributable to the fact that “it was based on a 
reconceptualization of middle-class interests, along with policies that reinforced such 
interests. However good the discourse, after all, interest also necessarily plays a role” 
(Schmidt 2001: 261). 
 
In the Dutch case study the ‘transitions’ storyline has been shown to be transformative. The 
initial impulse for a policy change stemmed from the recognition of VROM policy makers 
that existing policy had failed to solve persistent environmental problems; a notion 
produced through the emergence of the new storyline, which re-framed the way these 
problems were seen as well as suggesting a possible alternative policy approach: transition 
management. As argued in chapter 4, this process also partly transformed the interests of 
EZ, which became much more interested in long-term change as a means to complement 
their focus on liberalisation and short-term efficiency in the energy sector 41 . The 
Economics Ministry, usually opposed to seemingly over-demanding environmental policies, 
saw the approach as offering new steering possibilities in times of liberalisation. 
Transitions offered a means of paying more attention to the long-term future of the energy 
system. The ‘transitions’ storyline transformed EZ’s interests and therefore led to TM being 
accepted into the Fourth NEPP as well as EZ appointing itself as the transition manager of 
the Energy Transition. Without the transformation of EZ’s understanding of the 
Department’s interests, this policy change is unlikely to have happened. The power of this 
mechanism rests on the ability of new ideas to shape actors’ perception of their self-
interests. 
                                                 
41 However, it is important to point out that long-term goals complemented, but did not replace, EZ’s existing 
goals such as liberalisation to increase economic efficiency, which caused problems of policy incoherence in 
the implementation of the Energy Transition, as argued elsewhere (Kern and Howlett forthcoming, 2009). 
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In the UK case study, it was shown in the empirical chapter that the ‘developing low carbon 
technology’ storyline was more in line with the existing dominant discourse (and interests) 
and did not transform actors’ interests. This is not surprising as Radaelli and Schmidt point 
out that only relatively rarely can discourses be shown to have shaped the interests of actors 
(2005: 189). 
 
 
6.1.2 ‘Positioning and mutual functionalisation’ 
 
According to Hajer, actors do not have fixed roles, but are constantly positioned in 
discursive exchanges (Hajer 1995: 272). Storylines can have a positioning effect, for 
example by blaming certain actors for a problem and seeing others as being able to solve it: 
“[t]hrough story-lines actors can be positioned as victims of pollution, as problem solvers, 
as perpetrators, as top scientists, or as scaremongers” (Hajer 1995: 65). He claims that it is 
often possible to identify actors who strategically sustain storylines with different reasons 
in mind, often based on partially different understandings of the storyline: 
“Actors may accept certain positionings or adhere to certain story-lines 
because they see it as a functional moment in their overall strategy or 
general perspective. In the mean time positionings as well as definitions 
of problems and solutions are accepted and reproduced” (Hajer 1995: 
273). 
Hajer mentions examples in which actors uphold central eco-modernist storylines such as 
the suggestion that protecting the environment is a positive-sum game, that environment 
and growth can go hand in hand, and the idea that environmental investment creates jobs 
(Hajer 1995). Actors establish discursive links to another desirable political goal in order to 
facilitate agreement and subsequent action. Similarly, Schmidt points out that while 
coherence may sometimes make for a ‘good’ discourse, ambiguity sometimes makes for 
discursive success (Radaelli and Schmidt 2005: 185; Schmidt 2006a: 253) 42 . The 
malleability of the EU discourse on anti-discrimination policy, for instance, allowed 
domestic policy makers to fit EU policy into different domestic paradigms. It also allowed 
                                                 
42 However, it is unclear under which conditions coherence or ambiguity is helpful. Schmidt and Radaelli 
point out that it is also unclear how much flexibility is too much, rendering the storyline meaningless 
(Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 202). The theory does not as yet provide a specific hypothesis or scope 
conditions that can be tested in this regard. 
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policy makers to make “ideational and policy linkages that re-defined the problems and 
made them more amenable to collective action” (Radaelli and Schmidt 2005: 186). Actors 
can thus re-interpret a policy idea in a way which resonates with existing norms or policies. 
 
In the case of acid rain, Hajer argues that the discourse coalition “gained influence because 
many different actors, including industrialists and environmentalists, could employ the new 
cognitive frame starting from different premises” (Hajer 1995: 251). Both Hajer and 
Schmidt point out that the ambivalence of a storyline can sometimes help to drive policy 
change because its interpretive flexibility can be used by different actors in variable ways, 
which aids coalition building and linking with established norms or interests.  
 
In the Dutch case study this mechanism can be observed when EZ connected the 
‘transitions’ storyline with their liberalisation and innovation agenda as well as their 
commitment to ‘green business opportunities’, which fitted their interests and made the 
storyline more acceptable within EZ. This positioning of EZ enabled the ‘transitions’ 
storyline to enter NEPP 4. As argued in chapter 4, the interpretative flexibility also helped 
bring about the policy change. When transition management was adopted by policy makers 
as a new policy approach, the concepts had not yet been developed in any depth but were 
“vague enough to be inspiring” (interview 7). In line with existing polder model practices, 
the interactive policy making and stakeholder involvement aspects of the storyline were 
highlighted whereas the potentially threatening commitment to structural change was 
sidelined.  
 
In the UK case the discourse coalition around the ‘developing low carbon technologies’ 
storyline skilfully combined environmental considerations with business opportunities 
(win-win) as well as helping business to improve its energy efficiency to become more 
competitive, which led to actors not normally interested in environmental agendas 
supporting the storyline (Treasury, DTI, business). As argued in chapter 5, the storyline 
could be linked with a variety of departmental interests as well as business interest in the 
recycling of CCL revenue and therefore enabled the policy change. 
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6.1.3 ‘Need for sensory experience’ 
 
The ‘need for sensory experience’ is meant by Hajer in a wide sense including more than 
policy makers’ excursions to see trees dying as a result of acid rain, for he also stressed the 
role of meetings and excursions in processes of persuasion such as meetings with research 
groups, attending symposia or expert meetings:  
“these practices are known not to be the most effective way of mediating 
knowledge but can nevertheless be identified as an essential moment in the 
process of proliferation and utilization of knowledge and, eventually, 
policy change” (Hajer 1995: 271).  
 
This mechanism highlights the socio-cognitive aspects of political change. Hajer includes 
face-to-face contact with experts as part of this mechanism, which is believed to generate 
credibility and trust and is therefore key to persuasion (Hajer 1995: 271).  
 
In both cases such processes of close face-to-face interaction between policy makers and 
experts played a key role in developing the new storylines as well as creating support for 
them. In the Dutch case a lot of face-to-face interaction between policy makers and ICIS-
MERIT researchers fostered trust and credibility. Rather than just delivering a report, the 
‘transition’ storyline was created jointly through a highly interactive process. Researchers 
used not only evidence and rhetoric to convince policy makers but even a play, a fairy tale 
and paintings that depicted the main concepts in order to persuade policy makers of their 
ideas (see 4.4). This intense cooperation was enabled by the open civil service culture in the 
Netherlands and was key to persuading policy makers about the ‘transitions’ storyline and 
co-developing the transition management concepts.  
 
In the UK case too, a lot of personal interaction amongst the key participants took place 
during the development of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline. As outlined in 
chapter 5, it was in particular the close cooperation between civil servants and members of 
ACBE (including the secondment of ACBE people into government to prepare the CT) that 
fostered trust and helped facilitate thinking along similar lines. A civil servant working on 
the development of the Carbon Trust policy initiative described the interaction with a key 
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ACBE proponent of the CT as a “meeting of minds” (interview 7). This trust and cognitive 
resonance was the cement for the discourse coalition which enabled it to jointly argue in 
favour of the Carbon Trust idea. 
 
 
6.1.4 ‘Structured ways of arguing’ 
 
Hajer has proposed that policy domains have historically specific ways of arguing: “These 
discursive formats add credibility to the case that is being argued” (Hajer 1995: 273). He 
suggests that actors initially tend to follow these formats because they are well respected, 
but they can also introduce new problems in unconventional ways. However, as this is more 
difficult, the accepted formats are commonly followed initially. 
 
In the Dutch case study the ‘transitions’ storyline relied partially on the familiar ‘market 
failure’ argument which is central to legitimising policy action in energy policy, as argued 
in section 4.2. However, the dominant discourse in energy policy nevertheless included 
environmental concerns as a central point, as well as an active role for the state, which the 
‘transitions’ storyline could build on. The language around transition ‘arenas’ spoke to the 
polder model tradition. While this framing of the challenge resonated with ‘structured ways 
of arguing’ and therefore added credibility to the discourse coalition, it also limited the 
scope for more radical institutional change: to argue for the setting-up of stakeholder arenas 
in the context of the Netherlands guarantees almost full social support, but it underplayed 
other elements of the transition management toolkit such as putting the regime under 
pressure. 
 
In the UK case study one of the most powerful constructs in the sense of a historically 
specific way of arguing a case was the ‘market failure’ argument, which is central to 
legitimising any policy action (as argued in section 5.2). This argument was used to 
establish the need for an organisation to foster low carbon technologies. So in both cases, it 
can be seen that using ‘structured ways of arguing’ added credibility to the emerging 
storylines and therefore helped them to become accepted. However, in both cases this 
framing of the storylines made it difficult for the discourse coalition to argue for radical 
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institutional change. The framing of the ‘developing low carbon technologies’ storyline, for 
example, explicitly situated business action as central to a transition. As the problem was 
framed in terms of a ‘market failure’, it followed that it could also be overcome by the 
market given the right incentives provided by the Carbon Trust.  
 
This mechanism can therefore undermine as well as enable policy change: it makes change 
in line with historically specific ‘structured ways of arguing’ easier, while it obstructs 
policy ideas that are not in line with accepted formats. Historically structured ways of 
arguing can thus be understood as part of the institutional context in a policy domain. 
 
 
6.1.5 ‘Black boxing’ 
 
‘Black boxing’ is described by Hajer as “perhaps the most fundamental of discursive 
mechanisms. Making things appear as fixed, natural, or essential is the most effective way 
of steering away latently opposing forces” (Hajer 1995: 272). As knowledge is always 
incomplete, uncertain or not agreed on, ‘black boxing’ is a way of putting issues beyond 
doubt. 
 
This mechanism can be observed in the UK case, in which the claim that the market is 
superior in ‘picking winners’ whereas government is bad at picking ‘winners’, and the 
claim that generally ‘markets deliver’ outcomes, is part of the dominant discourse and has 
been ‘black boxed’. The ‘developing low carbon technologies’ storyline did not attempt to 
challenge this ‘black box’, but endorsed this understanding. The discourse coalition, 
however, added that technology-specific support is necessary for a transition to occur and 
should be provided by an independent organisation rather than the government. By pushing 
the choice of which technologies to support into the non-political realm, it enabled policy 
change without challenging the ‘black box’. 
 
Instances of ‘black boxing’ can also be detected in the Dutch case study. Most notably, the 
notion of the need for a transition itself was ‘black boxed’ during the emergence of the 
‘transitions’ storyline. For example, while the ICIS MERIT report emphasised the 
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importance of ‘system innovations’ as well as upgrading existing systems (as argued in 
section 4.4.1.1), this latter part was neglected in the subsequent coordinative and 
communicative discursive interactions. Consequently, there was no internal or public 
discussion about when a transition is necessary or when the optimisation of existing 
systems might be a suitable policy strategy. By making the fact that a transition is required 
appear to be a given, latently opposing forces, who might otherwise have argued that 
structural, long-term change is unnecessary and that an optimising strategy might be 
sufficient to solve the problems in the energy system, are silenced.  
 
Furthermore, this mechanism can play a dual role: in ‘black boxes’ institutionalised 
storylines can “themselves become a political reality in their own right and then stand in the 
way of more reflexive institutional change” (Hajer 1995: 269). Alternatively, actors can 
succeed in ‘black boxing’ some of the claims of an emerging storyline, which helps to 
reduce opposition to policy change in line with such claims. 
 
 
6.1.6 ‘The discursive creation of macro actors’ 
 
An important mechanism that can be used to prevent the development and use of policy-
relevant knowledge, according to Hajer, is the creation of so-called ‘macro actors’. These 
actors are perceived as being “solely responsible for passing judgement on the true state of 
affairs” (Hajer 1995: 271). In this way a sub-political realm is created in which knowledge 
or policy recommendations cannot be questioned. In Hajer’s study of the acid rain debate in 
the UK the Royal Society was found to be discursively constructed as a macro actor 
countering influence from other policy-relevant knowledge, such as that produced by 
environmental scientists, and preventing it from entering into the discussions. As the 
Labour Government considered advice from business actors to be more important than 
advice from academics or experts (Helm 2003), business actors such as Lord Marshall or 
ACBE played a role as macro actors in the discursive struggles around the climate change 
programme and the Carbon Trust43. The Government followed their considerations and 
                                                 
43 This resonates with the findings of Darkin, who claims that Labour’s approach to environmental issues 
“consistently highlighted the role of business and the importance of the business response to the environment 
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judgement and frequently referred to their advice, which suggests that they can be seen as 
‘macro actors’. This mechanism leads to a powerful position for the macro actor while 
other actors find it hard to challenge the judgement of the macro actor, meaning that their 
influence on policy making will be minimal.  
 
In the Dutch case, the actor usually charged with passing judgement on the true state of 
environmental affairs, which for example monitors carbon emissions and produces 
emission projections for VROM, is RIVM – the Netherlands Institute for Public Health and 
the Environment. RIVM would be the most likely candidate to be seen as a macro actor, 
but it did not provide a long-term outlook, nor did it engage in the debate about how to 
solve persistent environmental problems. One of the researchers promoting the transition 
ideas introduced RIVM’s board of directors to these ideas at the beginning of the 1990s but 
“there was no interest at all” (interview 17). Other advisory councils (SER, VROM 
council) played a role in the discursive developments but none of these actors seemed to be 
able to establish itself as a macro actor. It is worth noting that in Hajer’s study of the acid 
rain storyline he could not detect any macro actor playing an important role. A possible 
explanation for this is that this phenomenon is generally unlikely to occur in consensus-
oriented cultures. 
  
 
6.1.7 ‘Looking for new ideas from outside’ 
 
In both cases, a mechanism which has not yet been described in the discursive 
institutionalism literature can also be seen to have played a role. This can be described as 
‘looking for new ideas from the outside’. The policy learning literature has pointed to 
policy makers’ dissatisfaction with the status quo as a stimulus for looking for lessons from 
elsewhere to dissipate the dissatisfaction (Rose 1991). Uncertainty, negative effects of 
current policy programmes, changes in values, as well as new ideas that raise aspirations 
about what is possible, can all create dissatisfaction. Discourses can contribute to creating 
dissatisfaction by providing alternative framings and new policy ideas. Policy makers may 
                                                                                                                                                    
challenge” (Darkin 2006: 258). According to the ‘New Labour’ framing, policies on the environment were to 
be combined with economic and social progress. 
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also actively search for new ideas because they want to ‘score a point’ by championing new 
initiatives. Politicians are argued to enjoy coming up with new policy initiatives as it looks 
good on their CV and because they ‘need to be seen to be doing something’ once a problem 
has attracted attention. This mechanism again shows how policy decisions are based on 
perceived ‘necessities’ rather than ‘truth’. 
 
In the Dutch case the team of civil servants in charge of preparing NEPP 4 explicitly looked 
for new ideas from outside because of the growing dissatisfaction with NEPP 3 (interview 
7), which was partly amplified by the ‘transitions’ discourse coalition by emphasising the 
myopia of existing policies and suggesting alternatives (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001a). The 
‘transitions’ storyline emphasised that markets and market-based instruments on their own 
would not lead to the desired results, thereby opening up space for ideas for other policy 
initiatives, which enabled the Energy Transition project.  
 
Also in the UK case several interviewees pointed to this ‘need’ to invent something new 
(see for example interviews 5; 7; 10; 14) which tied in with the ‘shift in gear’ (interview 3) 
of the Labour Government with regard to climate change and energy efficiency policies. 
While in the Dutch case this mechanism is helped by institutional features (such as the open 
civil service culture), the civil service in the UK has a low level of autonomy, as argued in 
section 5.5. In the UK case, therefore, ‘looking for new ideas from outside’ was more 
connected with a new government that was trying to act on climate change, and the low 
level of autonomy explains why ideas close to the existing discourse were suggested by the 
civil service.  
 
 
In summary, the case studies confirm some of the mechanisms hypothesised by Hajer and 
Schmidt (see Table 6) and therefore demonstrate that the scope of their theory extends 
beyond the particular empirical fields that each of them studied (environmental policies in 
Hajer’s case and explaining different national responses to the process of Europeanisation 
and globalisation in Schmidt’s case). They also apply to policy initiatives aimed at 
promoting ‘system innovations’ towards sustainability. However, other mechanisms 
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hypothesised by these authors could not be observed in the cases analysed here, which thus 
weakens the claim that these are more general phenomena (the ‘role of disjunction markers’, 
‘symbolic politics’, ‘the social construction of ignorance’, and ‘rhetorical entrapment’).  
 
In terms of the ‘role of disjunction markers’ Hajer describes this mechanism as policy-
making institutions finding “legitimate ways of denying the institutional dimension of the 
eco-modernist challenge” (Hajer 1995: 269). The discourses analysed in both cases, 
however, confirm rather than deny that the challenge of greening electricity systems will 
require institutional changes (e.g. p. 15-18). In terms of ‘symbolic politics’ Hajer describes 
this mechanisms as follows: once a policy problem has become impossible to ignore, a 
highly practical solution is devised (e.g. installing scrubbers to solve the acid rain problem 
through a technical fix) (Hajer 1995: 269-270). Again the analysis of the cases showed that 
both storylines explicitly acknowledged that technical fixes were not enough to solve the 
problem (although technology was deemed important) but that wider changes in institutions, 
organisations, and the economy (CT) or society (ET) more generally were required. In 
terms of ‘the social construction of ignorance’ Hajer referred to cases were “relevant 
knowledge is held apart from the discussion” (Hajer 1995: 272). The analysis of the 
empirical material of the two cases could not find any evidence for this phenomenon. 
 
In terms of ‘rhetorical entrapment’ Schmidt argues that this mechanisms works on the basis 
of expectations of consistency and coherence, so that actors feel obliged to comply with the 
policy implications of discourses they accepted in the past (Schmidt 2008: 212). The 
mechanism as described by Schmidt is a bit ambivalent as linking a new policy proposal to 
an established discourse or norm is also part of ‘positioning and mutual functionalisation’ 
and was covered in the respective section. The distinct feature of this mechanism is that 
actors who have accepted a discourse in the past (even if only for strategic reasons) are 
expected to continue to support it for reasons of consistency. In the Dutch case no 
‘entrapment’ could be found as the transitions storyline was shown to be convincing 
enough to persuade rather then ‘entrap’ actors (see ‘new storylines’ section). In the UK 
case there might have been some ‘rhetorical entrapment’ if one assumes that policy makers 
did not ‘buy’ the ‘innovation gap’ rhetoric used to justify the Carbon Trust, but merely 
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supported it because it relied on a more general discursive commitment to supporting 
innovation which they accepted in the past. However, there was no evidence found during 
the analysis to justify this assumption. Interview evidence rather points to a process of 
persuasion than entrapment (e.g. in interview 26: “The only people who believe in the 
innovation chain are bureaucrats” [emphasis added by FK]). This mechanism therefore 
cannot be considered an important explanatory factor in these two cases. 
 
The case studies also contribute to theory development by suggesting a mechanism not 
identified by either Hajer or Schmidt, which has been described as ‘looking for new ideas 
from outside’. Wider empirical analysis is needed to analyse whether this is a more 
common mechanism.  
 
Table 6 below summarises the mechanisms discussed above with regard to the two case 
studies. It shows the different ways in which mechanisms of discursive politics enable, 
shape and constrain policy and institutional change.  
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Table 6: The discursive mechanisms explaining the case studies 
Mechanisms NL case study UK case study 
‘new storylines transforming interests’ 
 
storyline redefined problem perception of VROM and 
created interests of EZ into long-term change of energy 
system 
 
‘positioning and mutual 
functionalisation’ 
 
‘transitions’ storyline was linked to liberalisation and 
innovation agenda as well as commitment to ‘green 
business opportunities’, which made the storyline more 
acceptable within EZ 
DETR, DTI, Treasury perceived storyline as in 
line with their interests and supported policy 
change 
‘need for sensory experience’ 
 
face-to-face interaction between policy makers and 
researchers fostered trust and led to a process in which 
‘transition’ storyline was created jointly through a 
highly interactive process which gave it credibility 
close cooperation between civil servants and 
members of ACBE fostered trust and helped 
actors to think along similar lines; this cognitive 
resonance was the cement for the discourse 
coalition 
‘structured ways of arguing’ 
 
 storyline resonated with ‘structured ways of arguing’ 
(‘market failure’, environmental concerns, arenas) and 
therefore added credibility to the discourse coalition, but 
also limited the scope for more radical institutional 
change 
‘developing low carbon technologies’ storyline 
built on ‘market failure’ argument which was 
central to legitimising any policy action in 
energy policy 
‘black boxing’ 
 
necessity of a ‘transition’ was ‘black boxed’, which 
helped steer away criticisms that structural change is 
unnecessary and that an optimising strategy might be 
sufficient 
discourse coalition accepted ‘black box’ of ‘no 
picking winners by government’ and used 
argument in favour of setting up independent 
Carbon Trust 
‘the discursive creation of macro actors’ 
  
business actors such as Lord Marshall or ACBE 
had a central role in the discursive struggles 
around the climate change programme and the 
Carbon Trust 
‘looking for new ideas from outside’ 
 
civil servants were looking for new ideas because of 
existing dissatisfaction with NEPP 3, which was 
amplified by the ‘transitions’ discourse coalition 
government demanded ‘shift in gear’; civil 
servants were looking for new ideas 
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In terms of the way in which discourse can lead to policy change, the starting hypothesis of 
this thesis was that political struggles about meaning within existing institutional contexts 
enable, shape and constrain policy initiatives aimed at ‘system innovations’ in electricity 
systems in important ways. Based on the empirical evidence in this thesis, it is argued that 
these struggles about meaning can play out in rather different ways. This thesis suggests 
that there are three distinct ways in which discourses can influence policy change, as 
detailed below. 
 
 
1) New storylines can shape policy change by re-framing policy problems and/or 
changing the perceived interests of actors. 
 
 
In the above discussion it has become clear that several mechanisms (‘new storyline 
transforming interests’; ‘looking for new ideas from outside’; ‘need for sensory 
experience’) effect policy change by reconceptualising the policy actors’ problem 
understanding and/or transforming actors’ interests. By providing a new understanding of 
the policy problem regarding how to make the electricity system more sustainable 
(‘transition’ or ‘developing low carbon technology’), these ideas provided cognitively 
convincing and normatively appealing ways to act and therefore channelled political 
activity in certain directions rather than others. As Fischer pointed out, political power 
struggles are in part played out “through arguments about the ‘best story’” (Fischer 2003: 
x). The case studies highlight these discursive struggles and foreground the cognitive 
dimension of policy processes. This thesis thus strengthens the claim that interests cannot 
be seen exclusively as structurally derived but are dependent on the perception of the 
situation that an actor is in. 
 
 
2) New storylines can be used strategically by actors to promote policy change in line 
with their existing, perceived interests, which can change the policy output when 
compared to the output arising from pure ‘politics as usual’. 
 
However, reconceptualising problem definitions and/or interests is only one way in which 
discourses can contribute to policy change. The thesis also found that in several instances, 
even though the storylines did not challenge the perception of the problem or transform 
188 
 
interests, actors promoted them for their own strategic reasons, which helped to bring about 
policy change. Several of the mechanisms discussed above contributed to this outcome 
(‘positioning and mutual functionalisation’, ‘structured ways of arguing’, ‘black boxing’ 
and ‘discursive creation of macro actors’). ‘Positioning and mutual functionalisation’ in 
particular enables coalitions of actors with differing interests, which can collectively 
change the outcome when compared to ‘politics as usual’. Both case studies have shown 
how the interpretative flexibility of the storylines enabled wide coalitions to be built, which 
helped bring about political change. 
 
This finding resonates with Hay who argued that it is important to distinguish between 
whether a discourse is deemed to be true or simply deemed to be useful by those who 
employ it (Hay 2002: 258). In the first case a discourse or storyline is internalised by an 
actor (ideas are then transformative); in the latter case, it is an actor’s intentional, reflexive 
choice to strategically employ a particular discourse (ideas are then used strategically to, for 
example, justify reforms which would otherwise be difficult to legitimate). Either way, 
discourses are central to this process and can change policy outputs when compared to the 
outputs arising from ‘politics as usual’. 
 
 
 
3) The persistence of institutionalised discursive commitments can block new 
storylines advocating policy change or shape its direction. 
 
The analysis has shown how ‘structured ways of arguing’ pose an obstacle to radically new 
storylines. The storylines analysed in the case studies were therefore tied into these 
accepted discursive formats. Existing ‘black boxes’ also pose obstacles for new storylines 
in terms of creating space for political change. However, the analysis also demonstrated 
how actors can creatively overcome such obstacles by strategically building on ‘structured 
ways of arguing’ to create a viable coalition for enacting policy change. The Dutch case 
study showed how actors succeed in ‘black boxing’ some of the claims of the emerging 
‘transitions’ storyline, which helped to reduce opposition to policy change in line with such 
claims. 
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Analysing discursive politics not only helps to understand policy change, therefore, but can 
also contribute to analysing stability by shedding light on discursive structures. As Hajer 
has argued: “discourse contains structures that can be as effective in resisting policy change 
as walls and barbed wire can in preventing trespassing” (Hajer 1995: 275). Storylines “can 
subsequently themselves become a political reality in their own right and then stand in the 
way of more reflexive institutional change” (Hajer 1995: 269). This is true in the UK case 
study for the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline, which enabled the Carbon 
Trust to be set up but at the same time also prevented more reflexive institutional change, 
as argued above. The way in which the above-analysed mechanisms work shows how 
discursive structures can prevent or at least channel policy and institutional change in 
certain directions. 
  
 
The table below systematically relates the discursive mechanisms discussed to these 
different ways of influencing policy processes, as found in the case studies. 
 
Table 7: Different ways in which discourse influences policy change 
Mechanism 
Reframing policy 
problems and/or 
interests 
Strategic use of 
new ideas 
Institutionalised 
ideas blocking new 
ideas 
‘new storylines 
transforming interests’ X   
‘positioning and mutual 
functionalisation’  X  
‘need for sensory 
experience’ X   
‘structured ways of 
arguing’  X X 
‘black boxing’  X X 
‘the discursive creation 
of macro actors’  X  
‘looking for new ideas 
from outside’ X   
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6.2 Existing explanations of the Energy Transition case 
 
In terms of considering alternative explanations in light of the evidence it is also important 
to look at explanations which other scholars have thus far suggested for the phenomenon in 
question (George and Bennett 2005: 217). This query may only be posed on the Dutch 
Energy Transition case, since such a test is not possible in the case of the Carbon Trust, as 
there is no prior analysis of why and how this policy initiative came about. 
 
So what does the analysis presented in this thesis contribute to explaining the emergence of 
the Energy Transition in the Netherlands in contrast with existing studies? Rene Kemp and 
Derk Loorbach proposed three reasons why transition management was adopted by Dutch 
policy makers (Kemp and Loorbach 2005). These explanations will be discussed in the 
light of the findings presented above.  
 
The first reason given by Kemp and Loorbach is that the iterative aspects and in-built 
flexibility of the transitions management approach helped reduce concerns about future 
control. Those two attributes refer to the management process and the possible 
interpretation of transition management as a top-down control process. Rotmans, Kemp and 
other TM advocates always tried to avoid this interpretation by stressing iterative decision 
making, small steps and modulation as important elements of TM (Rotmans, Kemp et al. 
2001a; Rotmans, Kemp et al. 2001b). The analysis presented above shows that the 
flexibility of the concepts, however, goes significantly beyond that. Transitions are 
interpreted in different ways by different actors and therefore allow different actors to 
identify themselves with this goal, even when their interpretation sits uneasily with the one 
originally formulated by Rotmans, Kemp et al. One example of this is that a business actor 
involved in the energy transition interpreted the ‘simple’ substitution process of unleaded 
for leaded petrol as an example of a successfully managed transition (interview 14). Surely 
the original discourse coalition promoting the ideas of ‘transitions’ would not agree with 
such a narrow interpretation? The point is that the flexibility goes beyond just avoiding the 
impression that transition management is about future control. The ideas of TM are flexible 
in several other senses: with regard to the goals (structural system change versus ‘normal’ 
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innovation), the means (emphasis on participatory process versus elaborate process 
architecture including participation but also control policies), the language (innovation, 
participation, learning) and the role of government (facilitator vs. taking the lead as well as 
putting the regime under pressure). All these flexibilities enabled political and stakeholder 
support for this initiative across a wider coalition of actors than would have been the case 
without this interpretative flexibility. 
 
Secondly, Kemp and Loorbach argued that transition management did not directly threaten 
existing policies, which made it appealing to policy makers. The analysis above confirms 
this finding. Processes of ‘positioning and mutual functionalisation’ created win-win 
situations in which other departments supported the ‘transitions’ storyline because it 
enabled EZ in particular to link TM to their liberalisation and innovation agenda as well as 
their commitment to ‘green business opportunities’. EZ’s endorsement made the storyline 
acceptable for a wider coalition but it also reinforced the storyline. The storyline was seen 
to support EZ’s interest in regaining steering power lost through liberalisation. However, 
TM has in turn been subsequently criticised as a policy approach with a ‘lot of talking and 
no action’ because it linked in with rather than threatened existing policies. So again, while 
this feature of the storyline made it politically more palatable, it also posed difficulties in 
the discourse institutionalisation as the adding on of new initiatives such as the Energy 
Transition did not lead to a coherent policy mix, as hoped by TM advocates (Rotmans, 
Kemp et al. 2001a). Instead, existing goals and instruments are not well aligned with the 
aim of ‘system innovations’ towards a sustainable electricity system (Kern and Howlett 
forthcoming, 2009). 
 
Thirdly, Kemp and Loorbach claim that it proved difficult for sceptics to argue against an 
approach focused on innovation and learning (Kemp and Loorbach 2005: 129). This thesis 
agrees with this point but it needs to be added that it was not only difficult to argue against 
it, but that the language in which TM was presented and the concepts used relied on 
historically specific ways of arguing. The ‘transitions’ storyline, for example, partly relied 
on the familiar market failure argument which is central to legitimising policy action in 
energy policy, and the language around ‘arenas’ spoke to the polder model norms. In 
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addition, there seems to have been a lack of a viable alternative for the central concept of 
NEPP 4, as the discourse coalition promoting the ‘transitions’ storyline was very successful 
in engaging with policy makers involved in the preparation of NEPP 4 and before, 
minimising space for alternative framings. 
 
So what is the value added by the analysis presented above compared to the explanation 
provided by Kemp and Loorbach? On the one hand the analysis confirms their explanation, 
but it also enriches and deepens it by specifying the discursive mechanisms through which 
TM became accepted. On the other hand the analysis also highlights an additional 
mechanism which Kemp and Loorbach missed, which Hajer called ‘structured ways of 
arguing’: the TM language partly appealed to policy makers because it used the familiar 
market failure argument and was close to the polder model language. The analysis 
presented here thus contributes new insights to other explanations of the case. 
 
 
 
6.3 Alternative interest-based explanations 
 
To avoid a ‘confirmation bias’ of the analysis presented above (Bennett and Elman 2006: 
460), it is important to consider possible alternative explanations. Looking at other possible 
explanations is particularly relevant here, as Schmidt and Radaelli have argued that while 
discourse can be an important factor in the explanation of policy change, it is one amongst 
a number of possible factors and should not be considered in isolation (Schmidt and 
Radaelli 2004). In order to contrast the explanation of the cases presented above based on 
discursive mechanisms, the following will consider possible interest-based explanations for 
the emergence and shape of the two policy initiatives. 
 
In line with the discussion in the theory chapter, realist, materialist or rationalist 
explanations of politics generally see the motivation and behaviour of actors as driven by 
maximising personal utility – ideas are seen merely as rationalisations of interests (Fischer 
2003; Price 2006). Material interests are usually hypothesised to be relatively stable over 
time, rational in their attempts to maximise utility, and are therefore to a large extent 
‘knowable’ (Blyth 2002). In line with these claims, it can be hypothesised that both the 
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Energy Transition and the Carbon Trust were the outcome of actors’ attempts to advance 
their self-interests. The question is whether it is plausible that the observed processes were 
driven exclusively by actors’ material self-interest? In the Dutch case, three main groups of 
actors were pushing the energy transition policy initiative – researchers and consultants as 
well as policy makers from different departments. Business actors were less involved. Their 
respective interests will be discussed below.  
 
One could argue that researchers played an active role in developing the ‘transitions’ 
storyline because they wanted to increase their personal influence on policy making and 
thereby boost their professional standing or ‘make a difference’ in solving persistent 
environmental problems. The involved consultants also have an interest in ‘selling’ new 
ideas and tools to policy makers. However, such a generic interest is of indeterminate 
influence on the kinds of policy and institutional changes recommended by such ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ if the aim is simply to gain influence or ‘sell ideas’. It does not explain why 
certain ideas were advocated and subsequently accepted by policy makers and not others. 
 
It can be assumed that VROM policy makers had an interest in reviving environmental 
policy with new concepts to tackle persistent environmental problems as they were looking 
for a key idea for NEPP 4. Again, while this was probably the case, it does not explain the 
kind of new policy approach subsequently adopted. In particular it does not explain why 
nine different departments saw the ‘transitions’ approach as being in line with their own 
departmental interests, which would usually be believed to clash.  
 
The liberalisation agenda was dominant in EZ so energy policy makers were primarily 
interested in promoting short-term economic efficiency and competition in the energy 
sector. The ‘transitions’ storyline partly transformed EZ’s interests, which became much 
more focussed on long-term changes in the energy sector. However, the ‘transitions’ 
storyline also appealed to EZ’s interest in regaining steering power lost through 
liberalisation and in creating business opportunities. While from EZ’s traditional business 
opportunities perspective, marketable new technologies are a desirable outcome, civil 
servants within EZ internalised the ‘transitions’ storyline to the extent that they were self-
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critical of the implementation of the Energy Transition’s focus on technologies (Dietz, 
Brouwer et al. 2008). 
 
Business actors were surely in favour of additional government funding for long-term R&D 
given the focus of their own R&D spending on short-term priorities. But again, this does 
not explain the ‘shape’ of the Energy Transition, as a ‘normal’ R&D programme would 
have been sufficient to meet this particular interest.  
 
 
As for the UK case, the main actors in favour of a Carbon Trust were ACBE as well as a 
group of civil servants mainly from DETR and DTI. Their respective interests will be 
discussed below. 
 
In the UK case study the Labour Government overall had an interest in doing something to 
tackle climate change in order to appeal to green voters as it had made environmental issues 
a key concern in the 1997 election campaign, while at the same time ‘New Labour’ was 
keen to present itself as the representative of the interests of industrial and financial capital 
(Hay 1999; Gamble and Kelly 2001; Ludlam 2004). Civil servants in DETR had an interest 
in fulfilling the ‘New Labour’ Government’s demand for a ‘shift in gear’ in carbon 
reductions and energy efficiency.  
 
However, it is not easy in this case to directly link this interest with the Climate Change 
Levy and the Carbon Trust. Why were these initiatives believed to be appealing to green 
voters and business? Without taking into consideration existing institutions and dominant 
discourses it seems hard to explain why a Carbon Trust was seen as an appropriate policy 
response. The discursive institutional analysis points to its fit with existing discursive and 
institutional commitments around market failures and ‘business solutions matter’.  
 
The Carbon Trust policy initiative addressed the Treasury’s concern for revenue-neutrality, 
gave DETR/DEFRA the opportunity to substantially increase funding for their energy 
efficiency work and was in line with DTI’s interest in promoting low carbon business 
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opportunities44. However, it was the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline which 
created the perception of the new policy initiatives as a win-win-win situation in which it 
simultaneously helped to advance the interests of all the main departments involved. 
 
Why did the large manufacturing companies represented in ACBE not oppose the CCL? 
According to interview evidence, business actors were against the CCL unless there was a 
recycling mechanism to avoid additional tax burden. According to this line of reasoning the 
Carbon Trust was therefore a result of ‘politics as usual’ as the Government needed to 
make concessions to industry to achieve business acceptance of the CCL. This ‘deal’ is 
only in line with ACBE’s interests if the recycling more then compensates their additional 
tax spending. It is unclear whether this was believed to be the case. Even with overall 
recycling mechanisms in place, some individual companies will pay more levy then they 
will gain from the reduction of national insurance contributions. The exemption of energy-
intensive businesses from the CCL might have contributed to securing ACBE’s agreement 
in this respect. However, a complementary explanation could be that a committee charged 
with advising government on environmental issues at that point in time had been entrapped 
(Schimmelfennig 2001) in the climate change discourse (meaning that it could not 
legitimately oppose the idea of climate change) and could therefore not oppose a market 
instrument aimed at reducing emissions. In line with sociological institutional thought and 
its ‘logic of appropriateness’, one could argue that the discourse made it impossible for 
ACBE to oppose something which was not in their economic interest. This was crucial as 
without business support for the CCL, ‘New Labour’ – who wanted to appeal to businesses 
– would not have implemented these policies. More research would be necessary to see 
which of these two hypotheses holds. 
 
ACBE’s main interest in the Carbon Trust was, as they openly stated, to “allow greater 
business involvement in recycling of revenues” (ACBE 1999: 2). ACBE therefore preferred 
the introduction of a new organisation such as the CT over adding a business stream to the 
EST, which already had a board and where the receipts might be less effectively ring-
                                                 
44 An interviewee confirmed that it was the business support part of DTI rather than the energy part of DTI 
that took an interest in the CT idea (interview 3). This supports the hypothesis that DTI’s main interest in the 
CT was because of its potential to create business opportunities. 
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fenced. Opposition to the Carbon Trust came from certain business actors who profited 
most from the spending of the EST (such as ACE or BEEF). They also argued that energy 
efficiency should have the priority, which was more in the interest of their constituents45. 
Also, the EST itself lobbied for having a business stream alongside its domestic stream of 
work. These examples show how interest-driven lobbying took place during the discussions 
about the possibility of setting up a Carbon Trust. They show how incumbent business 
actors were trying to influence the policy development in line with their own interests. 
However, more analysis would be needed to ascertain why some business actors were more 
successful (ACBE) in lobbying for their interests than others (ACE, BEEF). Typically 
rational choice scholars would argue that actors with more resources are more powerful. A 
simple reference to interests does not provide an explanation of why the Government 
decided to set up the Carbon Trust separately from the Energy Saving Trust, unless ACBE 
is hypothesised to be more powerful then other business actors. In this case one would need 
to specify on what resources this power is based (for example material, discursive, 
structural). In ACBE’s case, access to Cabinet members, combined with the breadth of the 
discourse coalition, including civil servants from DETR/DEFRA, green NGOs and Lord 
Marshall, as well as support from the Treasury and the Prime Minister might have tipped 
the power balance towards ACBE. The argument is that while ‘politics as usual’ played a 
role in this policy process, it does not necessarily explain the policy outputs without a 
reference to broader discursive developments which add credibility and legitimacy to some 
interests more than to others. 
 
In summary, instances of interest-driven ‘politics as usual’ played a role in driving the 
policy processes analysed, but do not on their own provide sufficient explanation for the 
shape of the policy initiatives and the dynamics of the policy process. Through a rational 
choice lens the ET can be seen as the product of free-thinking civil servants trying to 
advance their departments’ interests, and entrepreneurial researchers who wanted to gain 
policy influence. It was facilitated by consultants who earn a living selling new ideas and 
concepts. However, such an explanation does not convincingly explain the shape of the ET. 
                                                 
45 ACE being the Association for the Conservation of Energy and BEEF being the British Energy Efficiency 
Federation. 
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Nor does it explain how the ideas of the ‘transitions’ storyline were created or the process 
by which they convinced policy makers from nine different departments that the 
‘transitions’ storyline was in line with their own departmental interests. The CT can be seen 
as having been adopted because it was viewed to be in the interests of the ‘New Labour’ 
Government overall, as well as large, energy-intensive businesses. The specific shape of the 
CT as a business-led, independent company allows large businesses more influence on CT 
spending. Arguments based on rational choice theory are less convincing when it comes to 
explaining why the CCL policy ideas were not opposed by business and why ACBE ‘won’ 
against ACE, BEEF and the EST. The agreement of the different departments involved in 
the CCL and the CT relied on them perceiving these policy initiatives to be in line with 
their own departmental interests, which had to be created discursively. 
 
The overall argument is that while rationalist or material explanations offer some useful 
insights, they are not on their own able to account for the shape of the policy initiatives or 
the dynamic processes leading to these policy outputs. The examples show how the 
perceived interests of actors interact with discursive and institutional factors. The general 
argument is that while ‘politics as usual’ plays a role in these two policy processes, it does 
not necessarily explain the policy outputs without reference to the broader discursive 
developments that add credibility and legitimacy to some views more than others, or that 
create certain perceptions of interests. 
 
On the other hand the analysis presented in chapters 4 and 5 has shown that the analytical 
framework has been better able to explain the emergence of ET in the Netherlands and the 
CT in the UK as a process of discursive struggles within an institutional context, than it has 
the practices of their implementation. An explanation of the processes and shape of the 
implementation of the policy initiatives relying solely on institutional and discursive factors 
is incomplete. Other factors that were decisive in terms of why the implementation of the 
storyline took a certain shape emerged from the analysis (such as the CT’s need to 
legitimise its activities as distinct from other actors). Section 7.4 on ‘avenues for future 
research’ will return to that point. 
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6.4 The relationship between discourses, institutions and 
interests in policy change 
 
The debate about the explanatory value of discourse versus interests versus institutions is a 
long-standing one in the social sciences. As pointed out earlier, the aim of this thesis was 
not to resolve this debate, but rather to elucidate the ways in which discourses can make a 
difference to policy outputs (discussed in section 6.1) and the ways in which discourses 
were found to interact with institutions and interests in the two cases studied. 
 
The 2x2 matrix below (see Figure 12) clarifies the expected policy outputs based on the 
relationship between new discourses and existing institutions as well as new discourses and 
existing interests of the main actors involved in a policy field. The two cases are positioned 
within this matrix according to the analysis presented above. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The relationship between discourse, interests and institutions in policy change 
  Relationship between new discourse and existing 
institutions 
 
 
New discourse and 
existing institutions are 
mutually supportive 
New discourse 
challenges existing 
institutions 
New discourse 
reflects existing 
interests 
 
 
little or no policy change Policy change in line 
with new discourse Relationship 
between 
new 
discourse 
and existing 
interests 
New discourse 
transforms 
existing interests 
 
 
Path-dependent evolution 
of policies  
Radical policy change 
(‘punctuation’) 
 
 
UK 
NL 
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The Energy Transition was intended by the discourse coalition promoting it to challenge 
existing institutional norms and practices (such as polder model consensus-orientation, 
focussing instead on frontrunners) which could have led to radical policy change. However, 
it was implemented in line with these norms and therefore led to a path-dependent 
evolution of policies, given the fact that the storyline partially transformed the interests of 
EZ. Otherwise little or no policy change could be expected to arise from the emergence of 
the storyline. In the UK case the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline mainly 
reflected existing discourses and interests and was largely in line with institutional norms 
and routines (such as the separation of policy making and delivery, and market-based 
policies). However, the new storylines challenged certain institutional norms (technology-
neutral policy) and therefore led to some degree of policy change in line with the new 
storyline. This matrix enables more systematic thinking in explaining and predicting the 
likely outputs of policy processes depending on the interplay of discourses with institutions 
and interests. Radical policy change is only expected to occur when a new discourse 
transforms existing interests and successfully challenges existing institutional commitments.  
 
 
6.5 Limitations of the analysis 
 
The case studies also point to a number of limitations of the kind of analysis developed in 
this thesis.  
 
As discussed above, at times it has been difficult to discriminate between alternative 
explanations, such as whether a storyline is used strategically by actors following existing 
self-interests or whether it has transformed their interests. The process tracing methodology 
used in this thesis has enabled various insights into these processes, but because of potential 
strategic response biases of interviewees it is not always possible to clarify the interplay 
between discourses and interests sufficiently. As pointed out earlier, Schmidt argued that 
discourse is a complicated variable as “the ideas it articulates cannot easily be separated 
from the interests that find expression through it” (Schmidt 2003: 129). The evidence 
available was not in all cases sufficient to rule out competing explanations and it is 
therefore important to be reflexive and transparent about these limitations. However, the 
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overall findings about the role of discursive politics in policy processes are considered 
robust and resonate with findings in the pertinent literature (e.g. Laird 2001; Blyth 2002; 
Campbell 2002).  
 
Another limitation of the analysis is that it is very difficult to determine the relative 
importance of the discursive mechanisms discussed, because there is no obvious way of 
measuring their importance. A simple counting of the number of instances in which they 
occur does not take into consideration that single instances (for example a new storyline 
transforming the interests of a key actor) can be sufficient to drive policy change. An 
additional difficulty in assessing their relative importance is that the mechanisms can 
interact. They can be cumulative (‘new storyline’ transforming interests of some actors and 
linking up with some existing interests of other actors through ‘mutual functionalisation’) 
or they can counter each other (e.g. new storyline creating pressure for change versus 
‘black boxing’ presenting obstacles to change). Further consideration is necessary to devise 
methods capable of solving these issues. 
 
The empirical evidence allows the conclusion that the policy changes observed were driven 
by a number of mechanisms. However, there is a chance that some of the observed patterns 
are contingent on particular conditions being present in the two case studies. The outcome 
of each mechanism might be different under circumstances that differ from those studied 
here and different mechanisms can produce the same empirical result (Sayer 1992: 108). 
Research that is based on two case studies does not allow certainty about the functioning of 
each mechanism and, in particular, the question of under which conditions it leads to which 
outcomes is unclear. However, one can be more confident in the overall pattern: in both 
cases discourses, institutions and interests interacted in a variety of ways to produce the 
analysed policy change. The corroboration of the results through other case studies would 
allow a better understanding of the nature of each of the mechanisms under different 
circumstances (see section 7.4 on future research avenues). 
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7 Conclusions 
 
This thesis has analysed the role of discursive politics in policy initiatives aimed at 
governing ‘system innovations’ towards sustainable electricity systems. It has analysed two 
cases in depth (chapters 4 and 5) and has drawn out theoretical implications by looking 
across the two cases (chapter 6). This chapter will present the conclusions of this thesis by 
answering the research questions posed in chapter 1. 
 
 
7.1 Answering the research questions 
 
In order to investigate the politics of policy initiatives aimed at stimulating ‘system 
innovations’ towards sustainable electricity systems, three research questions were posed. 
Each will be answered below. 
 
 
1. How are the national governments in the UK and the Netherlands trying to foster 
‘system innovations’ towards more sustainable electricity systems? Why were the two 
policy initiatives designed and implemented in the described ways? 
 
 
The Dutch Government in its Fourth National Environmental Policy Plan published in 2001 
acknowledged the existence of a variety of persistent environmental problems such as 
climate change and argued that systemic change in societal systems such as energy is 
necessary to achieve sustainability. It has subsequently set up a policy initiative, the Energy 
Transition led by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to manage the transition towards a 
more sustainable energy system. The project led to a number of institutional changes and 
initiated a stakeholder process aimed at exploring transition pathways by conducting 
transition experiments supported by government funds. The details of this initiative have 
been set out in chapter 4. 
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In contrast, as part of the UK 2000 Climate Change Programme, the British Government 
set up a company limited by guarantee, financed by government but independent in its 
management and charged with the task “to accelerate the transition to a low carbon 
economy” (Carbon Trust 2007a). This organisation, the Carbon Trust, helps companies and 
public sector organisations to reduce their carbon emissions, supports the development of 
low carbon technologies as well as the deployment of existing low carbon technologies and 
provides policy advice to government. Since being set up in 2001 the Carbon Trust has 
seen substantial growth in its funding and has developed a variety of innovative funding 
vehicles to fulfil its mission. The details of this initiative have been set out in chapter 5. 
 
Both policy initiatives have been promoted by a coalition of actors who discursively 
produced a normatively appealing and cognitively convincing storyline which enabled this 
policy change to happen. These storylines framed the policy challenge in particular ways, 
which partly shaped the substance of the policy initiatives. In the Netherlands a coalition of 
civil servants and researchers used a routine policy strategy development process to 
promote a new ‘transitions’ storyline which emphasised the necessity of structural change 
in societal subsystems and contributed to an acknowledgement that existing policy 
approaches had failed. This discourse coalition emerged during the 1990s through a series 
of sustainable technology programmes and co-produced the central elements of a ‘transition 
management’ approach. The ‘transitions’ storyline enabled the Energy Transition to be set 
up. The case study also shows how the implementation of the initiatives faced obstacles 
posed by institutional rigidities such as existing norms and practices, which led to a capture 
of the process by incumbent companies and a falling back on quite traditional instruments 
to stimulate innovation rather than initiating broader societal learning processes.  
 
In the UK a coalition of business actors and civil servants used a window of opportunity 
when the UK 2000 climate change programme was introduced to promote a ‘developing 
low carbon technology’ storyline which emphasised the necessity of having an independent, 
business-led organisation to promote the development of low carbon technologies and 
energy efficiency by recycling receipts from the Climate Change Levy. This discourse 
coalition strategically used concerns about competitiveness to argue for direct support for 
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the deployment and development of low carbon technologies. The storyline is closely 
linked to the dominant discourse around market solutions to tackle climate change. The CT 
thus focussed on technological innovations and the commercialisation (‘route to market’) of 
these technologies. However, through its policy advice work the CT also challenges 
government thinking around the efficacy of market instruments such as the renewables 
obligation and argues for technology-specific instruments. The case study highlights some 
of the institutional barriers this organisation is facing, such as EU state aid rules. 
 
A number of discursive mechanisms found in the literature where shown to play a 
substantial role in explaining why the two policy initiatives were designed in the described 
ways. In terms of the implementation of these storylines in policy practices, the suggested 
framework faced difficulties in explaining some of the detail of the discourse 
institutionalisation. 
 
 
 
 
2. To what extent have they delivered on their stated aims in terms of outputs and 
outcomes? 
 
In terms of outcomes, as ‘system innovations’ are long-term processes, it is too early to tell 
whether the policy initiatives will lead to ‘system innovations’ in the long run, but a 
number of indicators are available to judge what they have delivered so far (such as funding 
for projects, tonnes of carbon saved, future potential savings).  
 
Both policy initiatives were set up in 2001 and have since funded a variety of activities 
hoped to contribute to ‘system innovations’ in the electricity system. In both cases non-
trivial resources have been invested by the government and private actors. The Energy 
Transition funded projects through the UKR and EOS-DEMO scheme between 2004 and 
2007 with €160.2 million, which levered private expenditure of €1237.1 million (see Table 
3 and Table 4). The Carbon Trust’s programme spending amounted to £285.6 million 
during the same period (see Figure 11). The leverage of private expenditure of the Carbon 
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Trust’s Innovation programme has been 1:2 and for its venture capital investments 1:10 
(NAO 2007b: 5). 
 
In terms of realised savings of carbon dioxide emissions, the latest available estimates for 
both initiatives show that the projects funded under the initiatives have contributed to 
cutting emissions. As for the Dutch case study, in terms of the projects funded under the 
UKR and EOS-DEMOS scheme, these led to a CO2 emission reduction of 3.484 million 
tonnes/year between 2004-07 (see Table 3 and Table 4). For the EOS-DEMOS projects a 
so-called ‘theoretical repetitive potential’ is calculated in case the technologies 
demonstrated in these projects are implemented in the market46. The ‘Energy Innovation 
Agenda’ report estimates the potential of these technologies to be about 22.3 million tonnes 
of CO2 reduction annually (SenterNovem 2008: 113). As for the UK case, according to an 
assessment by the National Audit office,  
“In 2006-07, the advice and financial support for measures to reduce 
carbon dioxide provided by the Carbon Trust resulted in an estimated 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by its customers of between 1.2 
million and 2.0 million tonnes. … In addition the Carbon Trust estimates 
that its work supporting the development of low carbon technology up to 
March 2007 could lead to an annual reduction of between 13.7 million and 
20.7 million tonnes of carbon dioxide by 2050” (NAO 2007b: 5)47. 
 
In a broader sense, the Energy Transition has contributed to a ‘sense of opportunity’ 
regarding sustainable energy among policy makers and business actors. According to 
SenterNovem, the “Energy Transition has led to successful results in various sectors in the 
Netherlands”48. SenterNovem points to the following examples: the growing market for 
bioplastics, the use of carbon from industrial processes as fertiliser in greenhouses, and the 
refurbishment of social housing with innovative energy-saving technology. The large 
number of stakeholders involved in the seven transition platforms and their 15 working 
                                                 
46 The report points out that it is difficult to assess whether or not this potential will be fulfilled as this 
depends on assumptions such as opportunity for success, market developments and knowledge dissemination 
as well as investment climate. 
47 Again, predicting such potential impact is difficult. The CT has developed a tool to estimate the technical 
potential for future carbon dioxide savings related to specific technologies and the market potential with and 
without the Carbon Trust’s intervention. This has been reviewed by KPMG which has provided an assurance 
statement on the Carbon Trust’s application of this methodology (NAO 2007b: 24) 
48 See http://www.senternovem.nl/energytransition/dutch_approach/results.asp; last updated: 06.02.2008. 
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groups, as well as the leveraged private sector spending on transition experiments and 
technology demonstration projects, shows the interest and commitment of stakeholders to 
work towards a sustainable energy system. Within government the number of civil servants 
involved in managing the Energy Transition has increased from 5 to 60 over the last years. 
The Energy Transition also received mainstream public attention for the first time when the 
transition taskforce’s first report made it onto the eight o’clock national television news. 
The facilitation of stakeholder innovation networks to select specific themes for the future 
energy system to work on, to identify obstacles and opportunities, to come up with strategic 
visions, and to conduct concrete projects to learn about diverse options is an achievement, 
which has also led to some institutional change as outlined in chapter 4. 
 
 
In a broader sense, the Carbon Trust in the UK has arguably had an influence on business’s 
awareness of the importance of climate change and commitment to cutting carbon 
emissions (interviews 5; 13; 20; 22; 24). In particular it is claimed to have “reshaped UK 
industry’s attitude to climate change so I think there are lots of businesses who see it as a 
business opportunity, not a regulatory constraint. And that’s an amazing achievement” 
(interview 5). In terms of impact on business behaviour, the CT has been running an energy 
efficiency accreditation scheme “which has made some difference” (interview 22). The 
CT’s enhanced capital allowances scheme is claimed to have had an influence on business 
behaviour by forcing energy efficiency standards, which was “quite intelligent use of that 
opportunity” (interview 3). This area also includes carbon management services, such as 
energy audits for large companies and public sector organisations, which the Carbon Trust 
created (DEFRA 2006) and “now carbon management is a common term” (interview 23) 
and a lot of companies have implemented emission reduction strategies (interview 6). The 
latest area of work has been on carbon footprinting and product labelling, where the Carbon 
Trust’s work is beginning to really shape the way companies think about their supply chain 
emissions (interviews 6; 22; 23).  
 
 
However, an important remaining question is whether these activities will in the long term 
contribute to ‘system innovations’ towards more sustainable electricity systems. Here, the 
most that is possible is an informed guess.  
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As for the Energy Transition, the long-term vision of the project to cut carbon emissions by 
40-60% by 2030 and aiming at structural change in the energy system by 2050 is ambitious. 
Combining these goals with a process architecture aimed at learning and stakeholder 
involvement is novel (Kern and Smith 2008: 4101). The ET has largely followed the 
original TM suggestions in terms of the architecture of the initiative but the process was 
captured by incumbent actors and has been narrowed down (focus on technologies, focus 
on economic opportunities, focus on incumbent actors, neglect of behavioural or lifestyle 
issues), so it is doubtful whether it will achieve its original ambitions (Kern and Smith 
2008). Furthermore, liberalisation is still an important goal of Dutch energy policy, which 
makes it difficult to achieve a transition in the long term as some of the instruments are 
more aligned with that short-term goal rather than with the long-term aim of ‘system 
innovation’ (Kern and Howlett forthcoming, 2009). However, capacity-building through 
the Transition Competence Centre, which is training future transition professionals, or the 
continued interaction with researchers might enable more traction of the policy initiative in 
the future if support from a broader power base is achieved. 
 
As for the Carbon Trust, it has developed a variety of novel funding mechanisms which 
seem sensible and useful for contributing to ‘system innovations’ by supporting niche 
actors and providing useful advice to businesses and policy makers and by increasing 
awareness for the need to move to a low carbon economy. However, the mindset with 
which it operates is too narrowly focussed on business opportunities and less so on the 
wider social processes underlying innovation (for example, public acceptance, skills or 
network building). While it has sometimes adopted a systems view, such as with smart 
metering, the main thrust of its programmes is on technology acceleration. The analysis 
presented here has raised doubts about the possibility for a change in this respect as long as 
the dominance of the discourse around markets delivering the solutions to climate change, 
given the right incentives, is not challenged more substantially than has been the case thus 
far. While dismantling dominant discourses which have become embedded in institutions is 
a difficult endeavour (Scrase and Ockwell 2009), maybe the current macro-economic 
climate in conjuncture with the devolution process provides just this opportunity. However, 
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it is also important to note that the policy landscape has changed radically since the Carbon 
Trust was set up: while the 2000 Climate Change Programme and the 2003 Energy White 
Paper favoured a future electricity system based on (small-scale) renewable technologies, 
for which the Carbon Trust was a useful funding vehicle, policy debate now centres around 
large scale options like offshore wind farms, carbon capture and storage technologies, and 
nuclear power has made a political return. A variety of large funding initiatives (such as the 
Energy Technologies Institute as a ten-year £1 billion public–private partnership) have been 
set up. While a transition to a secure and low carbon economy is still the declared policy 
goal, ideas about what such a system could look like and what would be suitable policy 
mechanisms to help bring it about have changed substantially. In the context of the setting 
up of the ETI a senior civil servant responsible for energy policy in DBERR commented:  
“the CT has somehow managed to get itself into a space where it was 
really quite important in marginal energy technologies [such as marine] 
but not very important in mainstream energy technologies [such as 
nuclear]” (interview 4). 
The Carbon Trust thus faces the challenge of continuing to be seen as an effective 
organisation in contributing to a transition towards a low carbon and secure economy. 
Otherwise the likely change in government at the next election might jeopardise the future 
of the Carbon Trust. 
 
 
3. What are the political constraints and difficulties that each has encountered, why do 
these arise and what are the lessons for government initiatives aimed at fostering 
innovation towards more sustainable energy systems? 
 
 
In terms of political constraints and difficulties and why these arise, the analysis has shed 
light on several discursive mechanisms and the interplay of ideas with existing institutional 
arrangements and interest-based politics. The analysis can be summarised in four central 
claims, as set out below. 
 
First, new storylines can create potential for policy and institutional change if the discourse 
coalition constructing and promoting them can appeal to existing or emerging values and 
cognitive commitments while at the same time recasting them into new directions. The 
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analysis showed how both emerging storylines had to tie in with existing discourses (for 
example the commitment to liberalisation, privatisation and market mechanisms), which 
illustrates just how powerful these are. The case study analysis shed light on the difficult 
rhetorical balancing act of claiming that the neoliberal discourse is not enough to achieve a 
sustainable transformation of the electricity system, but without alienating actors 
committed to this dominant discourse. This balancing act requires political diplomacy on 
the part of the involved discourse coalitions. New storylines either need to address or re-
align interests of key actors. 
 
Second, a number of mechanisms such as ‘new storylines transforming interests’, 
‘structured ways of arguing’, ‘positioning and mutual functionalisation’ etc have been 
highlighted in the analysis. Some mechanisms can have a double-edged sword nature: 
while the interpretative flexibility of storylines might increase their acceptability for a 
wider coalition of actors, in the implementation of policy initiatives such flexibility can 
easily lead to a ‘watering down’ of the ambitions of the storylines and a capture by 
incumbent interests. The ET initiative was embraced by incumbent actors but was then 
‘watered down’ in its implementation. Open contestation has not taken place but capture 
has constrained the ability of the policy initiative to lead to more radical policy change. The 
outlined mechanisms help to understand and explain the dynamics of these policy processes. 
 
Third, the analysis has shown that a clash of emerging storylines with established 
discourses is not the only way to achieve policy change. The UK case study demonstrates 
that a new storyline which is largely in line with the dominant discourse can also lead to 
quite substantial policy and institutional change by rallying existing interests and building 
coalitions across actors which do not necessarily have shared interests. 
 
Fourth, the analysis has shown that interest-based politics played a role in explaining some 
of the features of the implementation of the ‘developing low carbon technology’ storyline 
in the Carbon Trust. Even in situations of uncertainty, interests still play a crucial role in 
explaining policy outputs. This reinforces the recursive understanding of interests and ideas. 
The politics of implementing new policy initiatives are not only influenced by the interplay 
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of existing discourses, emerging storylines and institutions, but also by interest-based 
politics. 
 
 
These claims support the theoretical hypothesis underlying the thesis, which is that 
discursive struggles and their institutional context enable, shape and constrain political 
change through contestations of meanings and re-ordering of understandings. However, it 
has also been acknowledged that such explanations need to be complemented by interest-
based factors and that contestation or reframing of interests is not the only way in which 
discourses influence policy processes.  
 
 
The analysis has highlighted that the discursive interplay between actors is also influenced 
by institutional factors. Formal as well as informal institutional rules can both enable and 
constrain the ‘room to manoeuvre’. Both initiatives have met institutional constraints which 
have limited their ability to contribute to wider policy and institutional changes. These 
constraints partly derive from a ‘misfit’ of the new initiative with existing institutional rules 
(such as EU state aid provisions) and partly from the persistence of existing routines (such 
as the familiar use of cost benefit analysis or polder model practices). Even when a 
storyline committed to different practices is accepted, in the concrete institutionalisation of 
the storyline the suggested practices were adjusted to be in line with polder model routines 
(as civil servants ‘are infected by polder model ideas’; interview 17). New storylines also 
face difficulties when they challenge dominant discourses that have been embedded in 
powerful formal, institutional arrangements (such as the commitment to competition, which 
has been institutionalised in Ofgem). However, the recent changes to the remit of Ofgem 
show that it is possible to alter even such formal institutions if pressure for change abounds. 
 
 
In terms of the policy lessons learned from this analysis, the next section will detail the 
policy recommendations drawn from this thesis. 
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7.2 Policy recommendations 
 
This thesis was aimed at providing analytic explanations rather than at producing policy 
recommendations. Nevertheless, the policy initiatives analysed in this thesis address a 
crucial and topical policy problem so it is important also to use the analysis to reflect on 
possible policy recommendations. 
 
The most important message for policy makers emerging out of this thesis is the need to 
recognise that attempts to steer ‘system innovations’ towards sustainable electricity systems 
are political, not just economic or technological, challenges. ‘System innovations’ are 
political processes which have to overcome both technological and economic as well as 
institutional lock-in and path dependency. Too often, especially in the framing of the 
problem in the UK, but also in the academic debates about transition management, steering 
towards sustainability is seen as unproblematic. The recommendation to policy makers is to 
admit that these processes are political and to make the underlying political choices more 
transparent.  
 
The second lesson is about the possibilities for policy learning49. The two case studies 
confirm that governing socio-technical change is politically challenging and that policy 
recommendations under the banner of ‘transition management’ are therefore too managerial 
and functionalistic. Nevertheless, academics in the UK have thus far viewed the Dutch 
transition model as an inspiring approach which could possibly be used to complement the 
UK’s policies in this area (see e.g. Foxon and Pearson 2007; Geels, Monaghan et al. 2008; 
POST 2008; Steward 2008). The ‘spill-over’ of some of the TM ideas into the UK 50 
suggests that policy learning is possible; as does the political science literature on policy 
learning, lesson-drawing and policy transfer (Rose 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Smith 
2004).  
                                                 
49 Dolowith and Marsh define policy learning broadly as a “process in which knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting” 
(2000: 5). 
50  For example at the beginning of September 2009, the Scottish Government co-funded a workshop 
organised by the Institute for Advanced Studies which investigated the possibilities of managing the Scottish 
transition to a sustainable energy system. Another example is a DEFRA-commissioned SPRU report on the 
possibilities of fostering ‘transformative innovation’ (Scrase, Stirling et al. 2009). 
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However, the analysis presented above raises serious doubts about whether the application 
of the Dutch approach would be politically feasible in the UK given the existing 
institutional structures and dominant discourse commitments. How can such learning be 
achieved if policy initiatives do not travel easily because of different institutional and 
discursive commitments? From the analysis presented in this thesis a number of important 
observations can be raised:  
- the active ‘translation’ of key ideas of a storyline into different social, cultural and 
political contexts is important51; 
- it is necessary to connect new ideas with established discourses; 
- researchers with ambitions for acting as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ can facilitate policy 
learning across institutional contexts. 
 
It is important to stress that policy learning is not a one-way street. The ‘transitions’ 
problem-framing which became dominant in the Netherlands is but one way to try to foster 
structural change in electricity systems. Based on a different discourse the UK Government 
implements a quite different approach. Dutch policy makers should also embrace some of 
the experiences made in the UK. The institutional context in the UK and the ‘developing 
low carbon technologies’ storylines led to an approach to fostering the transition to a low 
carbon economy that is, first, broader in the sense of simultaneously tackling the niche and 
regime level (whereas the Dutch energy transition has focussed too much on the niche level 
to date) and, second, more innovative in terms of funding vehicles. Third, overall funding 
for the transition is higher in the UK. So despite the rhetoric of ‘managing a transition’ in 
the Netherlands, it is in fact arguably the case that the UK is ahead of the game in some 
respects.  
 
As a consequence this thesis recommends that both countries can learn from each other’s 
experiences so far. Dutch policy makers can learn from the experience of the Carbon Trust 
                                                 
51 This resonates with findings from the policy transfer literature which shows that lesson-drawing is “best 
considered as a creative act, rather than as a process of copying” (Rose 1991: 21). Dolowitz and Marsh 
distinguish between copying (direct and complete transfer), emulation (transfer of the ideas behind the 
policy), combinations (mixture of different policies) and inspiration (policy in another jurisdiction may 
inspire policy change but policy does not actually draw on original) (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 13). 
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with the introduction of more innovative funding vehicles, and could combine fostering 
niches with greening the regime, and should consider possibilities for increasing the budget 
of the Energy Transition. UK policy makers can learn from their Dutch counterparts about 
the value of visioning and backcasting exercises, about the open and strategic choice of 
technological pathways complementing expert analysis, and about institutional 
arrangements better able to facilitate policy coordination (such as the IPE in the energy 
transition) across the wide range of initiatives in the UK. Whereas the Dutch energy 
transition follows an explicit overall process architecture which includes strategic learning, 
the ‘funding the best projects and firms’ approach of the Carbon Trust is not an adequate 
strategy.  
 
So what does all of this mean in terms of the possibilities for achieving sustainable 
electricity systems? Several concluding observations can be made. First, the two case 
studies show that promising and ambitious policy initiatives have emerged in both 
countries to explicitly tackle the challenge of transforming existing electricity systems. This 
is a sign for optimism. Second, there is no policy or institutional ‘silver bullet’ available to 
tackle this challenge as countries vary in their institutional settings as well as in their 
dominant discourses and interest constellations. Therefore there is no one ‘right’ way of 
framing the problem, which leads to a variety of policy initiatives with different outcomes. 
This diversity is helpful as it breeds innovation and provides ample scope for lesson-
drawing in many directions (Rose 1991). An analysis such as the one presented above can 
increase the reflexivity of policy makers and stakeholders with regard to alternative 
framings of the policy problems and possible solutions. Third, coalitions of actors with the 
‘right’ ideas can make a difference in bringing about policy and institutional change despite 
being constrained by existing discourses, interests and institutions.  
 
 
7.3 The contribution of this thesis 
 
The thesis makes three distinct contributions to knowledge: 
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1. From a political science perspective, a contribution has been made by showing how 
concepts from Hajer’s discourse analysis framework can be fruitfully combined 
with Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism framework in order to explain policy and 
institutional change by studying the interplay of discourses and institutions. The 
thesis confirms the ability of the framework to explain why the two governments 
have come to deal with the challenge of transforming electricity systems in quite 
different ways and how and why the analysed policy initiatives are being 
implemented in the ways they have been. However, the analysis also showed that 
processes of interest-based politics were important for explaining the policy 
processes. The analysis corroborated several of the discursive mechanisms 
identified by Hajer and Schmidt but also identified a mechanism neglected in this 
literature thus far. The thesis systematically grouped the mechanisms according to 
the way in which they influence policy processes. The evidence provided in this 
thesis adds weight to a recursive understanding of interests and ideas. 
 
2. This thesis’ starting point was the claim that the politics of governing ‘system 
innovations’ have so far received insufficient attention in the transitions literature; 
yet the thesis has shown that politics is fundamentally important in such processes. 
A contribution is made to the growing ‘transition management’ literature by 
shedding light on the politics of the adoption and implementation of transition 
management ideas into Dutch energy policy. The thesis also provides the first 
analysis of the emergence and implementation of a different approach to 
transforming electricity systems in the UK context, as institutionalised in the 
Carbon Trust. The contribution of this thesis has been to explain why and in which 
ways government attempts at steering ‘system innovations’ towards sustainability 
are politically challenging. 
 
3. By highlighting the importance of the interaction between discourses, interests and 
existing institutions, the results provide an input to scholarly debate and policy 
making alike in ways that offer to help inform the rethinking of strategies for 
214 
 
fostering socio-technical change. A number of policy recommendations have been 
made. 
 
The following section will outline potential avenues for future research and concludes this 
thesis. 
 
 
7.4 Avenues for future research 
 
There are a number of potentially fruitful avenues for further research building on the 
findings of this thesis. Three possibilities will be briefly discussed below. 
 
The thesis focussed on two case studies. However, as the framework developed for the 
analysis is hoped to be broadly applicable, it would be interesting to look at other ‘system 
innovation’ policy initiatives in countries which also have ambitious, long-term carbon 
reduction goals such as Germany or Finland. To draw on a wider empirical base would 
allow a strengthening or modifying of the claims made in this thesis. As both the 
Netherlands and the UK are unitary countries, it would be particularly interesting to 
contrast these cases with an analysis of similar policy processes in a federal system such as 
Germany. As the communicative discourse was relatively weak in its influence on the 
policy initiatives in both of the cases studied here, it would be potentially fruitful to study 
initiatives in policy areas which attract wider public attention. In the context of ‘system 
innovations’ towards sustainable energy systems the policy controversies surrounding 
nuclear power as well as biofuels could provide this opportunity. 
 
It has been argued that the discursive institutionalist approach was only partly able to 
account for the ‘fine grain’ of the institutionalisation of the storylines in the Energy 
Transition and the Carbon Trust. Further analysis in this respect could shift the focus onto 
bureaucratic politics. One hypothesis is that while storylines were important for the 
explanation of the emergence of the two policy initiatives, they become secondary 
compared to organisational self-interests in the institutionalisation of the storylines. 
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Instances like the struggle of the CT to prove itself against competitor organisations such as 
the EST, the TSB or ETI suggest that these processes play a role in determining the 
behaviour of organisations to some extent. Attending to bureaucratic politics, and shedding 
light on organisational factors and the motives of bureaucratic agencies, could therefore 
enhance the analysis presented here which has focussed on the overall political process. 
The public administration literature offers useful concepts for studying such phenomena. 
The classic model of bureaucratic politics was developed in the 1970s as a response to the 
conceptualisation of policy decisions as rational decisions by government as a unitary actor, 
which are then implemented by the administration (Allison and Halperin 1972). Allison and 
others suggested adjusting the conceptual lens to look at governmental decisions as the 
outcome of bargaining. Allison and Halperin object to using the term ‘implementation’ as it 
implies a too-simple understanding of ‘carrying out’ policies, which underplays a great 
number of lower-level decisions that shape policy practices. This understanding of the 
relationship between policy making and administering policy implementation breaks with 
the traditional model of administration. It assumed that there is “a strict separation between 
matters of policy, which are formally the province of politicians, and matters of 
administration, which are left to the public service” (Hughes 2003: 25). According to 
Allison and Halpering policy implementation cannot be seen as a separate, objective, 
politically neutral activity. Scholars in this field have widely studied how agencies use their 
professional expertise “to define or enhance issues through the interpretation of relevant 
information; to restrict or enhance the flow of information; or to cloud policy proposals 
with ambiguous information” in order to compete successfully with other agencies in the 
policy process (Ellison 2006: 1272). This conceptual lens is thus close to and compatible 
with the discursive institutional approach taken in this thesis. Understanding bureaucratic 
politics as agency competition can potentially provide further insights into the 
implementation of the Energy Transition and the Carbon Trust initiative.  
 
Finally, a third potentially fruitful possibility for studying discursive politics in the context 
of ‘system innovations’ towards sustainability in the future is to utilise the approach 
developed in this thesis to pursue investigations into the directionality of innovation. This 
thesis has focussed on explaining policy processes. It would, however, also be highly 
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important to look at the choice of directions of innovation processes receiving support in 
the context of policies aimed at ‘system innovations’ and how this is shaped by processes 
of discursive politics. Stirling has convincingly argued that innovation needs to be thought 
of as a vector and not a scalar (2009). He points out that innovation has not only a scale and 
a time dimension (that is: how much innovation and at what pace?), but it also has a 
direction: supporting research, development and deployment of solar panels or carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) technologies are very different socio-technical pathways. These 
sets of technologies have very different implications for the future of electricity and in 
particular for the question of whether future electricity systems will rely on small-scale, 
decentralised or large-scale, centralised provision of power. CCS and nuclear power are for 
instance appealing for actors who are part of the existing electricity regime, because they 
do not disrupt the current socio-technical structure of electricity provision relying on large-
scale, centralised provision of power (Scrase and Smith 2009). As transitions are open-
ended processes and a multitude of sustainable electricity futures are conceivable, how and 
why do policy initiatives come to support some pathways over others? Partly this will have 
to do with technological and economic considerations, but Stirling argues that a multiplicity 
of technically-feasible and potentially economically-viable options exist in this space 
(Stirling 2009). So, again, it is sensible to assume that because of uncertainty and 
disagreement about the future technical feasibility and economic potential – as well as the 
social desirability – of any of these options, processes of discursive politics will also play 
an important role in selecting the most promising pathways.  
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9 Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A: 
 
List of interviews conducted for the Dutch case study: 
 
Position of interviewee Interview 
date 
Interviewee 
code 
Policy advisor from the Ministry of Economic Affairs 16.01.06 1 
Researcher I 14.02.06 2 
Researcher II  14.02.06 3 
Researcher III 14.02.06 4 
Member of the Taskforce Energy Transition 15.02.06 5 
Platform secretary 16.02.06 6 
Representative from Competence Centre Transitions 16.02.06 7 
NGO member of a platform 17.02.06 8 
Representative from Innovation Network Agriculture 17.02.06 9 
Researcher IV 21.02.06 10 
Business representative, ex-member of platform 21.02.06 11 
Policy advisor from the Ministry of Economic Affairs 22.02.06 12 
Representative from an environmental NGO 23.02.06 13 
Business representative, member of platform 27.02.06 14 
Policy Advisor from the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs 
28.02.06 15 
Business representative, member of platform 01.03.06 16 
Researcher V 06.03.06 17 
Researcher VI 14.03.06 18 
Researcher VII 07.03.06 19 
Researcher VIII  24.05.06 20 
Researcher IX 10.03.06 21 
Business representative, ex-member of platform 04.04.06 22 
Researcher X 15.03.06 23 
Policy advisor from the Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment 
28.02.06 24 
Representative from Competence Centre Transitions 16.02.06 25 
Energy Consultant I 10.03.06 26 
Energy Consultant II 10.03.06 27 
 
 
 
 
List of interviews conducted for the UK case study: 
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Position of interviewee Interview 
date 
Interviewee 
code 
Policy advisor of business association 19.10.07 1 
Member of senior management of Carbon Trust 16.01.08 2 
Former senior civil servant at DETR (DEFRA) 13.03.08 3 
Senior civil servant at DBERR 08.02.08 4 
Member of Carbon Trust steering board 08.02.08 5 
Head of Policy of environmental organisation 03.03.08 6 
Former senior civil servant at DETR 06.03.08 7 
Former ACBE member 31.01.08 8 
Senior researcher 05.02.08 9 
Senior civil servant at DBERR 08.02.08 10 
Member of the Carbon Trust board 12.02.08 11 
Senior civil servant, DEFRA 14.02.08 12 
Civil servant, DEFRA 14.02.08 13 
Representative of alternative technology organisation 05.02.08 14 
Representative of business association 11.02.08 15 
Managing Director of marine device developer 18.02.08 16 
Senior management, Carbon Trust 19.02.08 17 
Technology manager, Carbon Trust 19.02.08 18 
Senior civil servant, DBERR 13.02.08 19 
Senior researcher 28.02.08 20 
Lecturer in renewable energy policy 22.02.08 21 
Business member of Carbon Trust board 03.03.08 22 
Senior management, Carbon Trust 05.03.08 23 
Senior management, UKERC 12.03.08 24 
Professor for Energy Policy 17.03.08 25 
Former senior management, Carbon Trust 10.03.08 26 
 
 
 
Appendix B: 
 
Example of interview schedule 
 
 
Interview with XXX, member of the Carbon Trust board 
 
Intro 
• Thank him for his time – remind him, is it OK that we talk for no more than one 
hour? 
• Explain aim of my PhD project (explain energy innovation policy to support 
sustainable energy systems) and purpose of interview (explore why CT was set up, 
learn about ‘first hand’ experiences of how it works; your view on its role in the 
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context of all the other government initiatives and its achievements and problems so 
far in promoting low carbon technologies, etc.) 
• Ask if recording is ok? 
• Ask him if he has any questions before we start. 
 
 
Main themes to discuss 
 
Process of setting up the CT:  
• Why was it deemed necessary/important? Why new institution? Which ‘void’ did it 
fill? Why form of company? What is its main role? Why independent from 
government/EST? What can it do better than government or other existing bodies at 
that time (given complaints about too many new initiatives)? Why was it considered 
“ground breaking” by Ms Hewitt? 
 
He was Chairman of the ACBE Climate Change Working Group: what role did ACBE 
play?  
• What impact did they have on the way the CT was set up? Did the Government 
listen to the two reports it published? Did the original idea of a Carbon Trust come 
from ACBE? How independent is the CT from the Government? This was one of 
the main concerns of the second report (independent from changing governments, 
independent to make sure the benefits go back to business paying the levy; 
maximise business influence). 
 
What has changed through the CT in the area of low carbon energy policy (innovation, 
technology)?  
• Impacts on energy policy; areas not affected? How does this happen in practice? 
Examples of when this has happened? Influence on renewables policy?; wider 
energy policy? Did the CT change the way the ministries and different groups 
within government work together? What role does the Carbon Trust play in 
advising the government on policy issues? What is its influence in this respect? 
How does it consider wider socio-economic factors which hinder the move towards 
a low carbon economy? Influence on practices, investment decisions by companies? 
 
Crowded context: how the Carbon Trust works together with government departments, the 
EST, the TSB, the ETI, etc; how are priorities coordinated? What is the division of labour?  
 
Governance of the CT: role of board?  
• How far are they involved in strategic direction CT is taking? Setting of priorities 
(based on which criteria are technology areas chosen? How does it work? How 
often do they meet?) 
 
How the Carbon Trusts engages with other stakeholders (beyond businesses and 
government as was initially thought to do)? 
• (Some decisions might be political: biomass: first or second generation, 
sustainability etc., why not environmental groups involved?); does it publish its 
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strategic framework for public consultation (as suggested when CT was set up)?; are 
there any stakeholder advisory groups? 
 
Your personal view on:  
• What are the main achievements and challenges of the work of the Carbon Trust so 
far? [Mention some criticisms of other people: BCC critique: neglects SMEs, too 
difficult to get info; focus on carbon as single success criteria (biofuels debate?); 
focus on technology fix?; focus on cost effectiveness and commercial gain like 
venture capital?; cannot address the valley of death, innovation gap?; business 
matters, other stakeholders neglected? National audit office: impact low? Focus on 
supply and large user-demand while separating the households?] 
 
If time allows: 
• Why did the Carbon Trust happen in the UK? Why not in the Netherlands, 
Germany? Same problems everywhere, only in UK this kind of institution: cultural 
dimension? 
 
 
De-briefing 
 
• Mention some of the main points learned, interviewee might want to comment on 
this feedback; 
• Say ‘have no further questions’, ask if the interviewee has any questions or ‘do you 
have anything else you want to bring up before we finish?’; 
• Are there any important points which you think I have missed or should know?; 
• Recommendation for other potential interviewees? 
 
 
 
